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INTRODUCTION 
A LOOK TOWARD THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF FEMININE GAZE 
 
 
 
 
A first glance over the gaze 
 
Vision has always had a double value in western culture: at the same time 
primary means among the other senses of knowledge, and means of sin and 
mistake. Science, aesthetics and also technology have always been fascinated by 
the mechanism that allows the eye to connect the mind to the outside world, and 
by the power of imagination which is still difficult to understand if related to vision 
or not. 
The fascination with vision in western culture was born with Plato and the strict 
relation among the eye, light and the sun it comes from, which is the supreme 
knowledge that men once belonged to and some of them can still reach. This 
fascination, however, became problematic during the seventeenth century, 
particularly thanks to Descartes study on Optics. Here the severing between the 
sensory eye and the eye of the mind was introduced, leading at once to the 
separation between the subject and the object of knowledge, but also to the 
separation between the pure intellect and illusory perception. 
This fascination never fell down, and the studies on gaze carried out in the 
twentieth century are one of the most interesting research fields within visual 
culture and, more in general, cultural studies, considering all the complex 
mechanisms that trigger from the practices of the gaze in terms of power, gender 
and social conditioning. 
In introducing Techniques of the Observer Crary provokes the question on how 
the definition of “the observer of 19th century” can be posed, wondering, at the 
same time, if such a large generality can be defined for the 19th or any other 
century. Of course, the answer is implicit in the purpose he explains: to study not a 
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single kind or model of observer (and not of a spectator1) individuated in a space 
and in a time, but a field of forces, rules and arrangements that all together shape 
an observer in a defined society. Thus, claims Crary, a «self-present beholder to 
whom a world is transparently evident»2, never existed, he can “only” suggest 
some of the conditions which allow the foundation of a dominant model by which 
vision has been «discussed, controlled and incarnated in cultural and scientific 
practices»3. 
Precisely the question of a dominant model will be at stake in this research, 
which will try to provoke other questions on the ways in which non-dominant 
models of vision have tried to spread out in a historical and social period, as 
dramatic as the 19th century was, and as revolutionary as it still appears. This 
century is the 17th, and the non-dominant model of vision4 is that of the female 
gaze.  
Some of the same tools proposed by Crary will help us in achieving this goal. I 
mean the tools necessary to detect the breaks, the ruptures in an established 
visual culture5: the significance of some optical devices, and the interlocking of 
literary and scientific knowledge and practices. As Crary has already pointed out, 
optical devices are significant not only as material objects of a history of 
technology, or for the models of representation they imply, but mostly, for what 
concerns us, as «points of intersection where philosophical, scientific, and 
                                            
1
 Crary makes clear the reason why he chose the term “observer” instead of “spectator”: «Unlike 
spectare, the latin root for “spectator”, the root for “observe” does not really mean “to look at”[…] In 
a sense more pertinent to my study, observare means “conform one’s action, to comply with”, as in 
observing rules, codes, regulations and practices. Though obviously one who sees, an observer is 
more importantly one who sees within a prescribed set of possibilities, one who is embedded in a 
system of conventions and limitations», Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision 
and Modernity in Nineteenth Century, Cambridge-London, MIT Press, 1992, pp. 5-6. 
2
 Ivi, p. 6. 
3
 Ibidem. 
4
 Ivi, p. 7. 
5
 The first treatment of this term in the sense we nowadays intend was in The Art of Describing by 
Svetlana Alpers. She took the term from Michael Baxandall, and used it to show how «in Holland 
the visual culture was central to the life of the society. One might say that the eye was a central 
means of self-representation and visual experience a central mode of self-consciousness. If the 
theater was the arena in which the England of Elizabeth most fully represented itself to itself, 
images played that role for the Dutch. The difference between the forms this took reveals much 
about the difference between these two societies. In Holland, if we look beyond what is normally 
considered to be art, we find that images proliferate everywhere. They are printed in books, woven 
into the cloth of tapestries or table linens, painted onto tiles, and of course framed on walls. And 
everything is pictured-from insects and flowers to Brazilian natives in full life-size to the domestic 
arrangements of the Amsterdammers. The maps printed in Holland describe the world and Europe 
to itself», Svetlana Alpers, The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in The Seventeenth Century, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1983, p. XXV. 
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aesthetics discourses overlap with mechanical techniques, institutional 
requirements, and socioeconomic forces. Each of them is understandable not 
simply as the material object in question […] but for the way in which it is 
embedded in a much larger assemblage of events and powers»6. The very 
accurate example taken by Crary is that of the camera obscura «as paradigmatic 
of the dominant status of the observer in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries»7. It produces an objective, almost disembodied vision that, as we will 
see, puts the observer at a distance from “his” object, and is supposed to give no 
chance of acting on it. A dominating, scientific and uncontested gaze operating 
through microscope and telescope as well. We should wait till the romantic thought 
and the nineteenth century discussions on it to discover a new priority for the 
subjectivity of vision, anyway related only to poets and artists, and still excluded by 
empiricists and positivists.  
Furthermore, even a feminist position such as that of Donna Haraway stresses 
the importance the analysis of technology can take in order to understand how 
ways of life, social orders and practices of seeing effect our knowledge and 
intervention in the world8. In Haraway’s opinion, not only the “histories” of science 
are all “histories” of technology, but they are about skilled practices: «How to see? 
Where to see from? What limits to vision? What to see for? Whom to see with? 
Who gets to have more than one point of view? Who gets blinkered? Who wears 
blinkers? Who interprets the visual field? What other sensory powers do we wish 
to cultivate besides vision? Moral and political discourse should be the paradigm 
of rational discourse in the imagery and technologies of vision»9. All these 
questions put at stake many of the most important issues about vision, especially 
for what concerns the gender matter implied in it: the situating of the view, the 
reason why we see or, moreover, the reason why we care so much about vision, 
and, even, the chances we can or can not offer to the other senses. However, the 
most important questions expressed by Haraway are those that introduce the 
uncanny possibility of unequal positions within the same field of vision, in which 
someone can wear the blinkers, someone else can hold the blinkers, and yet 
                                            
6
 Jonathan Crary, op. cit. p. 8. 
7
 Ibidem. 
8
 Donna J. Haraway, Situated Knowledges. The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of 
Partial Perspective, in Muriel Lederman, Ingrid Bartsch (ed.), The Gender and Science Reader, 
London-New York, Routledge, 2001, pp. 169-188. 
9
 Ivi, p. 177. 
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someone else, perhaps from a higher point of view than all others, can interpret 
the whole field of vision, that is the complex and contested terrain in which 
subjects, objects and instruments act from different points of view. That is why we 
need a political and moral paradigm to analyze vision rather than a scientific one. 
First of all, continuing in Haraway’s discussion, the instruments of vision are 
probably the main responsibilities of compounding the meanings of disembodied 
vision. In fact, that is the primary characteristic of the capitalistic, colonialistic, 
maschilistic power that accords to vision as a means of knowledge no apparent 
limits, or, at least, limits that can be easily and increasingly exceeded thanks to the 
optics technologies themselves. In this way, supported by optical devices, vision 
becomes an “unregulated gluttony” of the infinity of visibility gradually evolving 
from divine myth – or, at least, a “god-trick” – to an ordinary practice, from the 
illusion of seeing everything from nowhere to the form of a «cannibal-eye of 
masculinist extra-terrestrial project»10. This means in no way, as we will soon see, 
that a feminist discussion should abandon any project about vision or about 
analysis and use of optics. On the contrary it could well represent a politics of 
positioning, since it mediates standpoints, making us aware of the mediated nature 
of vision. This gives light to a new imagery of vision in which privileged and 
subjugated positions unveil their cultural, social, historical construction. 
Another tool, a very significant one, is delineating the way a particular visual 
culture shapes different kinds of observers. It stays in the interrelation between art 
and science and in the ways they condition the observer – which little by little is 
becoming more instable than we presumed at first – through new forms of 
experiment in visual representation, not only in terms of institutional and economic 
requirements, but also in symbolic and psychological ones. This is the way in 
which material objects or technological discourses affect literary and artistic 
expressions, shaping their topics and their structures11. Thus, new observers are 
                                            
10
 Zoe Sofoulis, Through the Lumen: Frankenstein and the Optics of Reorigination, Santa Cruz, 
University of California at Santa Cruz, 1998 (Phd Thesis). 
11
 Fundamental studies of the relation between the structure of a scopic regime and that of a 
contemporary form of literature – which is called structural homology – are those of Phillippe 
Hamon and Max Milner. Hamon studied the homology between the scopic regime of world's fairs 
and the nineteenth-century French fiction in P. Hamon, Expositions, littérature et architecture au 
XIXe siècle, Paris, José Corti, 1989, and that between the scopic regime of photography and the 
French narrative of the same period in P. Hamon, Imageries. Littérature et image au XIXe siècle, 
Paris, José Corti, 2001. Milner is the author of the study on the phantasmagoric imaginary and the 
fantastic in nineteenth-century, M. Milner, La fantasmagorie. Essai sur l’optique fantastique, Paris, 
PUF, 1982. 
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created not only by lenses but also by the pages of books celebrating or 
contesting them.  
Not too surprising, the question of the non-dominant model is what Crary will 
not examine: «What is not addressed in this study are the marginal and local 
forms by which dominant practices of vision were resisted, deflected, or 
imperfectly constituted. The history of such oppositional moments needs to be 
written, but it only becomes legible against the more hegemonic set of discourses 
and practices in which vision took shape»12. 
The claim of hegemony cannot pass unobserved in a field research as that of 
cultural studies. Such a central term has been coined by Antonio Gramsci in his 
Prison Notebooks, especially in the sections devoted to the role of intellectual in 
modern society13. Hegemony is one of the forms that power can assume in 
opposition, or better in cooperation, to dominion. While the latter acts by means of 
dictatorship – and it is operated by political society – the former is the function of 
organizing consent assigned to civil society, particularly the organic intellectuals. 
Cultural hegemony is thus definable as the organization of consent through 
ideological structures and their institutions. Power is not expressed through force, 
rather through a rational and sentimental influence leading to persuasion. In this 
way it affects thought and the whole way of life. This is precisely the point in which 
the dream of Marxist revolution failed: in not having fully comprehended the extent 
of the cultural instruments of control – school, media and religion. Through these 
media the workers have been manipulated in accepting dominant ideology, being 
that of the bourgeois or the religious, without being conscious of that.  
If it is true that some intellectuals become organic to the structure, others 
maintain their traditional role of the outsider, independent by dominant group. 
Moreover every man is an intellectual, because he (or she) has a proper 
worldview, and can provoke new ways of thinking. He or she can do that by means 
of language, for example, that is a crystallized manifestation of a worldview and 
thus both means of hegemony and of subaltern. Every man and woman, then, has 
in him(her)self the means to resist to this hegemony, even using the same material 
                                            
12
 Jonathan Crary, op. cit., p. 7. 
13
 Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni dal carcere, a cura di Valentino Gerratana, Edizione critica 
dell'Istituto Gramsci, Torino, Einaudi, 1975, trans. J. A. Buttigieg, Prison Notebooks, New York, 
Universiy of Columbia Press, 1996, vol. II, pp.. 201-202. 
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instruments of dominating class. Revolution is no longer something to be a 
struggle with violence, but with a systematic opposition. 
Quite twenty years later in translating Binswanger’s Dreams and Existence14, 
Foucault defined image as a crystallization that prevents reason from going 
beyond perceptual aspects of form. It is, as well as Gramsci’s language, a 
crystallized worldview. In fact, the production, the distribution and the consumption 
of images are part of cultural hegemony, particularly in our age. They seem to be 
particularly dangerous when they are supposed to be neutral, an objective 
representation of reality.  
One of the main points of focus of this project will be to demonstrate how 
images have always been instruments of hegemony’s propagation. Especially 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, when scientific images 
encountered non-scientific worlds, producing wonder and new knowledge, and 
vision was at the beginning of its “mechanical” age. Some outsider intellectuals 
foresaw the danger in which the non-dominant classes could have been incurring 
if they did not apprehend what these images really were and how did they work. 
Among these intellectuals there were some as marginal as women. 
 
 
Subjects and objects 
 
As we have already seen throughout these first lines, two terms are constantly 
recurring, those of subject and object, which could seem obvious at a first glance 
over the gaze. But the question is far from being obvious or still foreseen, being 
founded on all the deeper questions teasing visual culture and not only. 
First of all, the question of the relationship between subject and object produces 
a strong impact when we focus on who the subject is, meaning the active part of 
the process of vision, and, on the other hand, who or what the object is, meaning 
the passive part of the game. In so speaking we are already playing in a very 
contested terrain leading to such cultural and political topics as those related, for 
instance, to the colonial gaze and to gender questions, in as much as western 
culture is fundamentally based on a male subject, often colonialist, and on a 
                                            
14
 Michele Foucault, Ludwig Binswanger, Dream and Existence, Atlantic Highlands NJ, Humanities 
Press, 1985. 
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female object, often colonized. This is the way in which western gaze used to act, 
almost since the Renaissance till the nineteenth century, holding a central 
perspective by which mastering at a distance all the history and nature belonging 
to him, female nature included.  
The distance between observer and observed is exactly the topic on which the 
claim of objectiveness, mostly in science, has been funded, and has covered the 
techniques of observing throughout the modernity. Just this claim of objectiveness 
has been questioned by the philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth century, 
that from different points of view has unveiled the constructiveness and the 
partiality of this model, and has revised five hundreds years of western culture. 
Particularly the question related to gender is one of the most debated within this 
topic, because of the difficulties experienced by psychoanalytic theories first, and 
then by feminine critics in defying the nature and the action of female gaze. 
 
 
Field 
 
The complex mechanisms, we have already talked about, are set in motion by 
the social arrangements and relationships in which gaze usually acts, that is, in 
one word, the scopic regimes that, from cartesian view on, have influenced the 
operation of the gaze15.  
Each scopic regime is somehow a more complex version of Alberti’s visual 
pyramid which connects the eye of the painter, the subject of the picture and the 
eye of the observer through the painting, considered as an open window, and 
insofar nearly transparent. 
In modern theories the field of investigation extends from the arts and cinema, 
to scientific, ethno-anthropological or pornographic observations. In this 
enlargement and this multiplication the same scopic regimes seem to be 
profoundly changed and analysis should focus on each of the elements that 
constitute them: perceiving subject – and not only a creative one –; perceived 
object – being it more or less able to return the gaze of the subject –; the medium 
by which one perceives – that is, the device that allows the perception, directing, 
                                            
15
 Norman Bryson, Vision and Painting: The Logic of Gaze, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1983. 
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and thus characterizing the gaze –; the environment in which visual process 
happens, and finally the image, as the product of the cooperation or fight among 
these elements. 
One of the fundamental assumptions of contemporary visual culture is that each 
of these elements can change the entire structure of vision, producing different 
and often competing regimes. Indeed, in Martin Jay words «the scopic regime of 
modernity may best be understood as a contested terrain, rather than a 
harmoniously integrated complex of visual subcultures, whose separation has 
allowed us to understand the multiple implications of sight»16. The most significant 
implications arise, as we have already seen, from the relationship between the 
subject (active) and object (passive) of sight, depending on the type of regime: the 
relationship between doctor and patient, in fact, is different from that which is 
established between the biologist and his test sample, or between the painter and 
his model, or even between the colonizer and the colonized. 
Recent theories in visual culture have found general agreement in defining the 
operation of the Western gaze as sexually oriented, that is made to conform to the 
male model. In Ways of Seeing John Berger defines in this way the male/female 
relationship in gaze practices: «Men look at women. Women watch themselves 
being looked at [and become] an object of vision a sight»17. 
Subsequent arguments of Foucault, made in Surveiller et punir18, on the power 
relations established in prison, but also educational and health regime of the 
panopticon, have supported the hypothesis of a coercive power of the sight, 
generally if not exclusively exercised by man. 
 
 
Not only visual culture 
 
The issue affects many areas of investigation typical of cultural studies, in 
addition to the aforementioned visual studies. Many disciplines have been, in fact, 
interested in the elements and mechanisms of scopic regimes: psychoanalysis, by 
Lacan onwards interested in the functioning of the gaze in particular during 
                                            
16
 Martin Jay, Scopic Regimes of Modernity, in N. Mirzoeff, a cura di, Visual Culture Reader, 
London and New York, Routledge, 2001, pp. 66-67. 
17
 John Berger, Ways of Seeing, New York, Penguin Group, 1972, p. 47. 
18
 Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir, Gallimard, Paris, 1975. 
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childhood mirror stage, philosophy, especially in French philosophy of twentieth 
century, but also post-colonial studies interested in human exotic objects of the 
Western gaze. 
However, the approach most affecting this research is that related to gender 
and women's studies, of those disciplines, namely, that especially in the twentieth 
century have undermined the patriarchal structure of society and of Western 
culture in all ages, showing how the male/female opposition is culturally and not 
naturally determined. Starting from these studies, articulating the concept of 
gender either as an issue to «track, discuss, criticize, deconstruct» or as a «tool 
that allows the focus of the relationship between a woman and another»19, we can 
now review not only the operation of the Western gaze – so far monopolized by a 
male vision in which the woman remains desperately object – but the whole story 
of the woman as the subject of another sight, not only independent observer of a 
visual object, but also a producer of visual objects other than those of men and of 
equal dignity. 
In an attempt to examine the female gaze, and identify with, rather than 
differentiate from, the male one, and to liberate women from their objectification, 
the gender scholars have turned their attention to different fields where the 
modern gaze, of male and female, acts. The most interesting studies are split 
between the fields of film studies, art history and science studies. 
Studies analyzing the operation of the gaze in cinematographic regime are 
generally based on the themes of psychoanalysis. The fundamental contribution, 
which is now a classic on the subject, is certainly Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema (1975), in which Laura Mulvey, analyzing Hollywood films, found a 
conventional presentation of woman as object of male gaze20. This is a convention 
so rooted in Western culture practices that woman herself ends up being 
conditioned, and realizing, through the phenomenon of identification, a reductive 
exhibitionist position, rather than a rebellion against the sadistic male gaze. The 
male/female dichotomy in American cinema would, thus, confine itself to the 
connection look/to be looked, the concept of female to-be-Looked-at-ness in the 
words of Laura Mulvey.  
                                            
19
 A. Taronna, Women’s Studies, in M. Cometa, R. Coglitore, F. Mazzara, a cura di, Dizionario 
degli studi culturali, Meltemi, Roma, 2004, p. 530, my transl. 
20
 Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”, in «Screen», n. 3, 1975, pp. 6-18. 
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These conclusions on the female role in the mechanism of the gaze, have given 
rise to controversy within and outside the feminist community. First of all Mary Ann 
Doane tried to oppose the study of Mulvey on male cinema through a study of 
films made for female spectators in the '40s21. In an attempt to transform woman 
from a passive object to an active subject, Doane studied the way in which the 
objectness of woman, often seen as source of her own masochism, does not 
propose the same male model, but resists it through its own tools. As we will see, 
using the masks white men attributed to blacks and women, is a common strategy 
between these two marginal “subjects”. 
One of the most important contributions within this research field, and more 
specifically, within the perspective of gender history, is given by the 
reinterpretation of art history through the lens of feminism of Griselda Pollock. The 
author of Vision and Difference seeks to define the specific vision of women in 
history from the creative potential of women, even able to change the history of 
art. If this discipline has never considered the contribution of women in Western art 
it is because even it pursues the patriarchal model, and, moreover, because 
women were forbidden to access places of artistic canonization, which have 
always been considered unsuitable to women. Confined in closed areas of 
domestic life, and forced to address their artistic skills on subjects of secondary 
value, women were excluded from art history and included in the category of the 
curious, as subjects who showed artistic skills, although not in the biological and 
intellectual conditions suitable to do that. Despite the enslavement of their 
intelligence and their creativity, women have in every age tried to fight their 
condition. It is the task of modern women historians to reconstruct the history from 
the perspective of these few but important artists. Adopting a Marxist view of the 
study of history and society Pollock says:  
 
To know that society has been patriarchal and sexist means that you reject the idea 
that the oppression of women is divinely ordained, or biologically, psychologically 
inevitable. (To know that society is capitalistic means that you reject the inevitability of 
wage labour and capitalists’ profits). In studying art we want refined understanding of 
relation to and positions on that knowledge or social experience.22 
 
                                            
21
 See Mary Ann Doane, Film and the Masquarade: Theorizing the Female Spectator, in «Screen», 
n. 3, 1982, pp. 74-87, e id, The Desire to Desire: The Woman’s Film of the 1940s, Bloomington, 
Indiana UP, 1984. 
22
 Griselda Pollock, Vision and Difference, London and New York, Routledge, 2003, p. 41. 
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Another field which could well work in analyzing feminine gaze is that one 
related to the studies on science and gender, or more precisely, related to both 
feminist theories and social studies of science. The connection between these two 
different fields of analysis has been conducted by Evelyn Fox Keller – from a 
scientific point of view – and Carolyn Merchant – from an historical point of view –, 
trying to identify the relationships between science, society, gender:  
 
Such a venture come into being with the meeting of two apparent independent 
development in recent scholarship: feminist theory and the social studies of science. 
The second has changed our thinking about the relation between science and society – 
without however considering the role of gender – and the first has changing our way of 
thinking about the relation between gender and society but has been only peripherally 
concerned with science.23 
 
However what I would stress here is the way in which these approaches all 
move within a particular notion of vision, the same notion that brings some 
thinkers, such as Sartre and Lacan, to demonize it, others, such as Merleau-
Ponty, to defend its nobility, or to criticize and denigrate it, as Foucault and Jay do. 
The point of view that will lead this project will be divergent in attempting to 
delineate the possibility of a different notion of vision, in the way some new 
frontiers of gender and visual studies are doing, and in the way some previously 
have done. I am here referring to the study of vision in science, anthropology and 
society, which the three thinkers we will focus on throughout this research, did in 
an unexpected period, the early modernity. 
 
 
Corpus, horizons and objectives 
 
To understand the relationships and conditions relating to such a cultural and 
social experience waiting to be reviewed through the female perspective, next to 
the study of art history it will be useful to examine other fields of culture where the 
contribution of women has been underestimated if not finally forgotten. 
In this sense it is interesting to observe how, during the period of scientific and 
political revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Second Sex 
                                            
23
 Evelin Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, New Haven and London, Yale University 
Press, 1985, p. 4. 
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has been able to take advantage of small spaces left by a cultural structure in 
crisis. In fact, there seems to be a female contribution to the rewriting of history 
through a research on the scientific vision of women, in the era in which the same 
oppressive patriarchal model faltered, because of new findings under the 
microscope and the telescope, and women curiosity was allowed, just for 
pleasure, access to the same tools that would build the modern science. 
At the end of the seventeenth century, in fact, a strange participation of women 
in the cultural climate that would produce a new discipline spread, natural 
philosophy, a scientific approach that was born from the collaboration between 
empirical observation and philosophical speculation. It is the time when the 
Copernican revolution is being imposed through the studies of Galileo and Kepler, 
and in which the microcosm enter into debate on the plurality of worlds through 
studies by Leeuwenhoeck and disclosures by Hooke. 
The new interests and new questions, lead the discussions outside the scientific 
and philosophical academies and scientific societies, and, through magazines and 
works of disclosure, reach wider layers of amateurs who dabble in physics, 
astronomy, micrographs, opening up new horizons and themes for literature. 
This is the age in which the Scientific Lady was born:  
 
By the late seventeenth century, upper-class English women were noticing and 
reacting to the economic and educational advances men had made...they argued that 
differences in male and female achievement stemmed not from female intellectual 
inferiority, but from differences in childreading practices, educational opportunities, and 
social position...leading the way towards recognition of women as student of the new 
philosophy was Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle.24 
 
The end of this period seems to be particularly interesting in the words of 
Donna Haraway, because:  
 
Feminism as western political theory can be said to begin at the same historical 
moment and for the same historical reason as the discourse of biology and 
anthropology, with roots in the eighteenth century and flowering in the nineteenth 
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century. In this period the organism – animal, personal and social – became the 
privileged natural-technical object of knowledge. Organisms were structured by the 
principles of the division of labor. The special efficiencies derived from the separations 
and functional management of the new scientific entities called race, sex, class had 
particularly strong effects.25 
 
Among the amateurs, travelers, and the "journalists" who lived and spread this 
revolution, especially in England, three women seem to have contributed to 
modern European culture. They are the poet and natural philosopher Margaret 
Cavendish, the traveler Aphra Ben, and Eliza Haywood, the sole curator of Female 
Spectator between 1744 and 1746. 
The Duchess of Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish is a prime example of active 
participation in the scientific discussion of her contemporary. In 1666, a year after 
the publication of Sir Robert Hooke's Micrographia, a member emeritus of the 
Royal Society, Duchess published, with the help of her husband, a treatise entitled 
Observations on Experimental Philosophy, as opposed to the theories recognized 
by the Royal Society and contesting them, although with some ingenuity. What 
makes this work a strong affirmation of a female point of view, completely opposite 
to the male and socially shared one, is the novel that follows the philosophical 
treatise: The Description of a New World Called The Blazing-World, was written to 
amuse the scientific thoughts and to cheer the readers with a «variety of shapes». 
Through this appendix Cavendish proves to be something more than an author of 
modern times. Her new world, in fact, is not just a fantastic building, but a real 
building: against society and science, against ancient and modern. If through the 
new instruments men had an opportunity to change the structures of the world a till 
then known, reconsidering their own position and that of the “others”, women also 
seem to profit from this. Thus, our author shows her worldview, an upside down 
world, where the exterior becomes interior. Her world is bright because the light 
comes from within the stars: the sky is in the innermost room of the kingdom. In 
such a continuous short circuit between different levels of reality, the author 
identifies herself so closely with her heroine that her real soul is embodied in the 
unreal body of the protagonist. A possession, however, that doesn’t become total 
control of the life of the other, but complete sharing, as if two different beings, but 
of the same gender, could coexist in the same body. Patriarchal and phallocentric 
                                            
25
 Donna J. Haraway (ed.), Primate Visions. Gender, Race, And Nature In The World Of Modern 
Science, New York-London, Routledge, 1989, p. 289. 
 15 
society is hurt again when the two female souls end up owning the real body of the 
Duke of Newcastle, husband of the author. The continuous reversal of reality 
made by this extraordinary thinker, placed on the sidelines of a scientific treatise, 
is in itself a meaningful sample by which to investigate the ways in which the gaze 
of women on the same objects, through the same tools used by men, could 
produce completely different universes. 
At the same time Margaret Cavendish was writing and around the same cultural 
environment, Aphra Ben was publishing her literary works and her scientific and 
ethnological treatises. The approach of these two women to the male power, 
however, is radically different. Very close to the Royal Society, with which she 
collaborated as translator and editor of one of the most authoritative editions of the 
Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes by Fontenelle, Aphra Behn can be 
considered one of the first scientist travelers, an etno-anthropologist ante litteram. 
The scientific, political and literary activity, seems to suggest that the author had 
completely married male model. One of the most interesting instances is 
undoubtedly the short novel Oroonoko (1688) which tells the unfortunate story of a 
noble African and his wife, enslaved and deported to the American plantations. 
Here the young aristocrat tries to organize a revolt that will end in tragedy and that 
will force him to kill his wife, waiting for their heir, to avoid her worst punishments. 
The protagonist, however, fail to survive and be dismembered alive. The story is 
very raw, not only because of the events narrated, but even of the precision with 
which the author describes the scenes of massacre and, especially, the 
dismemberment of the young. This novel is a veritable archive for the study of the 
Western gaze, male and female: Behn has on his characters a colonial gaze – 
she did in fact use as sadistic descriptions as she did not if it were a white and 
European body – a pornographic gaze – nothing of the bodies of the male 
protagonist and his partner are rescued from voyeuristic gaze of the colonizer –, a 
scientific gaze – the dissection of the African prince is definitely the result of 
careful reading of the manuals of anatomy. While these images that are so violent, 
even more because so realistic, seem to bring the author to the male gaze, on the 
other hand cultural reversal of a female look that violent a male body, can be 
subject to careful analysis in terms of gender studies. 
The final example is Eliza Haywood, sole curator of Female Spectator, first 
women's magazine to address, not only education and behavior of women, but 
 16 
even their scientific update. Haywood seems to be an author aware of the 
difficulties she faces in the patriarchal society she lives in, therefore she is also 
concerned about instructing the women on the correct works that, with a 
reasonable level of education, may be able to gain some personal power. 
Haywood edited the magazine, which had a large distribution, for about two years, 
while remaining anonymous and in the literary shape of four different women: a 
woman full of wit and humor married to a man worthy of her company, with whom 
she lives in harmony; a wise widow, custodian of female honor and innocence; the 
daughter of a wealthy merchant, a beautiful girl with so many qualities that beauty 
seems to be but the last of these; finally, the spectator herself. Although the affairs 
of men, like war and politics, are not allowed to be debated by women, a little 
flattery from a man, especially if addressed not only to physical, but even to moral 
qualities of women, is granted. This is the case of the letter sent to authors, April 
27, 1745, by a mysterious Philonaturae, that encourages the study of women's 
natural philosophy, presenting the authors and readers to the wonders of nature 
revealed by the microscope and the telescope and citing the ubiquitous image of 
insects by Hooke. Some have seen this admirer of women as another pseudonym 
of the author itself.  
My purpose will be that of analyzing the way in which the gaze of the Scientific 
Ladies was formed between the seventeenth and eighteenth century, among 
these three writing ladies, identifying the similarities and the differences between 
each of them, and between them and male writings of the period according to 
three issues, to whom every chapter will be devoted. 
Indeed, after having briefly analyzed the history of modern sight in chapter I, I’ll 
analyze the question of the personal implication of the observer, which is the 
deepest feature of feminist perspective on the ways of seeing. It is rooted into the 
mythic distinction between the male traits of objectivity, reason, and mind, in spite 
of the female subjectivity, feeling, and nature, which I argue, with E. Fox Keller, 
were already working during the scientific revolution, and the women writings were 
not afraid to recognize them or, even, to use them. It also brought the private, the 
emotional, the sexual into the social, anthropological and scientific observation. In 
recognizing the actual influence of the beholder in scientific as well as in social 
fields, women destabilize the myth of an un-personal perception of the world 
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through lenses. The Blazing World26 will prove as even the same purpose to know 
the outside world can never be separated by the notion of inner world, through 
which we primary perceive. The Emperor of the Moone27, by Aphra Behn is truly a 
caricature of the figure of virtuoso, the man who in the late seventeenth century 
dedicated is entire life to scientific observation. Through a masquerade – which we 
will see as a primary means of visual culture resistance – Behn will “unveil” the 
real peeping purpose that is below many observations through the telescope. 
Finally the Invisible Spy28, by Eliza Haywood, will present one of the first 
characters created by a woman in order to picture a different kind of observer who, 
despite the title, has no intention either of controlling or intervening in the life of his 
(or her) objects. 
The third chapter will be devoted to the power of control, by which I mean the 
consciousness the subject (male/female) has of manipulating the object of the 
gaze. It is, of course, strictly connected with the concepts of 
activeness/passiveness-male/female, and with the conception of dominating 
nature. What primarily characterizes this study is the consciousness of the three 
writers of the “objectness” they represent as women, and the way they try to act 
with and against this objectness. Again the mask seems to be the fundamental 
tool of this fight, this time, however, used in the sense of mimicry, rather than in 
that of masquerade. Thus they try to enter the field of vision in a more and more 
active way, not only destabilizing the entire field. Margaret Cavendish will do that 
through her own aesthetics, as the visit at the Royal Society will show, and 
through the heroine of Bell in Campo29, who will reach such a victory during war 
that the King will be constrained to give her and her female army all the major 
honors usually attributed to men. Oroonoko30 is probably the most known work by 
Aphra Behn, who used the figure of her hero in order to unmask the constructed 
categories of whiteness and blackness. She will also show that the pretended 
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subject of all these gazes, the white man, can easily become an object of vision, 
as curious and explorable as blacks and women are for him. Eliza Haywood will 
stage Fantomina31 a woman who will secretly be as many women as her man 
desire. But the end of the story will demonstrate how her final aim was not to 
possess him but to create a woman free of patriarchy. 
The fourth and final chapter will explore the relation between facts and fiction, 
i.e. the relation between the “objective” interpretation of scientific facts and the 
“storytelling” connected with the popularizing task. The women of that period seem 
to be particularly conscious of the thin border between telling facts and telling 
stories. Moreover they will show how ironically the presumed objective science will 
produce, thanks to its popularized images, the opposite effects:  wonder and 
imagination. This period, in fact, has been seen as the origin of Science Fiction. 
Thus we will examine Natures Pictures32 by Cavendish, to see how she 
considered imagination a pure rational method of inquiring or inspiring knowledge. 
Aphra Behn is well known also for the translation of Fontenelle’s Entretiens sur la 
pluralitè des mondes33, which she translated as A Discovery of New Worlds, 
entering the field of public discussion on one of the most popular philosophical 
debates. Her translation, however, was not a faithful mediation between French 
and English, rather a real critic of the fancy by which men of science conceive 
false images as scientific, thus excluding popular audience from real reflections, 
just while they think they are enjoining it. Finally Haywood, with her most popular 
work, the magazine Female Spectator34, will actively work against cultural 
hegemony, forbidding women of true education, by instilling in their minds, and in 
those of their husbands and parents, the danger of knowledge. She will argue that 
knowledge will favor the same structures of patriarchal society, but then she will 
educate ladies to taste for their interior value rather than the outer appearance. 
These three points are direct offspring of the gender reflection in science and 
social science. However, they seem to be useful tools in analyzing other fields of  
vision as well, first of all that of media studies. As we shall see, indeed, the three 
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writing women we have taken as samples declined their own theory of vision in 
different media, according, I shall argue, the medium to the message and to the 
audience or spectatorship. It is not for a chance that Cavendish and Behn and 
Haywood were working on both the sides of print and scenic representation, 
accordingly modulating their own gaze and that of their audience. It is already 
clear how questions such as corporality, licit and illicit gaze, fiction and truth 
through vision are here at stake, brought about by such a cultural revolution which 
affected not only science but, in a more spread way, the system of representation 
in theatre as well as in printing. Moreover, such fields of culture began to be 
interested in topics such as those of gender, race and class, as never before. 
The male faith on the obedience or even narrowness of women’s scientific 
observation was not ever rewarded, and what they saw through lenses, in 
scientific translations or in popularizing writings, seemed to not fit with male order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 20 
 
I 
 
Brief history of the gaze 
 
 
 
 
The Copernican revolution has yet to have 
 its final effects in the male imaginary. 
L. Irigaray 
 
 
 
 
It is hard to decide whether to describe the relation between human kind and 
vision as a history, tracing the roots of a reflection of humans on their own means 
of knowledge, or a story, telling the aspirations they have nourished to the 
distances these means can reach.  
Commonly this history or story is assumed to begin with Plato’s discourses 
about the senses, from Timaeus to Phaedrus and Republic. What is less common 
and shared is to glimpse an end, for this plot seems to become increasingly 
complicated. As Evelyn Fox Keller has pointed out, from the very beginning it 
seems to be grounded on a paradoxical dichotomy between two functions of the 
sight: a connective versus a dissociative one. On one hand vision has been seen, 
throughout the history of western thought, as a means to connect us to the truth, 
on the other, but not in contrast with it, it seems to act as a distancing between the 
subject and its own corporality. Originally intertwined these two functions were 
gradually parted until a final separation between a ―body’s eye‖ and a ―mind’s 
eye‖1.  
What is clear is the close relation that has always linked knowledge to vision 
more than any other sense, at least in western culture that considers it such an 
evident matter not needed to argue anymore, from Plato on. On this basic 
assumption has been founded the human thought that over the last 2500 years of 
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history has lead to individualization rather than identification, analysis rather than 
resemblance, abstract rather than concrete, logos rather than mythos. As 
Havelock claims in Preface to Plato, as the eye grows up the ―I‖ must be born2.  
This path was already clear when Plato described the creation of the sense of 
sight and of the other senses. Indeed, while the first is described in Timaeus3 as 
the first gift gods gave us (eventually noticing in Republic4 how lavish they were in 
giving us this sense) all the others are described as parts of the material nature of 
men. It is further interesting to notice how the use of eye as a metaphor of 
knowledge is carried out under the explanation of the way light itself acts, as a 
medium of perception. The model Plato designed for the process of knowledge is 
that which links through sameness the eye to the intellect and, by means of the 
light, to the sun, in turn linked to goodness5. This is probably the reason why vision 
has been able to reach such a prominent place: because of its distance from the 
world it acts in, in order to supremely know, to work outside the time, in such a 
disembodied way as to promote the primary illusion of disengagement and, 
therefore, objectification. Even thought it was not difficult for Plato to understand 
the incorporeity of the sight and the communion with the knowledge as not 
conflicting, this will become the Gordian knot of all classic and modern philosophy.  
Particularly in the modern theories of optics, the eye has become a mere, even 
if useful, lens, thus increasing its objectifying power, but loosing its suitability in 
terms of non-material knowledge. The strongest suspicion on the senses, and 
among these even the sight in spite of mental intellection, comes from Descartes 
who definitely detached the sight of intellect from physical seeing. If the senses 
belong to the soul, than the soul is the one that sees, the eyes are its mere 
means6. Keller argues that since the knowing agent has lost his connection with 
his own percipient organism – for his senses are relegated to the realm of the pure 
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materiality –, the eye becomes one of these passive means, while the pure 
intellectual activity is reserved to the ―I‖7. 
The more science and philosophy evolve along the route of knowing the eye 
and its functioning, particularly thanks to optics technology, the more the concern 
about the sight grows. Newton, one of the main characters of the revolution of 
modern science, deeply knew the way physical eye worked as the primary 
medium of his experiments. Still he felt the uncomfortable awareness of not 
completely comprehending how the ―inner eye‖ worked. That eye which would 
allow him to see what God saw, that is «things themselves intimately»8, beyond 
their appearance. The divine vision, a vision over infinite time and space in which 
things are seen in a definitive way that we can only perceive through our visual 
imaginary, still passed through the eyes elaborating images. 
A certain sort of communion between physical and mental eye still stands, but 
the subsequent history of science will travel more and more distant from physical 
knowledge:  
 
Where Kepler experienced science as an opportunity to grasp God as it were, with his 
hand, it was Newton’s ambition to ―see‖ as God ―saw‖, Einstein perhaps came closest 
to the ancient ideal when he concluded ―I hold it true that pure thought can grasp 
reality‖ […] the dual paradigm behind the promise of the visual – clarity and 
communion – survives as the root of aspiration behind the dual tenets of modern 
science. In objectifiability the world is severed from the observer […] it was thought 
without contaminating. In knowability, communion is re-established, mediated by a 
now-submerged but still evident dimension of the same sense.9 
 
Precisely the recurring characters of this history create the plot of the complex 
story that implicates men and the ―others‖. The detachment between the subject 
and the object, the not always recognized bias implicated in this same distinction, 
the suspicion on the fallacy of sight, the human hubris in trying to overcome this 
fallacy by every means in order to master the nature and world (being those visible 
or invisible) are all still at stake.  
Something happens when new doubts come on stage: that the vision is not so 
incorporeal as we thought, that it could influence the object which is seen, and, 
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moreover, that this object could break the screen dividing the two spaces of the 
sight and that it may return the gaze. These doubts did not rise in a precise 
moment of this history, but surely the most dramatic moment was at the end of the 
nineteenth century and the beginning of the following. Many questions were at this 
moment implicated: the way the gaze of the ―other‖ (woman, colonized, object of 
experiment) works, the dangers related to the gaze (surveilling, suppressive or 
violent), the different kinds of gaze that can exist (sexual, medical, 
cinematographic, etc), the means by which analyzing them (from gender/neutral, 
photographic/cinematographic, artistic/scientific points of view, etc). After almost 
2000 years of reflections the territory of vision is still mostly unknown. In fact, 
many ―dark continents‖ are now emerging, the most enigmatic of those being that 
of women. 
 
The gender matter 
 
In his essay on femininity of 1932, Freud proposes to investigate not what a 
woman is but how the feminine personality is formed, and he suffered some 
discomfort in dealing with an enigma who has committed "people" throughout the 
history of humanity10. 
That there is a difference between the sexes is indisputable both from the 
anatomical, and from the mental and behavioral point of view. Yet, Freud says, 
especially this second aspect of the matter is far more steeped in cultural and 
social "superimpositions" than one might imagine at first sight. An example might 
be, if nothing else, the equation in the relationship between male and female and 
between active and passive. As Freud said this proportion is only valid in some 
cases of life (for example, it does not apply in the growth of the offspring) and is 
not attributable to all animals. 
Beyond these considerations, however, the father of psychoanalysis conducted 
an investigation on the sexual development of women starting from two basic 
assumptions: that this development is conflictual – even more than in the case of 
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men – and that some turning points of this evolution are already inherent in the 
premise of childhood. In essence, the baby-girl will have much more difficulties in 
dealing with the three stages of sexual development because each of the changes 
she will pass through will not reach a final stage, but only a temporary one: the 
anatomical source of her desire, to be replaced several times, not excluding 
problematic returns especially in the phase of penis envy; the object of her desire 
(love) for the mother to be abandoned, to be hardly recaptured only when she 
becomes mother in turn. In these circumstances, the formation of the female 
super-ego faces great difficulties: «It cannot attain the strength and the 
independence which gave it its cultural significance; and feminist are not pleased 
when we point out to them the effect of this factor upon the average feminine 
character»11. This is why a woman's sexuality will remain marked by a 
fundamental bisexuality, an inherent narcissism and a desperate desire to be 
loved rather than loving.   
It is, Freud himself admits, a partial analysis, valid only in regards to the 
development of sexuality, but that has no validity in other areas which express the 
―humanity‖ of women: «If you want to know more about femininity, enquire from 
your own experiences of life, or turn to poets, or wait until science can give you 
deeper and more coherent information»12. 
Analyzing the overall long and rich work of Freud, we cannot escape a certain 
difference in treatment or, in other words, a flaw in its complex system. What is 
immediately evident, in fact, is the absolute lack of a female variation of issues 
related to sight which also has an important part not only in Freud's 
psychoanalytic, but also in his humanistic studies, that help him in finding a basis 
for arts and literature, linked to the trauma of sexuality. 
Although he never built a structured theory of the gaze, his own sensitivity to 
the problem is reflected in many writings in which, very often, the word of the 
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psychoanalyst is behind that of the art critic13: the fear of castration is symbolically 
staged in Medusa by Caravaggio, the admonition of idolatry in Moses by 
Michelangelo. Further we should not forget that fetishism, one of the sexual 
perversions, is linked precisely with a visual process, and that all sexual child 
development is linked to the fluctuating fortunes of voyeurism and scopophilia, that 
is the sexual pleasure in subjecting the other to one’s own gaze, leading or not to 
a perversion14. But if all these visions and these images are inextricably linked to 
sexuality, this is definitely a masculine sexuality.  
There is no doubt that Freud was aware of the importance that artworks 
probably have for the female psyche as well, condensing in an image a sexual 
trauma, a perversion, a repressed instinct, most often a phobia. This applies, for 
example, to one of his patients, the most famous, known under the pseudonym of 
Dora. In analyzing the second dream of the eighteen years old girl – who will be in 
care by the analyst for only a few months, leaving him orphan of a promising study 
on hysteria through the interpretation of dreams – the analyst reconstructs the 
real-life experiences that led to the setting of the dream15. The unknown city, 
probably a German one, is traced back to a series of different images: the 
postcards a young suitor sent her from this mysterious city; the city of Vienna that 
Dora had to show to her cousin, the resemblance of this city to Dresden, that Dora 
had visited some time before. The visual experience made in this city, shared with 
almost all visitors who have traveled there over centuries, is marked by a visit to 
the famous gallery that houses the Madonna Sistina. The girl tells Freud she 
stayed in contemplation of the image for two hours, but she was unable to 
describe her feelings, even less than she can explain what struck her about this 
image, except «the Madonna». 
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Freud interprets this figure as the condensation of early motherhood and 
virginity: 
 
The ―Madonna‖ was obviously Dora herself; in the first place because of the ―adorer‖ 
who had sent her the pictures, in the second place because she had won Herr K.’s love 
chiefly by the motherliness she had shown towards his children, and lastly because 
she had had a childish thought she was still a girl […] Moreover, the notion of 
―Madonna‖ is a favorite counter-idea in the mind of the girls who feel themselves 
oppressed by imputations of sexual guilt, – which was the case with Dora.16 
 
The experience of this vision and the break, not only ecstatic, that it produces 
are not new to Freud who had been there before in 1883, and had not been able 
to resist writing to Martha Bernays:  
 
You are sure to know her, the Sistina. My thoughts as I sat there were: Oh, if only you 
were with me! The Madonna stands there surrounded by clouds made up of 
innumerable little angel heads, a spirited-looking child on her arm, St. Sixtus (or is it the 
Pope Sixtus?) looking up on one side, St. Barbara on the other gazing down on the two 
lovely little angels who are sitting low down on the edge of the picture. The painting 
emanates a magic beauty that is inescapable, and yet I have a serious objection to rise 
against the Madonna herself. [Raphael's Madonna] is a girl, say sixteen years old; she 
gazes out on the world with such a fresh and innocent expression, half against my will 
she suggested to me a charming, sympathetic nursemaid, not from the celestial world 
but from ours. My Viennese friends reject this opinion of mine as heresy and refer to a 
superb feature round the eyes making her a Madonna; this I must have missed during 
my brief inspection.17 
 
The unique similarities of the two experiences, that of the doctor and of the 
patient, do not lead, however, to any theoretical elaboration and the issue 
regarding feminine gaze, though it begins to appear in all its problematic nature, 
will not meet any medical or philosophical awareness. 
 In spite of Freud’s lack of position on Dora’s gaze, feminist critics, particularly 
during the seventies of nineteenth century, looked at her as an example of the 
objectification of the female body by a male, even though medical, gaze. The 
―illness‖ itself of hysteria became a way in which the female body reacts against 
social and masculine constrictions to silence. Dora herself became the main 
character of her own drama in more than one reflection by Hélène Cixous, who in 
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1974 wrote a piece called Portrait of Dora18. What Cixous got interested in was the 
special interplay between the dreaming work and the stage work. The former 
operates so well in Dora’s case as a system combining images in which is difficult 
to say what is true and what is not. The latter is a system producing images. The 
two both project desires into space by means of words or gestures: «The stage is 
the reflecting surface of a dream, a deferred dream»19, that is a place in which to 
analyze once again Dora’s drama. Starting from Freud’s analysis itself, Cixous 
definitely criticizes the way in which he interpreted the young lady’s story, and 
unveiled the gender and social overtones he, after all, employed. Through this new 
point of view, Dora appeared as a ―subversive force‖ operating against ―the united 
force of social class‖ and against the sexual commerce the new century is carrying 
out. In Cixous play, the point of view is constantly contrasted, depending on if we 
are on a dream, on a memory or on a fantasy level: between Dora’s eyes, Freud’s 
eyes, or the other character’s ones. Anyway the main character never appears as 
a victim. In fact, the victim is Mrs K, who is a woman unable of fighting the system 
of bourgeois lies Dora rejects. However, what is deeply important for our discourse 
is the way in which Cixous looks at Dora’s experience before the Madonna Sistina. 
Where Freud saw a desire of identification with the virgin, Cixous sees a sexual 
desire more or less similar to what Freud himself experienced before the picture. 
For Dora identifies the Madonna with the same whiteness of Mrs K who, Freud 
agrees, the girl looked at as such charming lady since she was a fourteen years 
old girl. Her desire is to be the child in her harms, and she wants to be kept by the 
mature woman gaze: «look at me! I would like to step into your eyes. I want you to 
close your eyes. Her way of looking at herself. Of loving herself. Of not suffering. 
Of not looking at me. Of looking at me so calmly, with that smile»20. This is without 
a doubt a case in which the scopophiliac desire is steeped into a sexual one, and 
this matches very well with Freud’s thoughts, even though he was unable to 
conduct them on a female ground. 
Thus the criticism of the twentieth century is still tied to the theoretical 
reflections on the gaze matured at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century. 
We are at the dawn of the century, that is the dawn of the new Western image 
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society. The gaze that until then had been the object of investigation of aesthetics, 
circumscribed within a specific fee or a specific scopic regime, that of the 
perspective first and of the darkroom after, was now put in a new contested terrain 
not only in an analytical sense, but also in a historical one, at the crossroads of 
four major cultural revolutions: the birth of cinema, the birth of psychoanalysis (and 
biology), the consolidation of colonial institutions. The perspective and uniqueness 
of the view that since the Renaissance had characterized Western culture was 
being questioned. It was no longer possible to think of a single divine sight, but at 
least four different points of view came up on stage. New objects of study, hardly 
adaptable to what previously known: a fixed look at moving images (film gaze), a 
legitimized and deep gaze onto an animate or inanimate object (the gaze of the 
biologist who replaced the naturalist), a gaze supposed to be culturally superior 
onto an object less than desperate (the colonial gaze).  
Jonathan Crary has shown how precisely the science of the nineteenth century 
has brought the issue of the gaze back to the physicality of human vision and, 
therefore, to an individual and temporal instability that made seeing much more 
volatile than the Renaissance had expected21.  
The distinction between ―gaze‖ and ―glance‖ introduced by Norman Bryson had 
also added a spatial and a temporal dimension to the issue, stressing that the 
technological revolutions related to photography – as well as to the stereoscope, 
the panorama, the magic lantern, and, prior to the microscope and the telescope – 
had placed before the human eye new images at the same time evanescent and 
desirable: «A division separates the activity of the gaze, prolonged, contemplative, 
yet regarding the field with a certain aloofness and disengagement – from that of a 
glance, a furtive or sideways look – carrying messages of hostility, collusion, 
rebellion and lust»22. In studying the ways in which seeing operates in art history, 
Bryson stresses the cultural value added to this process, and the different changes 
it gains. Thus, the gaze is a concentrated way of seeing, even a forceful one, while 
the glance is a distracted, furtive and often illicit one. This produces also moral and 
political implications, for the division doesn’t stays on a temporal level only. The 
first is related to the intention of the viewer, that is the subject of the vision, and on 
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the cultural and translating techniques it will adopt in order to understand the 
object of its own look, since two persons could not have the same vision of the 
same object. Thus the gaze is a political channel of power on which the 
relationship between the author, the artwork and the viewer of the artwork is 
grounded, in the case of art history; between the subject, the object and the image 
between them in almost all the different settings of vision. This relationship 
changes as changes the role of the subject performing its gaze. A new form of 
vision affected the entire body of the observer, whose intentions, memories and 
desires project his or her internal stimuli onto the object of the gaze23.  
Carrying this reasoning to the extreme, we can say that from the very first 
moment in which human vision passed through a lens, the image became an 
object of desire, the look became sexual, and optics gave way to aesthetics and 
psychological survey. From the moment the gaze becomes problematic it can be 
questioned from both the points of view, of the subject and of the objects. 
In this sense Derrida, in Memories of The Blind Man, invokes the "blindness 
revelatory, apocalyptic blindness, one that reveals the most profound truth of the 
eyes, this would be the look veiled in tears»24, specific of female gaze. If according 
to Freud, for what concerns the male gaze, the blindness is closely linked with 
castration, according to Derrida it cannot be more excited if not by tears, related 
instead to female gaze and to the purely human eye. What differentiates our vision 
from that of animals is, in fact, according to the deconstructionist philosopher, the 
ability to go beyond what the eye captures, that is, the ability to recognize the 
limits of the look itself, an awareness that is expressed precisely through tears. If 
then the tears are women's own blindness, as an expression of the tragic 
limitations of human sight, only a feminist theory, flattening the dominant scopic 
regime, can save us from the hierarchical we see in. 
We are now in the twentieth century. The crisis of the ―ancien scopic régime‖, 
as Jay described the regime of the Cartesian view, has not yet completed its 
course and, indeed, continues to work on three philosophical fronts: the 
―detranscendentalization‖ of perspective, the ―recorporealization‖ of the cognitive 
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subject, the revalorization of time over space25. Questioning the very existence of 
an unique, natural and historical reality, philosophy and art of the period break the 
linear perspective that had allowed Descartes and Alberti to ensure the ―mind's 
eye‖ to a superior and unique human-divine eye, figuring out the ideas in the 
world: «The death of God meant the end of a God’s eye view. The very distinction 
between an illusory appearance present to the fallible senses of the observing 
subject and a deeper, essential truth available to the intellect or reason (there to 
be ―seen‖ by the ―mind’s eye‖) collapsed»26.  
What the nineteenth century had questioned, the twentieth century will complex. 
In fact, not only the neutrality of observation had already been questioned by 
Nietzsche, Marx and Feuerabach, but with Bergson the physicality of the looking 
subject has acquired its full rights: «as my body moves in the space, all other 
images vary, while that image, my body, remains available. I must therefore make 
it a center, to which I refer all the others images…My body is that which stands out 
at the center of these perceptions»27. Thus, not only the static and the 
synchronicity of the look and of the image are questioned, but the error is also 
revealed that commonly leads to think of a coincidence between the images made 
by the subject, even of himself, and how others see it.  
Another typical issue of this crisis of vision will be the discovery that the looking 
subject can be in turn "re-watched". The last stronghold of the Cartesian view was 
so low: there is no longer a self-reflective subject on the outside world, a primary 
look that invisibly dominates reality, but subject and object of vision, whatever they 
are, live in an adversarial relationship in which each one tries to impose its own 
vision. The concept of 'being watched' is perhaps one of the most characteristic 
figures of twentieth-century philosophy of the crisis – especially, as we will see, in 
its feminist declination. It was born with a very problematic personality with regard 
to the eye, constantly driven by a double pulse, the obsessive desire of the vision 
and the fear of the dangers associated with it: Jean-Paul Sartre. 
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Inspired, as Merleau-Ponty, by the anti-Cartesian suspicion of German 
phenomenology28, haring the illusion of transcendence by Bergson, Sartre focuses 
especially on the question implied by relational vision. The hegemony of the sight, 
in which a distant subject dominates the world, leads Sartre to a pessimistic theory 
of the subject/object relationship within the dynamics of the vision (and more). In a 
desperately hostile environment the object of the gaze cannot be but its victim, as 
"to-be-looked-at" precludes the chance of returning the gaze. Not only that, but the 
freedom of the object, once it comes within the range of action of the ―other‖, is 
threatened by the imposition of a spatial and a temporal position of the subject, 
and also by the risk of self-identification with the image processed by the subject. 
Even the look of love doesn’t escape this conflictual perspective. Indeed, since it is 
based, perhaps more than others, on desire, it submits the object of love to its 
carnal desire of appropriation. The political implication of such a perspective does 
not hesitate29. Anticipating, as Jay noted, the critique of imperialism and racism on 
the power of the gaze made by Said, in Black Orpheus Sartre gives to the white 
man a kind of gaze that for centuries has been privileged, that is free of moving on 
the surface of black skin in a non problematic way, authorized by the clarity (purity, 
virtue, genetic superiority) of his own skin. Now, however, blacks have begun to 
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return the gaze, and the experience, never felt before of ―being-looked-at‖ exposes 
us «to the bone»30. 
If the object of the gaze, so described, is distressed because of his "to-be-
looked-at-ness" it is because, according to Merleau-Ponty, Sartre made him forget 
his own body, made him believe that what he sees is always elsewhere, it is never 
his being, so it is nothing, or rather, it is a pure vision. The subject in Sartre is thus 
a visionary. Trying instead to recover a different embodiment, Maurice Merleau-
Ponty tries to give credit to the nobility of vision, building it on a ground completely 
different from the Cartesian one: the vision is no longer a mechanism of 
objectification, which exists only at the conceptual level, but an intersubjective 
relationship.  
The main feature of this vision, that will be especially useful in the analysis of a 
feminine gaze, lies in the body, even in the flesh of perception, which is translated 
into a "chasm" between the visible and invisible. The vision Merleau-Ponty refers 
to, is not the scientific vision, the vision from "above", the vision imposed, as 
Sartre said, that distances the subject from the object putting them in a 
hierarchical situation31. This is a "narcissism of vision" as the subject wishes to 
enter a world that was made of his own flesh32. The flesh itself, neither fully 
opaque nor fully transparent, is the place of exchange between the visible and 
invisible. This is where the single punctum caecum is created: the being, the 
corporality is the means by which the world becomes visible, but is also what is not 
visible to the subject. Just giving the same ontological status to the visible and 
invisible, and somehow wiring invisible to the same known subject, leads Merleau-
Ponty's vision back to the Freudian unconscious, permeating it of psychoanalysis. 
Especially since, in 1960, he devoted an essay to child cognitive development, 
where it is impossible not to see the seeds of what will then be the mirror stage of 
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Lacan. The external perception of the self, the ―autoscopy‖, as defined by the 
same Merleau-Ponty, allows the individual in training to create a homogeneous 
configuration of space33. This necessarily leads the author to open a hole in his 
system, since the mirror stage, as in Lacan, implies some conflicts between the 
image inside and the image outside this self, so reinstating, as Jay argues, the 
dialectic of Sartre's vision. Merleau-Ponty's vision remains, however, an optimistic 
vision in which the relationship between the two parties needn’t be a conflict. 
No reflection in the twentieth century will be equally positive and, indeed, many 
will see in the forming self a germ of conflict, even for Merleau-Ponty.  
Precisely the psychoanalytic implications have inspired the theories of Lacan, 
who in some way seems to occupy a central point between Sartre and Merleau-
Ponty. On one hand, his studies on the formation of the self are based on a 
constitutive transitivism – the confusion between self-image and the image of the 
other, or the image out of the mind – bridging with the conflicted theory of Sartre. 
On the other hand, however, the evolution of the (dyadic) stadium of the mirror 
stage in the (triadic) Oedipal drama opens the possibility of a non narcissistic 
intersubjective relationship, even if still conflicting.  
It is no doubt that the Lacanian theory, particularly in regards to the distinction 
between eye and gaze, was indebted to Merleau-Ponty and its position on the 
relationship between visible and invisible. In fact, it is not for a chance that Lacan 
devoted the chapter entitled The Split Between The Eye and The Gaze within the 
Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, to Merleau-Ponty, addressing his 
thought, particularly that one expressed in The Visible and The Invisible, as  
 
the moment of arrival of the philosophical tradition – the tradition that begins with 
Plato with the promulgation of the idea, of which one may say that, setting out from 
an aesthetic world, it is determined by an end given to being as sovereign good, 
thus attaining a beauty that is also its limit. And it is not by chance that Merleau-
Ponty recognized his guide in the eye.34 
 
 What Merleau-Ponty calls eye, Lacan calls the ―seer’s shoot‖, something prior 
to eye, for «I see only from one point, but in my existence I am looked from all 
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sides»35. Reinterpreting both Merleau-Ponty phenomenology and Freud 
psychoanalysis, Lacan found the place of the question no longer in the passage 
between the visible and the invisible, but in the scopic field itself, with all its limits. 
In fact, in Of the Gaze as Objet Petit and in his survey about the mirror stage, the 
―anamorphotic scopic relations‖36 established within this field make the object and 
the subject involved by means of a first medium: the eye. It is connected to other 
forms of media: the screens on which the images are projected. In this relation the 
distinction between the subject and the object is no longer defined, for it is now 
founded the subject illusion to be able to see the self.  
As we will soon see these observations by Lacan are fundamental for the most 
part of visual culture thought, for what concerns both terminology and topics. 
Almost the whole critique within this field – post-colonial gaze, women gaze, 
studies on cinema and photography – regards questions such as the scopic 
regimes and the problematic relations among all the characters taking part: 
subjects, objects, images, media and the different kinds of seeing. 
Foucault immediately caught the psychological implications of the forms of 
seeing in Lacan. Especially their variations of pouvoir and savoir became tools for 
the analysis of the phenomena of surveillance and punishment.  
Still moving in a non-reciprocal and asymmetrical sight, Foucault brings to the 
extreme the positions of Sartre. The subject of vision becomes relative, even more 
than in Merleau-Ponty, being transcendent only in relation to a specific scopic 
regime. The scopic regime itself is not given once and for all, but it changes as all 
the other components of the system change. There can be no more, then, an ideal 
spectator, because we can no longer believe in an objective reality. There is only 
an epistemic reality, which is linguistically constructed and, above all, visually, and 
closely contextualized.  
Consider, for example, Foucault says, the medical gaze, irreducible - like any 
kind of look - to all other kinds: the subject in it has become a totality of observers 
who exercise the "sovereign power of the empirical gaze", onto the solidity opacity 
                                            
35
 Ivi, p. 72. 
36
 Lacan referred to the Ambassadors by Holbein to point out how a particular dimension of the 
invisible is shown to the observer. It is not the epiphany of a hidden object, but a specific 
deformation of visibility, that is ―the invisible object of the desiring gaze‖. 
 35 
of the patient’s bodies37. On the other hand the history of mental illness, taking 
place completely within the fields of observation and classification, has showed 
how the patient is the victim of the ocular inspection, at least in the classical age, 
before Pinel reform, that gave the gaze of madness to madness itself38. Moreover, 
Foucault does not exclude forms of "heterotypic‖, i.e. forms of resistance to the 
dominant scopic regime, through forms of ambiguity and disorder.  
 Rather than seek alternative forms, Foucault is interested in the genealogical 
reconstruction of the problem. It is in fact, the historic aim of his work that has tried 
to trace the roots of every form of power linked to the eye: from the beginning – 
before the end of the sixteenth century in which word and image coincide with and 
believed in the ability to know a real world – to the advent of the classical period – 
which goes from the birth of modern philosophy to the Enlightenment, and is 
shaped by the condemnation Bacon and Descartes made of the fallibility and 
limitations of human knowledge. This is also the age of great technological 
revolutions and of new confidence in the possibilities they open for exceeding 
these limits.  
Retracing the terms of the issue to the field of scientific observation – from the 
birth of Natural History until his replacement by the nineteenth-century biology – 
and to its unexpected political and cultural implications, will be fundamental for our 
research. Above all, the merit of Foucault, for what concerns us, lies in defining in 
a new way the problematic question of the gaze. With the closure of the classical 
period it will stay no longer, as Sartre had suggested, in the privacy of the 
individual observer but, in an even more problematic way, in its replacement by an 
observed spectator, at the same time subject of observation and its own object. It 
is the ultimate sign of the crisis of ocularcentrism. 
Precisely the destabilization of the central point of view was, as we will attempt 
to demonstrate, the heterotypic resistance range constructed by female ―objects‖ 
of each scopic regime. Already in the seventeenth century women staged a 
confused field of vision, in which it was more difficult than the science of time not 
                                            
37
 Michel Foucault, Naissance de la clinique. Une archéologie du regard médical, Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1963, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith, The birth of the Clinic. An 
Archaeology of Medical Perception, New York, Pantheon Books, 1973, p. XIII. 
38
 Michel Foucault, Folie et déraison. Histoire de la folie, Paris, Librairie Plon, 1961, trans. Richard 
Howard, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in The Age Of Reason, New York, Vintage 
Books, 1973, p. 70. 
 36 
to admit to distinguish the knower from the known and, moreover, isolate their 
mutual physicality.  
On the other hand, Foucault himself would have preferred a phenomenological 
implication in the psychoanalysis of vision. It is a fundamental implication without 
which we could not take into account the spatial dimension related to the gaze, 
that is the interrelationship of the body with the world it observes. Already at the 
origins of scientific observation, proclaimed the most objective that had ever 
existed, women scientists warned this arrogant visuality and proposed a model of 
vision that only three hundred years later would have reached its full 
consciousness. 
The reconstruction of the path of a crisis that we have so retraced, and for 
which we are indebted to the study by Martin Jay, allows us to isolate the issue 
between the two poles in which it appears to be fully understood, two poles whose 
paternity, in my opinion, should be given to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty: the power 
of the gaze and the paradoxical interplay between visible and invisible. As we 
have seen all theories that have followed these ones, have done nothing but 
question, historicize or report these two issues within different visual fields.  
The power of the gaze, the twentieth century is analytically and historically 
aware of this, is malicious, since the relationship between the two sides of the 
gaze is always unbalanced. Against the desperately pessimistic and violent vision 
by Sartre, who sees in vision nothing but a process of objectification, little can be 
done by the optimistic reflection by Merleau-Ponty. In order to make this 
relationship intesubjective, he ends with destabilizing the most powerful part of the 
process, that of the viewer, posing it before the limits of invisibility, but, in so doing, 
going back to the mistrust of the twentieth century with the eyes. A combination of 
the constraints of an outsider vision and the escape routes, on one hand, and the 
dangers associated with them, on the other, reports the matter to a psychoanalytic 
dimension, which is based on the study of the formation of the self by Lacan. But 
perhaps more important for the last century was the deepening reflection by 
Foucault, who translated the power of the gaze into specific scopic regimes, and 
their relative impact on the cultural categories and the corresponding social 
arrangements, such as prisons, hospitals or schools. In so doing he has revealed 
the full political extent that the question has always hidden, from the sixteenth 
century onwards. 
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The other side of the question, the limits of visibility and invisibility, has seen a 
variety of forms, for which the two terms have taken on different nuances. Sartre 
assigns somehow the quality of invisibility to the subject of the gaze. This 
invisibility allows him to exercise his scopic dominion, in such a way as the jailer of 
Bentham's Panopticon, or the kings in Velazquez’s Las Meninas - both analyzed 
by Foucault - that can only be inferred, but that are the only ones to actually 
dominate the visual field of representation. 
 
 
The Race and the Gaze 
 
 
The problematic relation between knowledge and the physical experience, the 
power of the gaze acting onto the Other, the consciousness the Other has of that 
gaze and of that power, the interiorization and the instituzionalization of this 
looking power, are all questions at stake in the nineteenth conception of ―thinking 
the difference‖, especially when this difference is placed within the field of race 
difference. Even if, as we have just seen, phenomenology seems to have a difficult 
relation with bodily experience, in different ways and degree, some feminist 
scholars have proposed to rethink the possible link between the studies of the 
difference and the study of visual perception as concerned within phenomenologist 
reflection39. 
Within this field of studies, particularly oriented by post-colonial studies, a fruitful 
encounter, a critical one, seems to be that between the phenomenology of 
Merleau-Ponty, and the studies on race of Frantz Fanon. 
It is commonly accepted to trace the reflection of Fanon back to the influence of 
Sartre, especially for what concerns the pessimistic concepts of authenticity and 
bad faith, but also the power of the ―to-be-looked‖. The problematic link built by 
Fanon between the ―different subject‖ of the gaze and the historical environment in 
which it, as a body, acts, reminds us of Merleau-Ponty. However struck differences 
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have to be stressed, as Jeremy Weat points out40. If, on one hand, in Merleau-
Ponty’s opinion the body acts within and on the world thanks to corporeal schema, 
and vice versa, on the other hand, and in Fanon’s point of view, this body’s agency 
is not always as open as he thought. If nothing else it doesn’t work if the body is a 
black body, for, in this case, it is neither a subject nor a participant at the 
surrounding historical settings, rather they are imposed upon it.  
This is why Fanon talks about a triple mechanism of the ―black gaze‖: as a 
subject, moving in the space looking at the world from inside; as an object being 
seen from outside, and forced to be aware of this sight; as an object aware of the 
opposition of the two sights, neither having means to making his own sight to 
coincide with the other’s, nor being able to resist to this sight41. 
In recollecting the corporeal schema proposed by Merleau Ponty, Fanon makes 
the process of vision act between the historic-racial schema and the one he calls 
epidermal schema. Come first the historical scheme and the mythological 
narratives, which introduce the black skin within a defined and alien (European) 
framework. Even the self-image of the object is constrained within this framework. 
With the fixation of this historical framework within social categories and habit, 
scientific discourses, cultural practices, the historical leaves place to the epidermal 
schema, which now appears as naturalized: the color of the skin looses its original 
space and becomes significant per se and, for the other, it becomes the ―fact of 
blackness‖. 
Now that the ―all pervasiveness‖ of white gaze has been hidden under an 
appearance of science and biology, and the black has become an object rather 
than a subject of the visual communication, it works like the foucaultian 
Panopticon, keeping the object under constant surveillance, so that it itself 
interiorizes the power of this control, making the surveillance itself no longer 
necessary42. This is why, Fanon claims, the black interiorizes his own model 
designed by white men, by means of an act of mimicry. 
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Edward Said has stressed the panoptical disposition of white gaze upon non-
white bodies as well, posing it as a tension between a synchronic panoptical vision 
of domination – which acts by stasis and identity – and a diachronic history – 
which asks for change and difference43. Between these two positions, Homi 
Bhabha argues, there is the place of an ironic compromise, which acts through 
mimicry44. The mimicry is an uncertain terrain in which the colonial object is fixed 
as a ―partial presence‖ at once incomplete and virtual, depending on his own 
representation upon the limitation of the authoritative discourse, which by means 
of visual power regulates, reforms and disciplines the other, making him 
recognizable «as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not 
quite»45.  
He does not perfectly agree with the vision of Fanon that a black man stops 
being an actual man, for the mimicry, like the camoufflage in Lacan, doesn’t tend 
to harmonize or repress the different, rather it forms a resemblance that Bhabha 
calls metonimy of presence: «Black skin splits under the racist gaze, displaced into 
signs of bestiality, genitalia, grotesquerie, which reveal the phobic myth of the 
undifferentiated whole white body»46. This partiality of the presence of both the 
subject and the object of vision has much to do, in Bhabha’s opinion, with the 
fetish that rearticulates the values of the interdict within western culture.  
The black, or any ―Other‖ body evaluated as a marginal object, ―not-quite/not 
white‖, dissected as ―part-object‖, or objects trouvés, of colonial discourses, enters 
the place of the spectator, of the not-forbidden gaze on which white gaze was not 
allowed to cast on. The Victorian society, at the apex of colonial power, is the 
principal spectator of such a kind of entertainment, which displays sexual 
abnormity and exotic curiosities. However, as this work will demonstrate, a parallel 
phenomenon was already settled in the young colonial societies of the late 
seventeenth century, when the delight for the exotic, being it human or not, was 
spreading and the curios gaze on these ―objects‖ was already paving the way to 
the mimicry.  
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The immediate reference here is at the colonial gaze a writing woman such as 
Aphra Behn put on the scene of her Oroonoko, playing her colonial and female 
desire over a black body, object of female sexual desire, and male colonial 
violence, in such a way that lead us to wonder whether the female always acts like 
the male does or not. 
 
 
Gender and visual studies 
 
In twentieth-century philosophy of vision, mostly lead on by men, the interest in 
the possibility of a visual difference related to gender has been addressed only 
laterally.  
After the promise by Lacan to make free women desire from phallic desire or 
envy, and from the Oedipal stage Freud had relegated it, a new way seemed to be 
opened for the concern about the female gaze and the contested nature of the 
whole gender. That is why Simone de Beauvoir herself decided to include the 
mirror stage within the process of women development47. The 1970’s feminist 
studies in psychoanalysis saw a certain step back toward Freud in Lacan’s 
writings and work, mostly because of his insistence on the patriarchal metaphor 
and his final ignoring of a different kind of motherhood beyond the pre-Oedipal 
stage. However, it was the concept of a gaze, expressed in the mirror stage 
(analogous between men and women) that interested the most part of the critics, 
coming from his own school. It is the case of Luce Irigaray. 
Foucault, instead, deeply convinced of the fallacy of any essential immediacy, 
attributed low value to the attempts of feminism of his time, which sought an 
alternative to the hegemony of vision taking into account sexual specificity, or 
turning to alternative means of knowledge such as that of touch or smell. 
Moreover, he was not interested in looking for an escape from the dominant scopic 
regime. 
Only one philosopher seems to trust in a possible alternative differance, he is 
Jaques Derrida. It could seem curious to start with the critic Derrida move to 
feminism, but what he didn’t accept was its inner tentative to turning the female 
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difference into a male model, both on a philosophical level – in which dogmatism 
would impose the power of truth, science and objectivity – and on a mental one –
which recollects the virile desire and the fear of castration. In Derrida’s opinion, the 
ground on which feminism can really fight this phallocentric point of view is that of 
the differance, that is the struggle against the phenomenological reliance on the 
primacy of perception, the reliance in its immediacy, the primacy of presence onto 
temporal modes.  
What does Derrida mean with this term? The concept or term of différance 
allows him to put into question some concepts of both ontology and linguistics, but 
it is interesting for what concerns our research as well, under several aspects: the 
intelligibility of the différance; the enclosure under a term of two different meanings 
for difference; the temporalization/spazialization of the question; the active/passive 
process of ―differentiation‖48; the relation between subject/language (whatever kind 
it is). The neologism itself found the issue of intelligibility. In writing the French 
word, that is usually written with e instead than a, Derrida sets a first linguistic 
problem, since the e is pronounced like an a. This means that, from a phonological 
point of view, we can’t perceive any difference: 
 
Here, therefore, we must let ourselves refer to an order that resists the oppositions 
of philosophy, between the sensible and the intelligible […] between speech and 
writing, and beyond the quiet familiarity which links us to one and the other, 
occasionally reassuring us in our illusion that they are two.49 
 
 Proceeding in his analysis of this new concept Derrida retrace it to its 
etymological history, as related to the Latin differre. It includes both the action of 
«putting off until later, taking into account» – which is an action of suspension, of 
temporalization –, and the more common sense of being other, being non 
identical. The question of identity is of course the most interesting for us, moreover 
since Derrida specifies that this ―division‖ is neither simply definable as active nor 
as passive: 
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This does not mean that the différance that produces differences is somehow before 
them, in a simple and unmodified presence. Différance is not full, non-simple, 
structured and differentiating origin of differences. Thus, the name ―origin‖ no longer 
suits it.50 
  
This only term, thus, allows Derrida to introduce one of his most important 
outcomes: in this semiological differentiation once more it is clear how the 
language (verbal, visual, written, etc) is not a function of a speaking subject, but 
the speaking subject is a ―function‖ of the language, since he moves in the world 
being inscribed in the rules of (more than) a language. 
Once we get conscious of the materiality of sign, being textual or visual, and of 
the mental, symbolic world our culture lives in, and we get conscious of the 
relativity of our sensual media, we can regret any univocal point of view that so 
many damages carried into the last two centuries. The imposition of male gaze 
onto women’s, the superimposition of a white mythology onto rhetoric and 
philosophy, are all forms of the appropriation of a point of view, which, as we have 
already seen, is a form of possession «negotiated through the right of 
inspection»51. The way out from this arche-ecriture – the infrastructure always 
operating, and invisible to the eye – is not, however, another main point of view, 
but the politics of the fragment, denying any view of the whole52. 
A trend towards equality rather than towards difference, or we could now say 
différance, has always been typical of some kind of feminism from the origin until 
the mid-20th century. Even though the aims were very different between the 
original vindications of Mary Wollstonecraft and those of Simone de Beauvoir, still 
quite two hundreds years of feminism revolved round an ocularcentric model of 
sight, the same in which Wollstonecraft suggested women writers to adopt a 
―God’s eye view‖, and in which de Beauvoir suggested women to rebel against the 
active gazer by destroying the passive object itself, i.e. the female body, in order to 
emerge in the light of trascendence53. Even if they share a great force in making 
women aware of the passive status in which men put them, and in introducing new 
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ways of struggle, they, by the way, accept this model as true, only trying to 
overthrow the place where women occupy in, and not to overthrow the model 
itself. We have to wait for the post-1968 debate to find an attempt to escape from 
this ocularcentric/phallocentric model. But still it would be difficult to discover a 
new model for female gaze. 
It wouldn’t be possible to speak of feminine gaze without mentioning Laura 
Mulvey, for her Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema54 represents the first 
introduction of the question of a female gaze within the field of film studies. In her 
work she attempts to discover what the specific pleasures of cinematic gaze are 
by means of the ―weapons‖ offered by psychoanalysis. The kinds of pleasure she 
detected posed her speculation within the patriarchal structures she is attaining to 
unveil, they are the pleasures of scopophilia and narcissism, defined as two 
opposite movements one of separation, the former, one of identification, the latter. 
Indeed, in avoiding the «surreptitious observation of an unknowing and unwilling 
object» thanks to darkness and the separation from this object, cinema acts a 
voyeuristic separation. On the other hand by focusing the attempt of the spectator 
on human forms, questioning the recognition of the image, that of the star, as self-
image, cinema stimulates an identification of the subject and the object on the 
screen. But where is the place of woman in this structure? It is in the peculiar 
place of the image itself, it is in the object of male gaze defined as the ―bearer of 
the looking‖. In this way the reproduction of the concordance between the two 
couples of opposite male/female and active/passive is reassured. At the matching 
point of two gazes, that of the character and that of the spectator, both of which 
are erotic, the woman perpetrates her traditional exhibitionist role, that of the to-
be-looked-at-ness.  
This theory provoked, of course, a wide critic response both in feminist circles 
and not.If it was acceptable at the end of seventies to consider the gaze working 
within cultural and political situations, it could be less acceptable to consider a 
gender positioning of the gaze, especially if it was reduced only to a heterosexual 
condition. What was most striking was the omission of the reasons of a female 
spectator. 
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Many other feminist critics of film studies tried to rearrange Mulvey’s work, 
which had the merit to have questioned the cinematic gaze as a mise en scene of 
cultural and political stereoptypes. In 1980, Mary Ann Doane responded to 
Mulvey’s statements specifically on the matter of identification and, moreover, of 
mis-identification. In Misrecognition and identity55, Doane stresses how 
identification, instead of collapsing the spectator onto character, creates and 
maintains a distance. In popular cinema, indeed, three different kinds of 
identification are operating: the identification with a person – at once star and 
character –; the identification of pretended objects, actions and persons, with 
actual objects, actions and persons; and the identification of the spectator with his 
own act of looking. This is the identification Metz called the primary, while the 
secondary is due to the awareness of identifying himself no longer with a real 
person, but with a ―super-person‖. At this point the film theory of Metz, and of 
Doane as well, returns to the mirror stage of Lacan, being this ―super-person‖ to 
identify with the better version of the subject of vision. What Doane critiques to 
Mulvey is the lack of distinction between the primary and the secondary 
identification. Doane leads the question back to the feminist reading of this mirror 
stage, which discovers woman as the mirror of man, especially in Irigaray’s 
opinion, as we will soon see. The study Doane conducts on the films of the forties 
and the fifties in American Cinema, seems anyway to stop once again at the lack 
of a definition of female spectator. 
In 2007, quite ten years later the first edition of Visual Pleasure, Mulvey tries to 
response to the critic, focusing, this time, no more on the pleasure of cinema, 
above the sexual differences within the spectatorship, rather to the female 
spectator as such56. Anyway, since a hidden definition of female gaze doesn’t 
exist, at least within the psychoanalytic terms, by Freud on, beyond the unique 
male model, Mulvey remains constricted within the polar distinction of active and 
passive that we have already encountered. She will try to overcome it in Death 24 
frames at seconds57, in which by analyzing the new frontiers offered to the 
spectator by new digital cinematographic means, she tried to point out the 
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changed relation of spectatorship now mastering the ―narrative continuity‖ and ―the 
cinema time‖. Between the Medusa gaze – that freezes the moving image – and 
the Pygmalion desire – that makes the image moving – acting in these new ways 
of consuming films, it doesn’t seem possible to discover a new role for a free 
female spectatorship. 
Probably the most successful reflection on female gaze as contrasting its own 
objectification, within film studies,  is that by Mary Ann Doane, and of her study on 
masquerade58. Rejecting the limited definition of the female as the image, and 
therefore only able of a narcissistic look, Doane recollects the last feminine 
specificity discovered by French feminist, that of proximity against discontinuity. 
The primary exemplification of this positioning within a territory of representation 
such as that of Cinema, is that of transvestitism, which not only put on the stage a 
confusion in the sexual differences but allows the woman to keep the role of 
mastering. By the way, if transvestitism reduces once again women as the object 
of desire, as Marlene Dietrich demonstrated, the masquerade will be something 
different. It is, in fact, a new awareness of the construction of femininity as a mask, 
under which there is no identity. As Joan Riviere has already demonstrated, this 
trans-sex identification is, for what concerns women, a two steps process: first the 
woman assumes the position of the subject, then compensates the lack of 
masculinity with an overdoing of feminine gestures59. To masquerade is, thus, «to 
manufacture a lack in the distance between oneself and one’s image»60. It doesn’t 
mean to include herself as an object of desire, rather to separate the cause of 
desire and oneself: «the woman uses her own body as a disguise»61. This anti-
hysterical separation falls into line with the femme fatale representation, for the 
two both double the representation: the woman demonstrates the representation 
of a female body. But till this moment the masquerade is working on the side of 
making an image. What about looking at an image? Is it possible to consider a 
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masking counter seeing? Doane protests for the existence of an active female 
gaze, a gaze anyway disassociated from mastery, just breaking the patriarchal 
system of correspondences. This lack is operated by a new character that of the 
looking woman, an uncanny character operating under the means of the glasses: 
«the man with binocular is countered by the woman with glasses»62. No longer the 
object of desire she opens the chance for the reconsidering of the female 
exhibitionism63.  
Outside the field of film studies it will be within the intellectual turmoil of 1968 in 
France that the feminism debate evolved from the liberal original forms to the new 
ones, steeped in Marxist theories, in structural and post-structural suggestions, in 
a new anthropology of Patriarchy. In this cultural climate new contributions to the 
cause came from Julia Kristeva, Hélène Cixous – who we have already quoted – 
and moreover from Luce Irigaray, who focused on the vision as a means of 
patriarchal uncontested control. 
Being quite indifferent to Marxist approach – which cost her the heaviest 
criticism of the feminists themselves –, she referred to Nietzsche and Derrida 
critique to feminism and definitely linked the ocularcentrism to the phallocentrism, 
tracing the origin of the concept of femininity as a lack in the old idealistic illusion 
of an eidetic truth. As far as the ―optics of truth‖ forgets the materiality of our sight 
and, moreover, the mediation of any kind we constantly and unconsciously use, 
visual experience remains dialectic of domination of the gazer over the gazed. But 
the philosophy of différance provides Irigaray the means against «the blind spot of 
the old dream of symmetry»64 which affected not only Freud but also even Lacan 
theories. 
The entire theory of Freud is full of an economy of presence, itself producing all 
phobias of lack and absence, i.e. castration, penis envy, and of course the anxiety 
caused by the enigma of woman. But even the mirror stage, theorized by Lacan, 
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moves within the same Cartesian perspectivalism he supposes to challenge65, by 
founding the personal development of male and female children on a field of 
sameness. In fact, Irigaray says, women look from behind the male representation 
onto the mirror screen, and what belongs to them is a non categorized gaze, made 
of mysterique, that is the fusion of four elements: mysticism, mystery, hysteria and 
femaleness. This mysterique place is the deep and dark place of the female being, 
and of the female way of seeing, but it can in such a way be shared with the male 
being, for it is the proper place of the soul66: 
 
La mystérique: this is how one might refer to what, within a still theological onto-logical 
perspective is called mystic language of discourse […] This is the place where 
consciousness is no longer master, where, to its extreme confusion, it sinks into a dark 
night that is also fire and flames. This is the place where ―she‖ – and in some case he, 
if he follows her lead – speaks about the dazzling glare which comes from the source 
of light that has been logically repressed, about ―subject‖ and ―Other‖ flowing out into 
an embrace of fire that mingles one term into another, about contempt for form as 
such, about mistrust for the dry desolation of reason. Also about a burning glass. This 
is the only place in the History of the West in which woman speaks and act so 
publicly.67 
 
Being the place of the soul, this is a spiritual place, but being the only place in 
western culture in which a woman can speak and act so publicly, this is as well the 
place of woman’s madness, or at least the place of a knowledge in which «the 
subject can no longer find himself as a subject […] where it will already been noted 
that the poorest in science and the most ignorant were the most eloquent, the 
richest in revelations»68. Finally, this is the place that men have more comfortably 
addressed as that of the hysteric, or of the mystic saints. 
Thus, the counterpart of the ocularcentrism is a gaze made of both material and 
spiritual contemplation, neither predatory nor specular69, and a new awareness of 
a different notion of vision, beyond phallocentrism. A new dimension in which the 
subject is not so far from its object, considering all the participants so far 
misrecognized by philosophy of vision: air, light and, it might seem ironic after 
Freud, touch. 
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All phobias produced by the male notion of vision – lack, castration, alienation, 
but also domination of gaze over the eye – and, above all, the vision of always 
struggling intersubjective relations, come from the assumption of the emptiness of 
the space of vision, that vision cannot always traverse. But what all the 
philosophers we have so far studied forgot is that the space between the subject 
and the world, between the subject and the object and, also, between different 
subjects, has never been empty. In fact, we are all connected by such elements 
we cannot see, but thanks to that we stay alive and perceive: air, light, matter. 
Irigaray wrote Forgetting the Air after the death of Heidegger, who thought of 
the air as ―the side watching at us, already, open, that surrounds us, […] the 
country, the space in which the man acts and knows taking things at a distance. 
This is the place of his existence, at once as primary detachment, which makes 
the thing appearing as ob-jects, and Gestell, roots within the being»70. From 
Heidegger’s point of view this ―openness‖ is what reassures man about his own 
existence, needing himself. From Irigaray’s point of view it is the primary forgetting 
of air, the element which funds and surrounds man, not needing man action, in 
fact neither needing nor being able to be mapped.  
All male western thought is funded on a language of caesura, of hate by which, 
since Empedocles, air has been condensed in the vitreous sky, and from a 
dynamic and fluid being in transformation, we moved to an ontological and 
epistemological predominance of solid. Thus man will be born detached, will exist 
at a distance from his origin and his end, and will only know what is in front of him, 
and only by entering the other’s territory, conquering it. By forgetting air, men 
forget what is the natural medium of all their way of living, knowing, seeing: 
medium of logos, medium of language, medium of voice, that all acts through air, 
not passing through, but by exchanging, melting, sharing. This ―sensible 
transcendence‖ is the tertium datur, the medium in which ―subject‖ and ―object‖, if 
we can continue in so speaking, can approach without sacrificing their own 
identities.  
Thus, it is no longer possible to talk about a single subject, insofar as the 
sensible is not one but, at least, it is divided into two. The whole human nature is 
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double, even though men are not always aware of their own incompleteness, for 
what they only know is one part of this nature. Irigaray claims, according with 
Hegel, that man is living in a philosophical state of somnambulism, living in a 
―pseudo-nature‖ between reality and spirituality, in a state of unity with nature 
which is nothing but himself, «so he dreams to be a whole»71. However, neither air 
itself is simple or universal, it has different states according, for instance, with 
density or heat: «air and sexual difference may be the two dimensions vital for/to 
life». That is the way we have to go beyond the deep teleology that the whole 
western philosophy is grounded on. It is, in Irigaray’s words, the mastery of 
direction of will and thought by the subject, this subject being a historical man. The 
task of women must be to pose the question on a different level, in order to find 
harmony between activity and passivity, between subjectivity and objectivity, a 
new state of mind no more needing to dominate neither the nature nor the other. 
Beyond the object submission there is no more a slavery economy, but an 
exchange economy with no preconceived object. 
There is something else within the pretended vacuum in which man has so long 
thought to see: it is the light, which according to Irigaray represents the first step of 
human being into philosophy. It is quite foreseen to recollect reason to light, from 
Plato on, but in order to reach what has been conceived more as a metaphorical 
matter than as a means, philosophy itself has constructed a «system of mirrors» 
by which light is indirectly observed, and, in so doing, avoid the «consuming 
contact» with it72. In this way men used to know through forms alone, or through 
optical apparatuses, paying attention to ―ideas‖ according to the light they are able 
to stop, to hold. Not only light has been considered dangerous – according to a 
relation with the sun, benevolent and malevolent father at a time – but «the impact, 
the contact, of light is – at least implicitly – considered to be too close to the 
senses and to matter to constitute the main source of profit for the intelligible. Light 
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is too corruptible, too shifting and inconstant to form the basis of the relationship to 
the self and to the All»73. Irigaray doesn’t miss the ambivalent relation western 
culture has with light. It remains, at least as a metaphor, a funding image of our 
culture, as Derrida has pointed out as well. The myth of the cave in Plato’s 6th 
book from Republic is the most famous example of the true light, the light of the 
sun, as both real and good knowledge, and dangerous source for human senses, 
so that only few men can reach it, by risking their own safety and their joining the 
society. This is why Irigaray calls Western society the society of ―photology‖, but 
her aim is quite different from that of Derrida. She won’t reconcile the metaphor of 
light to the concept of knowledge, rather she is recollecting the complicity between 
―photology‖, or the language of metaphysics, and ―phonocentrism‖, or the 
language of man body. The metaphor made by Plato seems to Irigaray to convey 
a dominating sunlight in which all sexual differences have been erased, and in 
which all the feminine metaphors – such as that of womb, easily referable to the 
cave – seem to be connoted in a way of fallacy and inadequacy. 
Should, thus, the vision and all its metaphors, once again be referred to 
―phallocularcentrism‖? Irigaray finds the way out in an engagement of light as a 
texture rather than as a medium. Reducing the distance between subject and 
object, filling this space, once pretended to be empty, with changeable air and 
shadowing light, crumbling the power of the subject and multiplying his ways to 
know, as well as those of the object, Irigaray reconceived the materiality of 
knowing to recollect the gaze and the touch. This is why Irigaray’s point of view 
seems to go in the direction of a ―denigration of vision‖, as Martin Jay has pointed 
out, as a means of the western male ocular centric culture. In spite of the 
phallocularcentrism, Irigaray proposes a new weight to be pointed to the other 
senses, mainly the touch.  
In the study about the relationship between vision and touch in Irigaray, Levinas 
and Merleau-Ponty, Cathryn Vasseleu tries a different interpretation74. Challenging 
the usual way in which the ―photologic‖ western culture interprets light, and making 
of it both an ideal and a physical medium, Irigaray denies any transparency of 
sight and vision themselves. This is why we can talk about ―texture of light‖, 
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meaning «a fabrication, a surface of a depth that also spills over and passes 
through the interstices of the fabric […] as a texture, the naturalness of light cannot 
be divorced from its historical and embodied circumstances. It is neither visible nor 
invisible, neither metaphoric nor metaphysical. It is both the language and material 
of visual practices, or the invisible interweaving of differences that form the fabric 
of the visible»75. In this way, Irigaray is also challenging the classical division 
among senses, a fundamental binary in photological culture, and also the illusion 
of objectiveness residing, as we have already seen, in the illusion of distance. The 
interweaving of material and ideal, insofar referred to a touching vision, can be 
seen as a return to the erotic seeing of Freud. In assigning the responsibility of the 
impoverishment of bodily relations to vision, Irigaray is not renouncing to any such 
good power of the gaze. In fact, she is acting in the same way Merleau-Ponty 
intended the fruitful relation between the visible and the invisible. Otherwise his 
concept of a vision incorporating tactile, within an ethics of sexual difference, 
would be annihilated by a disembodied vision. This carnal dimension of sight 
realizes itself by means of color in Merleau-Ponty’s opinion, and by means of the 
light in Irigaray’s opinion, which is not anymore a unique means of vision, but also 
a means of touch: «I see only by the touch of light». 
What a new design for female gaze should realize is that there’s no ―immediate 
subject‖, that it is a conceptual mistake for no one can be neither identical nor 
equal or similar to anyone else. We can now understand how all our relations – 
being them love relations, knowing relations, etc – can only be relations of 
indirection, that is mediated relations. This is what I love to you means, this to 
being just the medium which prevents transitivity, working as a barrier against the 
alienation of the other in a subjectivity, in a proper world, in a language. 
This is the proper way in which women act, know, see, by privileging relations 
between subjects, rather than relations to an object by conferring «transcendence 
upon horizontality»76, which is at a time a philosophical and a political task 
overcoming any opposition between particularity and universality. This means that 
in no way can we act in a spiritual, disembodied world with no differences. 
Claiming that, for example, there’s no difference between man and woman, is, in 
Irigaray’s theory, a ―serious ethical mistake‖. Actually, as the subject is no longer 
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unique, but rather multiplying, his/her ways of knowing have to be multiple as well, 
working by a concentration of senses that can only integrate the multiplicity, and 
remedy the fragmentation. In doing so, we also will remedy the desire of what we 
perceive, especially by means of the gaze. This is the Buddha’s gazing at the 
flower which: «is not an inattentive or predatory gaze, nor the decline of the 
speculative into flesh. It is both material and spiritual contemplation, furnishing 
thought with an already sublimated energy. This contemplation is also training in 
finding pleasure while respecting what does not belong to me. Indeed, Buddha […] 
gazes at what is other to him without uprooting it»77. 
By recollecting the female/male sense of sight to that of touch, Irigaray makes it 
suitable to a new pleasure of seeing no longer funded on the distance between the 
two subjects in question, rather on their continuity and on their reciprocal respect.  
The need Irigaray and others felt to mitigate the sight with the touch, provoked 
many feminist scientists, who criticize these as anti-visual sentiments through a 
deeper analysis of the association between scientific vision and philosophical 
truth. This is an approach that seems to de-eroticize vision by means of the act of 
building metaphors. 
 
 
Gender and science studies 
 
Trying to build a bridge between the different waves of feminism thought and 
their impact onto the concept of female gaze, we can, by a simplification, outline 
three moments or focuses78. A first focus is related to the very first moment of 
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feminist reflection, in which women attempted to gain an equal dignity to that of 
men and, therefore, attempted to conform their own position and their own gaze to 
masculine gaze: a central point of view, distanced from the world it is looking at, a 
mastering and unequivocal perspective gaze. In a second moment, more or less 
detectable between 1960-1980, feminist critics, focused on the liberation of 
women from the patriarchal model, unveiling the sexist matrix that had formed the 
whole western culture paradigm, from science to psychoanalysis, from philosophy 
to art: the predominance of view among the other senses is now seen as a 
metaphor of the penetrating male model over the whole nature, that included 
women themselves. They had, therefore, to react to this cultural construction 
passed off as real, and to rediscover an alternative sense, closer to their thought – 
i.e. touch – or at least rediscover a multiple way of knowing, funded on a mixture 
of senses rather than on their division. During the last years of the twentieth 
century, a new approach to feminism critiques took place within a specific field of 
research, that of ―hard‖ science, a usually male oriented territory. Many women 
scientists – a lot of who eventually changed their field of investigation from 
precisely scientific to cultural analysis – challenged the consideration of vision as a 
patriarchal sense. According to this opinion, considering the whole sense of vision 
as a model of purely masculine knowledge means reducing the discussion within 
the same patriarchal stereotypes women are trying to fight, rather than to create a 
new model supplanting all the forms of sex supremacies within this sense. New 
feminism is, finally, trying to restart the study of female vision in its own difference, 
from a scientific point of view, giving back the vision to women. 
A close relation between the practices and the politics of gender, especially of 
female gender, and the practices and politics of science has been made by Donna 
J. Haraway, who posed the raising of feminism as a western political theory at the 
same historical moment and reason of the raising of biology and anthropology, i.e., 
in the nineteenth century, with very deep roots in the eighteenth century, or even 
before as this research is attempting to demonstrate:  
 
in this period the organism – animal, personal and social – became the privileged 
natural-technical object of knowledge. Organisms were structured by the principles of 
the division of labor. The special efficiencies derived from the separations and 
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functional management of the new scientific entities called race, sex, class had 
particularly strong effects79. 
 
Once the biological organism has been historically defined, even the human 
body becomes «a particular cultural form of appropriation-conversation, not the 
unmediated natural truth of the body»80. 
The female body, in particular – so long a desired object –, becomes a 
condensed focus of medical and psychoanalytic practices – as we have already 
seen at the beginning of this chapter – and of the social theory of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century. 
A new way of describing the world as separation and functional management 
was emerging, anyway it was still a work of men, made from their own point of 
view and confused as the absolute truth. 
―Science feminism‖ would challenge such a claim, not in believing in a real 
objective science free of any gender-class-race orientation, rather by describing 
the science as a socially constructed category, as well as gender, class and race. 
Thus, if we assume that women are made and not born, the same should be, 
Keller claims, for what concerns men, and for what concerns science as well. This 
last point could be the most difficult to accept within a culture that relies on 
science, the faith of its own ability of mastering, or at least describing the world. 
How could we by now describe science, if it is no more the faithful mirror of 
nature? Keller proposes that «science is the name we give to a set of practices 
and a body of knowledge delineated by a community, not simply defined by the 
exigencies of logical proof and experimental verification. Similarly masculine and 
feminine are categories defined by a culture, not by biological necessity»81.  
Thus, being scientific knowledge no longer a pure neutrality, rather a local 
shared ideology, we need to ask when and how this mirror of the nature was 
broken. Keller has no doubt, this change depends on two different and apparently 
independent turns in scholarship: the social studies of science, and the feminist 
theory. The first has pointed out the unexpected relations between science and 
society, but also the impact society can act on science and vice versa, even 
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though without considering the role of gender. The second has pointed out the 
relation between gender and society, even though without concerning the role of 
science. Three turns – Kuhn’s paradigm, social studies of science, feminist study 
of society – have brought a deep concerning in the world view as no longer 
grounded on a collection of facts organized within an inner logic, rather as the 
representations in which different scientific points of view (philosophical, 
theological or teleological), different interpretations of the world (for instance 
considering it the centre of the universe rather than one of the other stars rotating 
around the sun), and mostly different organizations of knowledge (the separation 
among the ways of knowing or their integration) can define what we call science. 
Briefly, deciding what kind of phenomena are worth studying and which form of 
data is significant in these phenomena or at least adequate, depend on the social, 
linguistic, and, of course, scientific grounds on which this decision was taken. 
In Haraway’s critic this is exactly what leads to a new consideration of the 
assumed distinction between fact and fiction, a distinction belonging to science, in 
dividing its own territory from that of popular culture. A fact should be what has 
actually and independently happened, and what has been known by direct 
experience, by testimony, and by interrogation82. On the other hand fiction is what 
has no objective status or no meaning in the growing of knowledge even if it can 
be in such way connected with the ―real‖: «Fiction can be imagined as a derivative, 
fabricated version of the world and experience, as a kind of perverse double for 
the fact or an escape through fantasy into a better world […] tones of meaning in 
fiction make us hear its origin in vision, inspiration, insight, genius»83. The 
etymologic study of Haraway shows how both fact and fiction stay in the territory 
dealing with the action of man: «facts are opposed to opinion, prejudice, and not to 
fiction». This will be a main focus of the distinction between female and male 
vision in the following chapters. In this moment, it would be only necessary to point 
out how the discussion of science seems to be grounded on a linguistic and 
culture territory, no less then other narratives. 
This, of course, can in no way mean that we do not need to take into account 
the successes science has achieved, even though in such a structured way. What 
we need to do is understand how these successes have been affected by the 
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political, social, historical, in one world cultural, commitments of individuals or 
groups, consciously or not. A feminist perspective can help us to unveil the 
popular mythology that usually distinguish the objectivity as an intellectual work 
grounded on mind, reason and male gender, from the subjectivity, as an emotional 
work grounded on emotional, natural and in so far feminine gender. It is the same 
distinction we have already seen carrying all the western discussion about vision, 
as a main means of knowledge, i.e. science, from Plato on. In this division 
between emotional and intellectual labor, Keller claims, «women have been the 
guarantors and protectors of the personal, the emotional, the particular, whereas 
science – the province par excellence of the impersonal, the rational, and the 
general – has been the preserve of men»84. 
As we have already seen, the social study of science has partly rejected the 
assumed ―neutrality of science‖ on behalf of a more shared agreement within a 
scientific community85. However, this turn in the history of science does not mean 
a radical protest of the gender and social oriented organization of science and of 
its commitments, rather a shift from a division between subjectivity and objectivity 
to a division between private and public, personal and impersonal, that leads to an 
already known division between feminine and masculine, thus ensuring once 
again the autonomy of science. A further step towards a greater awareness of the 
influence of gender on science and vice versa, could be made by the feminist side 
of this new critics, by providing a new subject to analyze and a new way of 
analyzing it, that is by using the expertise usually belonging to women, rather than 
trying to erase this ―otherness‖: «not simply as a woman’s perspective, but as a 
critical instrument for examining the roots of those dichotomies that isolate this 
perspective and deny its legitimacy [...] understanding of the history, philosophy, 
and sociology of science through the inclusion […] of those domains of human 
experience that have been relegated to women: namely, the personal, the 
emotional, and the sexual»86. 
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The status of outsider now becomes a privilege, or at least a provocative point 
of view, in the twentieth century as well as in the seventeenth century. And if Keller 
«began to see the network of gender associations in the characteristic language of 
science as neither natural nor self-evident, but as contingent, and dismaying»87 so 
had Cavendish, Behn and Haywood. Anyway, Haraway warns against the 
romanticizing in appropriating the point of view of the subjected. Even this kind of 
vision is neither innocent nor unproblematic, and, beyond this, it needs to be 
critically examined, interpreted or even deconstructed. Even ―seeing from below‖ is 
a learned skill, formed by means of the language and of the whole culture, more or 
less as the highest techno-scientific visualization. Haraway agrees with Keller in 
considering this extraordinary point of view as a useful point of view for feminist re-
appropriation of vision, for it cannot consider its own vision neither as unique nor 
as unmediated, and, moreover, it works beyond the definition of an identity, mostly 
a self-identity: «Only those occupying the positions of dominators are self-
identical, unmarked, disembodied, unmediated, transcendent»88. Now, since no 
kind of identity produces knowledge, but only objectivity, and only (self)critical 
positioning, therefore only a position from below is productive, for it is aware of the 
embodiment, and therefore particularity, of its own sight. 
In discussing the cardinal points on which the modern western canon is 
founded, Keller leads a precise reflection on the vision as a model of supreme 
knowledge. She found three fundamental points, that in different ways we have 
already encountered during our discussion: the simultaneity of presence, the 
dynamic neutrality and the objectifying dependence on distance89. The 
simultaneity of vision reveals the peculiar character of spatiality, rather than 
temporality related to vision and to its eternal sense: «Indeed only the simultaneity 
of sight, with its extended ―present‖ of enduring objects, allows the distinction 
between change and the unchanging and therefore between being and becoming. 
All the other senses operate by registering change and cannot make that 
distinction. Only sight therefore provides the sensual basis on which the mind can 
conceive the idea of the eternal, that which never changes and is always 
                                            
87
 Ivi, p. 12. 
88
 Donna J. Haraway, op. cit., p. 177. 
89
 These are the three points of residence of the supposed ―nobility of sight‖, according to Hans 
Jonas, The Nobility of Sight, in «Philosophy and and Phenomenological Research» 14 (1954), pp. 
507–519. 
 58 
present»90. The dynamic neutrality is the most shared aspect of vision, as well as 
for those resulting directly from it, the lack of engagement and the absence of 
intercourse: «I see without the object is doing anything […] I have nothing to do 
but to look and the object is not affected by that […] and I am not affected by 
that»91. This is the main point to affirm the objectivity of sight in spite of all the 
other senses that always imply a sort of modification whether in the object or in the 
subject, and what distinguishes the theory from the practice. But the most 
determining source of objectivity stays in the dependence of sight on distance: «to 
get the proper view we get the proper distance»92, this is the motto of the whole 
perspective scopic regime. This is precisely the aspect Keller, together with 
Irigaray, Haraway and others, pointed out. The expected distance of the object 
from the subject, as well as the resulting objectivity, neutrality and eternal 
simultaneity, represents, if not just simulates, only one of the possible models of 
sight. A model that is not able to neither explain nor to understand the mechanism, 
for instance, of the looking into eyes, or of the locking eyes: «a visual experience 
not centrally contained in the experience of looking at or surveying […] a form of 
communication and communion […] in direct eye contact, we have a visual 
experience quite different from and in many ways even opposed to the sense of 
distance and objectivity evoked by merely looking at an object»93. In unveiling the 
constructed model of vision as a distanced and painless process for both the 
subject and the object, Evelyn Fox Keller shares the same instances which 
feminists like Laura Mulvey had already pointed out about the pleasure of 
cinematographic male gaze, and, as a result, the violence that can be felt by the 
object of a gaze, as Sartre had pointed out in his theory of the ―to-be-looked-at-
ness‖ that inspired Mulvey research. 
However, the point Keller wants to stress is a point, in such a way connecting 
with Cixous’s legacy, about the voyeurism. In catching the latent eroticism, veiled 
by the expected total disembodied of the gaze, both Cixous and Keller discover 
the main aim of feminist re-appropriation of the visual, by de-erotizing it. A vision 
with no expansionistic or sexual will, with no desire to possess or univocal reason 
to apply, it is a new model to oppose to patriarchal model, once the visual appears 
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as inescapable and new concepts of vision and light in physics and optics leave no 
more temporality neither neutrality to the means of philosophy and scientists. 
What is, then, the way for analyzing and re-appropriating the vision from a 
feminine point of view? In attempting a propose Donna Haraway talks about the 
―persistence of vision‖94. In this metaphorical reliance on the ―maligned sensory 
system in feminist discourse‖, precisely the vision, Haraway focuses, once again, 
on the fantasy of objectivity doctrines on which the hierarchical systematization of 
knowledge has been funded, even by feminist approaches. This is the way in 
which the sight has been designed as ―a perverse capacity‖ of distancing from the 
object of its own power in very different contexts, such as capitalistic, colonialist, 
gendered and, even, military. Once this supremacy is posed, amplified by the 
prosthetic instruments of vision, the vision has become the infinitely mobile sense 
we already know, able to reach everything and everywhere. A feminist writing on 
the vision should, therefore, insist on the particularity and the embodiment of all 
kinds of vision, overcoming the ―partial perspective‖ that has brought all modern 
sciences to believe in a false transcendent vision and in the promise of objectivity.  
A new feminist objectivity is still possible. It stays in a limited location, and in a 
situated knowledge, aware of the responsibility of its visual practices, and of the 
power exercised through them. This is a new way to learn how we see in our body 
and, therefore, in a particular way, neither unmediated nor passive, rather in highly 
specific visual possibilities, partial ways of organizing the world. Difference (or 
differance, once again), is the new key word: «that’s not alienating distance; that’s 
a possible allegory for feminist version of objectivity. Understanding how these 
visual systems work, technically, socially, and psychically ought to be a way of 
embodying feminist objectivity»95. In re-appropriating not only vision but more in 
general objectivity, Haraway avoids to fall in the trap of relativism that, as she 
herself claims, is a perfect ―mirror twin of totalization‖, since both deny localization, 
embodiment and the partiality of their own perspective. The new model of sight is 
no more that of organized axes, such as that of the dichotomy, that leads to the 
illusion of symmetry in which any position is alternative and mutually exclusive with 
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the other, but that of the web, of nodes of fields, in which the new subject – no 
more self confident, as self identity is a bad visual system, or fused, as fusion is a 
bad strategy of positioning – is shaped in a non isomorphic form, that is constantly 
ready to position subjects in perspectives never known in advance, nor being 
predictable. This implies a really important task for «the sciences and politics of 
interpretation, translation, and the partly understood»96. There is no longer a single 
way to view, and the images we see are to be interpreted, considering all the 
variables of gender, class, race, and so on implying. Optics is no longer sufficient 
in educating our sight, what we need are new ways of ―visual literacy‖, made of 
interpretation and re-interpretation. These are the sciences of a multiple subject, 
seeing in double ways. These are the sciences of a critical vision no more 
positioned in a ―homogeneous gendered social space‖:  
 
So location is about vulnerability; location resists the politics of closure, finality […] 
feminist objectivity resists simplification […] that is because feminist embodiment 
resists fixation and is insatiably curious about the webs of differential positioning. There 
is no single feminist standpoint because our maps require too many dimensions for 
that metaphor to ground our vision.97 
 
The challenge to phallocularcentrism is therefore the position of a partial sight 
and a limited voice. In this position partiality has no importance in itself, but in the 
disclosure of unexpected connections that a situated knowledge can reach. 
Haraway says that «the only way to find a larger vision is to be somewhere in 
particular». This is not the perspective from above, the one that overcome the 
limits of the subject, rather the joining of many particular, different  points of view, 
and positioning them in a collective – still multiple and non-homogeneous – 
subject. 
Trying to sum up what this history/story of the gaze – however partial, or, we 
can now affirm, just because partial – has taught us, we can say that since its 
origin the human concern about sight has always been linked with the concerning 
about objectivity in such a way that the latter, in all its little differing positions, 
seems to be a litmus test of the sight, in all its great differing images. Precisely the 
question of objectivity with all the leading dichotomies it carries out – 
subject/object, activeness/passiveness, etc – has created the fundamental 
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detachment and a feeling of absence in the western male theory of vision. Once 
this empty space has been filled with air, matter and light, and the two parts 
playing the match have been reconnected by paradoxically multiplying the points 
of view of the two both, even the concept of objectivity has been changed as well 
as that of the two poles of destroyed dichotomy. 
Starting from these points an increasing complication of the gaze has been 
triggered, in which the sexual racial and cultural implications, i.e. the subject of 
election of the twentieth-century philosophy, made it an object more and more 
misunderstood, so that few philosophers believed it could still be trusted. 
The history of modern vision is so built on endless attempts of domination and 
resistance, on cross directions, hazards and new ways out. Above all, in spite of 
the "surrender" of Freud, we have probably come a little further towards the 
explanation of how the feminine side of the eye works, a phenomenon as complex 
as, for so long, underestimated that it is actually difficult to become aware of. 
After renouncing any form of schematization, we have here a new target: to 
propose a different perspective, to turn the telescope of modernity upside down, 
as Benjamin has taught us, using the critical tools to investigate the archeology of 
this issue. Studying the place, time and manner in which the female gaze was 
born, or at least in which it began its process of individualization, may contribute if 
not to define the structure, at least to order the components; if not to find an 
alternative to the dominant scopic regimes, at least to build a genealogy of the 
issues. 
So let's get back to the moment when for the first time the gaze of the woman 
passed through a lens and let’s see what she saw and how she did it (in spite of 
man). 
 
Con-texts 
 
In his research on The order of Things devoted to the origins on which grounds 
the positivist of the western episteme, Foucault affirms that his work is not an 
attempt to manifest a history of growing perfection towards the target of objectivity, 
as many may think, rather a history of the conditions of that possibility98. This 
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archaeological excavation brought into light two fundamental discontinuities in this 
episteme, one detectable in the seventeenth century, which he called the 
―Classical Age‖, the other during the nineteenth century, the ―Modern Age‖ of 
knowledge. The two ages are presented as the two poles of a non linear evolution 
of the concern of human beings with their own faculties of knowing, an evolution 
starting with a certain coherence between the theory of representation and the 
theories of language, natural order, wealth and value, and arriving to a deep crisis 
of the representation that looses its task of foundation of all possibly knowable 
things, thus leading into an increasingly inner-reflexivity (or hidden-reflexivity) that 
took the place of out-observation. In this perspective the history of human 
sciences seems to be a history of resemblance, of what were the conditions in 
classical thought for reflecting the relations of similarity or equivalence between 
things. Up to the end of the sixteenth century resemblance was a means of 
knowing visible and invisible things, as the universe was «folded in upon itself, 
earth echoing sky»99. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, however, 
knowledge ceased to move within this territory, similarity was no more a form of 
knowledge rather a source of error or illusion, at least since Descartes and Bacon 
were warned by idols that made people believe things resembling what they 
learned and that things are connected to each other. This is the rising of 
rationalism, that is of the abandoning of old superstitions or magical belief in signs, 
and the «entry of nature into scientific order»100.  
But what happened that provoked this revolution that, as we will see, will be not 
only scientific but also cultural? What made the seventeenth century such a 
turning moment that gave origins to a new deal for science? And could that be the 
origin of what we are looking for, the female gaze? 
The discovery and development of lenses, their evolution in the instruments of 
the telescope and microscope, and especially the observations they permitted 
during the early seventeenth century represented the cornerstone of the cultural 
revolution that would bring the new approach for the study of nature Foucault was 
talking about. An innovative approach both for what concerns science and for what 
concerns philosophy, which began to evolve from metaphysical studies towards 
the way already glimpsed by Copernicus and now paved by Kepler's theories and 
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Galileo’s studies. Thus was born the natural philosophy, a term that replaced, in 
the present century, the anachronistic and now unsatisfactory term of scientia. 
Scientists became in this way natural philosophers, thereby making explicit the 
inevitable scientific conditions on philosophical speculations. 
While on one side, the new perception of the world through these tools 
encouraged confidence in the new horizons reached by the human intellect, on the 
other it put a strain on certainties and points of reference for thousands of years 
leading the knowledge and consciousness of men, who found themselves 
increasingly competing with worlds imponderable for their vastness or minuteness. 
As new discoveries and the resulting speculation spread from laboratories, 
academies and scientific societies throughout amateur studios, magazines, more 
or less scientific publications, new worlds penetrated the everyday imaginary also 
reflecting through imagination, critique, and humor in the seventeenth century 
literature and the following century. Western man was now fully aware that the 
Earth and the Universe known so far were only a small portion of the newly 
revealed reality. Time and space exploded in front of the new fields of vision 
offered by the microscope and the telescope, and the plurality of worlds became a 
doctrine increasingly discussed between the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries101.  
Since western amateurs were neither aware of what they had seen till this 
moment, nor of the correspondence of our world with the sky, the resemblance – 
that was the main system of knowledge during the sixteenth century, relating 
human skill to know not in seeing or demonstrating but in interpretation – was 
about to be replaced with analysis, that is the task of finding relations between 
beings in form, order and measurement. This is, therefore, a form of knowledge 
grounded on identity and difference, having by now, nothing to do with divination, 
since it resided no more in a discovery of signs. Signs were present, and no longer 
precedent, to the process of knowledge itself.  
                                            
101
 One of the most popular books in France and England in the late seventeenth century was 
Conversations on the plurality of the Worlds (Entretiens sur la plurality des mondes), in which 
Fontenelle introduced an as intelligent as uneducated Marquise to the new discoveries of 
astronomy with some references to the new horizons of microscopy. This text written in 1686 is 
one of the first in which it has made clear that the boundary between the professional scientist, or 
should I say the natural philosopher, and the amateur will go by more and more indefinite. Even the 
ladies, in the opinion of some authors, should have been encouraged to study science which, by 
their natural curiosity and their indifference to the practical life, seemed to show a particular 
propensity. This will be, of course, a primary point for our discussion. 
 64 
Not that our senses were now considered infinitely powerful, rather they were 
inevitable, however partial, kinds of knowledge. If observation became the 
privileged tool of science, it is because of the technical improvements introduced 
by the optical devices of the time, and because it allowed natural philosophers to 
see at a glance of the new comparative tables all the history of the living being 
they were looking at. Science now matched with history, not meaning that we see 
what others have seen, what others have imagined, but in the sense of a purified 
document resulting by meticulous observation and eventual transcription in 
―neutralized words‖, as signs were no longer a part of things themselves rather 
modes of representation. Thus, we are looking at a double character of the newly 
born natural history: a new faith in the progress of technology of vision, and a 
clash with a reality far from our intellect and only partially knowing through senses.  
Indeed, not everything that comes in contact with us can become an object of 
scientific observation. The new science seems to exclude the other senses, 
because of their variability and their incapability of knowing things by means of 
systematic separations of components and reorganization as a whole. Thus, 
hearsay, taste and smell are excluded, and touch is limited only to few lateral 
observations – such as smoothness instead of roughness. Linnaeus noticed: «we 
should reject … all accidental notes that do not exist in the Plant either for the eye 
or for the touch»102.  
If the privilege of vision acts through a sensory restriction, on the other hand, it 
extends towards new objects, thanks to the optical devices that compensate for 
these restrictions. But, was sight enough to transmit observations from generation 
to generation? That is, was it a good conductor of history? Natural historians were 
not sure about that. In fact microscope and telescope were created precisely to 
overcome this limitation: «the use of microscope was based upon a non-
instrumental relation between things and the human eye – a relation that defines 
natural history»103. That is why observation needs a structure to make its 
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purification possible: «Structure is that designation of the visible which, by means 
of a kind of pre-linguistic sifting, enables it to be transcribed into language»104. 
Thus, among the scientific and technological discoveries that contributed to the 
development of the new philosophy, a primary role is that of the lenses and of their 
development and specialization. If the use of the telescope has enabled the full 
affirmation of the Copernican theory and rekindled interest in theories about the 
large number of extraterrestrial worlds, the subsequent evolution of the 
microscope opened a new window on what until now had remained invisible. The 
subvisilia, on one hand, seemed to encourage the human aspiration to unveiling 
the secrets of nature and the pursuit of knowledge in the world as it is, on the other 
hand, they expanded, out of all proportion, to the perception of different planets 
with respect to which the man could no longer consider himself as a 
measurement. Through the telescope the fixed stars showed quite a different 
nature from that of pure delight for human eyes. There was the scene of distant 
solar systems totally independent from life on Earth. While many did not want to 
accept it, man and Earth were no longer the center of the universe. Through the 
microscope complex social structures, beings endowed with great physical skills, 
and possibly intellectual skills, filled the empty spaces of nature so far considered. 
The cultural upheaval brought by revolution, at the basis of our own conception 
of the world and nature, was very explosive in society at the time, a crucial 
specimen of which was the restriction of benchmarks in human measures. In the 
relativization that followed the development of modern science, the new perception 
of space and time, due to enlargement or shrinking of dimensions of reality, was 
the trait d'union of scientific writings. The measurement of large and small could 
no longer aspire to any absolute value. It had become a mere result of 
comparative mechanism, so that even the measurements of space and time had 
to be conditioned. Not only, therefore, man lost his confidence in being the 
measurement of the universe, in learning about space through absolute 
measurements, but the immediate perception of time itself - that which governs the 
rhythms of animal life even more than human, not subject to social conventions - 
came back in what must have seemed to many like a whirlwind comparison105. 
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The transition from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century witnessed the 
clash between a conception of human knowledge based on reason, in an a priori 
unique position in knowing the surrounding world, and one based on the senses, 
the only means of empirical knowledge and therefore limited to the perceptions of 
those experiences. The English empiricism provoked some skepticism based on 
the limit of the human senses, but the dissemination of contemporary 
technological tools such as the telescope and microscope, and above all the 
revolutionary scientific discoveries related to them, seemed to open new horizons 
for scientists and philosophers. If the human mind remains, at least until Kant, an 
instrument linked to concepts such as those of space and time, the amplification of 
sensory skills, especially related to sight, will seem to restore some confidence in 
human knowledge, sometimes even releasing it from the influence of God. 
Philosophers and writers were involved in a new speculative horizon, along with 
science and philosophy - that of natural philosophy – that hid a danger of 
confusion and threatened the impossibility of action for the human mind and soul. 
Indeed, the new worlds with whom humankind came in contact, did not correspond 
to anything in previous human knowledge, and, while the multiplication of worlds - 
microscopic and macroscopic - excited the imagination of those who thought they 
could project positivity and genuineness onto these characters, the lenses seemed 
to show with indisputable clarity how limited was the world of man.  
Among these were even those who saw the new revolutionary optical devices 
as entertainment opportunities and embryonic forms of spectacle. New seeds 
began to spread among scientific laboratories, magazines and fictional inventions, 
starting a contagion. The lenses of microscopes and telescopes, screens that put 
the subject of research away from its object, would soon become thresholds 
through which not only humans would be able to unlock the hidden treasures of 
nature, but also the most hidden secrets of creation could invade his world in the 
balance between microcosm and macrocosm. 
From an art-historian point of view, William Irving identifies this period as that of 
the ―rationalization of sight‖ triggered by two motors: the impact of linear or one-
point perspective on the visual culture of post-Renaissance Europe, and the 
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establishment of a new basis for vision grounded on the aims of objectivity which 
led visual perception to a perfect match with natural reality or external fact. As both 
Foucault’s historical reconstruction and ours have showed, neither was the vision 
conceived as capable of knowing everything that came into contact with it, nor the 
observation was useful by itself, if not regimented within a specific structure. 
Moreover, what the eye saw through lenses was in no way safely or securingly 
correspondent to what could be expected or even hoped. Even Stuart Clark in 
Vanities of the Eye claims that «during the early modern period, and more 
especially between the Reformation and Scientific Revolution, vision was anything 
but objectively established or secure in its supposed relationship to external 
fact»106.  
Precisely the question of objectivity is central to the question of vision in the 
early modern period and, as we have already seen, it will remain central in the 
history of vision till nowadays107. It has to do not only with regard to the 
philosophical separation between matter to be known and mind to be knower, but 
also with the socially constructed ways in which sight works. It is, as Norman 
Bryson has already claimed, the collective visual experience of human beings 
submitting retinal experience to the social description of an intelligible world. It is in 
some way connected to the structure of scientific discourse Foucault described, 
not even taking up space to ―visual disturbance‖, to the deviation from this social 
construction108.  
Again, what is the form itself of a precise period thought if not the relation 
between a culture and its representations? Or between a culture and the limits of 
what is thinkable or not within that system, and the ways to go beyond those limits 
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themselves109? In such a way the mechanism of vision becomes a political matter 
of visual protocols, particularly interesting when they have to deal with a period of 
shock and dislocation, as did the period between the fifteenth and the seventeenth 
centuries, suffering a visual paradox for distinguishing between the true or false 
was possible only on a visual ground. Even though the works of Descartes and 
Hobbes, among others, could be seen as an attempt to restore visual rationality on 
to new philosophical principles, still in the early modern period, visual experience 
began to be built as a cultural rather than natural experience. 
Science and human observation were led to a reality that was dealing not only 
with dis-embodied natural phenomena, but also with social and material elements. 
Early modern scientists or natural philosophers, seemed to be conscious of the 
dangerous path this instable reality could have reduced the prestige of their 
studies to, and precisely for this reason tried to define the offspring of their 
observation within a precise and finite space, that of the experiment, whose 
precise rules and instruments worked on two fronts, that of learning and that of 
persuasion. Thus, not only the instruments, which we have already talked about, 
served as a means to extend senses, but on them, perhaps more than on the 
experimenter himself, resided the reliability of the experiment: «in this sense the 
experimenter is constrained by the instrument used»110.  
Once again the importance of optical devices in working science but also in 
cultural concerning of sight is stressed. That is why nowadays many studies are 
devoted to the material history of the instruments that surrounded the scientific 
revolution, such as those of Willem Hackmann and of Simon Shaffer. 
In his works Hackmann tries to go beyond the conventional distinction of 
scientific instruments as mathematical, optical and natural-philosophical by 
concerning them as alternately ―active‖ or ―passive‖ devices, with respect to the 
interaction with the experimenter. The formers were used to produce new 
phenomena by actively interacting with nature, that is isolating phenomena in a 
controlled environment, it was the case of air pump111 or of electrical machines. 
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The latter were those ones used for measurement and observation. Of course this 
distinction is only given to orientate since, as Hackman himself claims, it hardly 
could define the position of such important devices such as the telescope or 
microscope, being them passive, as they don’t actually interact with nature, but 
active as they revealed unexpected phenomena and allow the observation of 
things, as well as beings, which the naked eye would never be able to perceive112. 
However, the most interesting offspring of these researches is the relation they 
founded between the spreading of the optical devices in early modern period and 
the different communities participating in this spreading, and the ways in these 
communities, each for its part, influenced scientific thought sharing: «more than 
one community was involved in the production and the use of instruments. A 
community of makers and salesman interacted with the experimenters in complex 
ways, and this market place was a site of key importance for the establishment of 
the authority and repute of the various devices of experimental sciences»113. 
Thus, not only knowledge needs instruments to affirm its credibility in 
replicability and ―transparency‖114 – in such a way that leads Bachelard to talk of 
phenomenon techniques115 – but also these instruments need to be standardized 
and commonly agreed, since they do not enter the laboratory being ready made. 
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In fact, the great dissemination of devices brought out the necessity to asset public 
standards both for instruments and for instrumental performances. This led, as a 
consequence to the development, to the survival and the growth of experimental 
communities communicating with each other. Curiously, parts of these 
communities were considered lens makers, who in turn, had to reach a standard 
or to fix one against which all the glasses belonging to scientific communities of 
the time were to be compared116. The significance of an experiment also resided 
on the glassmaker who made the instrument adopted in it. 
As the studies on the uses of experiments in natural philosophy, made by 
Simon Shaffer, have demonstrated, all this artifice didn’t seem neither to go 
against the principles of nature itself that is the object of study, nor to violate it with 
instruments made outside its system. In fact, a new relation was founded between 
nature and the ―gentlemen‖, thanks to the ―inscription devices‖117, i.e. the means of 
scriptural interpretations made by experimental works. This is the point of view 
most shared among scientists of the period. Galileo for instance considered nature 
as «a divinely authored book written in mathematical language» to be read, or 
better, opened by natural philosophy and its instruments, precisely in the way 
Bacon claimed that nature should be interpreted through the senses, aided by 
experiment fit and opposite118. The validity, however limited, of sense experience 
is again on stage so that Bacon felt the need to distinguish between what was 
directly experienced and the invisible phenomena that could only be evoked. A 
kind of magic in the interpretation of nature again threatened the scientific 
revolution that had just released the resemblance of the baroque age. This is 
probably why Newton tries to fix another difference between a mathematical 
formulation and the creation of a completely new model, as a kind of physical and 
not verbal, in his opinion was too human, explanation. Thus Optics, probably the 
most followed writings in the following eighteenth century, is characterized by an 
astonishing sequence of experimental proofs, models of ―real‖ natural process. 
Reproduction still stayed there, but it was no longer made directly by the human 
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hand, or at least so appeared to Galileo who insisted that the images ―revealed‖ by 
his telescope existed in the real world and were not artifacts of the instruments or 
infringements of imagination. 
 The period we are analyzing is that one in which epistemic values seem to be 
closely linked to scientific visualization, a visualization that by means of the 
standardization of its own instruments and process could provide a guarantee of 
objectivity. Indeed, if according to Foucault the history of human sciences can be 
represented as a history of resemblance, according to Lorraine Daston and Peter 
Galison119 it can be represented precisely as a history of objectivity. This is a 
primary point, since the reliance on the possibility of a mechanical objectivity, born 
with the scientific revolution in early modern period, would even affect nineteenth 
century science very heavily, and part of the twentieth century. But what did 
science mean by the term ―objectivity‖ throughout these three hundred years of 
history? The most common and continuous character of this concept, in Daston’s 
view, seems to rely on a kind of self-denying passivity, as an automatism or even 
a blind sight of the experimenter in conducting his observations and the deriving 
interpretations. From seventeenth century on, this kind of self-restraint achieved a 
moral value or, should I say, epistemic virtue in the faithful reading of the nature 
books. Here stays, as Foucault noticed, the shift from the statements’ authority of 
scholasticism to the most impersonal statements of the matter of fact in new 
science120. 
As Simon Shaffer again has pointed out, the original ideology of natural 
philosophy seems to stay all in the Royal Society motto: ―Nullius in verba‖. Indeed 
Robert Boyle, doyen of the experimental philosophers within that society, was one 
of the strongest supporters of faith in laboratory objects rather than in 
untrustworthy men, and right in his Occasional Reflections upon Several Subjects, 
written in 1665, the origin of this trust in objectivity can be found. It sums up two 
notions, that of «evidence as a gesture beyond the fact to some other state of 
affaire», as Hacking noticed121, and that which «carries the rhetorical sense of 
vividness, a gesture which refers to the immediate appeal of the fact itself», as 
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Shaffer added122. The program Boyle realized in this work, and in the entire 
research he did, is a very particular scientific program, for his end is that of 
transcribing his witness of artificial experiences. Transcribing has here a particular 
meaning, inasmuch it assumes the value of creating an emblem in the metaphor of 
inscription for, in the solitude of his laboratory, the scientist reads and then re-
writes the secret’s of God’s nature. In so doing he achieves a double end, that of 
disclosing the secret signs of nature, and that of shaping his own moral character. 
The word of the scientist becomes in this way self-evident, not because of its 
authority, but because of his own skills to distract his observation from the limits of 
the human body and to make them pure and neutral.  
But mostly he is trustworthy because he, as well as own body, belongs to the 
collective body of scientific communion. A guild, Hobbes would have said, 
equipped with instrumental technology, literary reportage, and, moreover, a social 
organization defining the way in which he reports his practical experiences. It is 
what Shaffer calls the ―evidential context‖, that is the power and the authority of a 
corporation of experimental philosophers. As we have already seen: «new 
experimental regimes were designed to distract attention from the person of the 
experimenter by making instruments into inscription devices and by automating 
the experimental process. New scientific disciplines needed disciplined 
instrumental techniques and docile bodies. Self-registration became a key goal for 
modern instrumental design»123. The body became at the same time the object of 
experimenter’s surveys and for the collectiveness that gave them authority. This is 
the way in which knowledge invested the body and determined the forms it was 
subject to, that is the ―political anatomy‖ of experimental philosophy124. 
One interesting matter leading with this is how social issues of difference, such 
as gender, class and race, could affect this epistemic value of objectivity, from 
seventeenth century on. This, of course, could not have any impact on the design 
of the norms and standards still operating through nineteenth century science. 
Many scholars, such as Donna Haraway, Londa Schiebinger, Rusty Shteir, Evelyn 
Fox Keller, and Daston and Galison themselves, have demonstrated how it is a 
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value created within a particular circle of persons: male, white, middle-class, ―men 
of science‖. Among these diverse points of view, all agreeing on the partiality 
rather than neutrality of the concept of objectivity, Keller insists on objectivity as an 
illusion reflecting an image of the self (the experimenter), autonomous and himself 
objectified. He is severed from outside world of objects, not being the objects of 
his laboratory, and, at the same time, severed from his own subject, since he must 
be a passive register.  
On the other side, however, this supposed neutrality conflicts with the ideology 
of detachment, perfectly fitting with the Baconian vision. A vision, on which natural 
philosophy is grounded, that more or less consciously conceives knowledge as 
power, at least power to know the hidden connections in the world, and to the 
highest degree, that of dominating nature. This kind of knowledge seems to have a 
certain relation with sexuality as well, and it is not a case that often metaphors of 
sexual discovers were used in describing natural discovers. Keller argues that this 
is an emotionally constituted connection deriving from the lack of continuity 
between subject and object of experimentation, and it represents a risk for 
objectivity to be contaminated with domination125. 
This point of view makes, obviously, not only the experimenter a dominative, 
rather than neutral, observer, who can reach all the deepest secrets of a feminized 
nature, even with the help of objectifying instruments, but also of the object of his 
penetrating gaze, an actually passive object. The metaphorical and ideological 
male dominating observation is underlined in the foundation of natural philosophy 
itself and of the primary representative institution, the Royal Society. Indeed Henry 
Oldenburg, Secretary of the Society, condensed the aims of the society in the 
intention of raising a Masculine Philosophy. Thus, it is clear how the intention of 
the new science was no longer the metaphysical union of mind and nature, rather 
the establishment of the empire of man over nature. 
The dominion project so clearly explained in the foundation of natural 
philosophy, was, of course, not only a prerogative of science, but an emblem of 
the entire whole asset of the seventeenth century, a century of great social, 
economic, political and also cultural upheaval. The same definition of male and 
female assumed a polarized form as, probably never before, somehow linked to 
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the objectification of science. This is why many feminist critiques recognize in the 
dualistic reason of Descartes, the origin of modern gender difference:  
 
[Descartes] treats objectivity and reason as male, and feeling, the body, and nature as 
female. Cultural and literary critics denounce the Cartesian mechanization of nature for 
its drive to exploit a passive and limitlessly productive nature or its technocratic and 
totalitarian urge to extend the reach of scientific rationality into every corner of society. 
Regarded as synonymous with the rise of modern philosophy, Descartes bears the 
onus for relegating women to a realm of physicality and affect and for making 
disembodied consciousness the human essence126  
 
Even though the civil war seemed to have brought a push towards a certain 
sexual freedom and towards universal education, so that women were a visible 
presence even in radical aspects, the restoration, and the scientific revolution 
along with it, ended in reconsidering the economic, social and intellectual authority 
women could reach. They were finally relegated to a closed part of the society, 
that of a motherhood more debased in spite of the reverence it had acquainted 
during the past century, and denying them large access to education. Still the 
instable climate, the struggle of former hierarchies, even a new kind of relation 
between State and Church, somehow allowed the creation of however limited 
places of free-space, no man's land, or places with no or little control, where 
women acted in such a way we could today call strategic resistance. 
During the whole seventeenth century some upper-class English women tried to 
participate in the intellectual progress men were reaching. They rejected the 
alleged inferiority of female intellect and inclination towards science and 
observation, by retracing it back to the inferior education and social position they 
were constrained to. Many writers such as Hannah Wooley, Bathsua Makin, Mary 
Astell, used their writings to gain women back the right to study philosophy, foreign 
languages, medical care, and writing itself, going even beyond the rights that 
characterized manuscript women education during The Renaissance.  
Even though educated ladies partially joined science and mathematics since 
the earliest of times, this period saw the raising of the ―scientific lady‖. As Londa 
Shiebinger has noticed127, it is hard to fix an image of women in a period like this 
in which great revolutions take place in turns. Indeed, science emerged somehow 
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from a former social setting that it had in Renaissance courts its precedent form, 
which constituted both the political and intellectual centre of power. Within this 
―institution‖ high-ranked women boasted a certain privilege, which they maintained 
for a while even out of the courts. However, as the century went on nobility waned 
and gentlewomen lost their place in scientific settings. The founding of the 
academies system in Europe was one of the most decisive acts of exclusion of 
women from science, even if at the beginning of this foundation it was not that 
clear, for at least in principle they were supposed to be opened to a wide range of 
people, in fact this openness was never actual. Even though these noblewomen 
were not admitted in the academies, it doesn’t mean that they didn’t participate in 
scientific works, outside these institutions. They were active holders or partners of 
scientific cabinets or private salons, or great supporters of the same academies 
where they were excluded as illustrators or translators.  
A primary case is, of course, Aphra Behn, translator for the Royal Academy of 
Fontenelle, and other scientific works, spy for the King Charles II, politically 
influent and one of the first women to gain from her own writing works, but without 
an official role within the male system. By the way, the ―intellectual rank‖ she 
obtained, being the most prolific dramatis in England after John Dryden, allowed 
her to express her opinion against male dominating culture. Her critics were 
addressed to scientific concepts in natural philosophy, still almost influenced by 
the Cartesian mechanism, and, moreover, too affected by the illusion of objectivity 
we have so long discussed. Precisely Behn didn’t miss this objectification and the 
relative passive role it attributes to object, women and nature128. In fact, this is the 
main point that she critiques in her writings: seriously addressing the male 
chauvinism system (she was even working for), the patronizing approach to 
women of Fontenelle, unveiling the ―virtuoso’s‖ gaze129 of its political speculation, 
accusing the colonial gaze upon savages of the same sexual desire addressed to 
women. Moreover, she wasn’t afraid to put on the scene of her dramas the 
feminine (sexual) desire, in all its active and also perverse character. This is why 
as Virginia Woolf noticed: «All women together, ought to let flowers fall upon the 
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grave of Aphra Behn […] for it was she who earned them the right to speak their 
minds»130. 
Another side of the scientific revolution opened a little place in which women 
immediately found their own place in science. With the circulation of new optical 
devices, as we have already seen, and the new fashion of popularized optics 
studies, a new way of conceiving observation spread out. Looking through 
microscope and telescope was no longer a purely scientific activity, but also a 
source of honest amusement. Thus, not only gentlewomen were instructed in 
peering at the skies or at worms, but also suddenly they achieve a certain 
acquaintance in experimental physics or astronomic calculations. In these very 
years also writings devoted to the popularization of science for women became a 
primary industry and, alongside with male writings – such as that of Fontenelle and 
Algarotti – women themselves wrote to instruct other women. It is of primary 
importance to remember what Londa Schiebinger points out:  
 
Historians tend to take the case of women as authors of and audience for popular 
science as the paradigmatic example of women’s participation in modern science. Yet 
[…] relegating women to the status of amateur diminishes the contributions that women 
like Margaret Cavendish or Emilie du Châtelet made to science. Popular science was 
not sharply divided from professional science as it is today. Though today it would be 
difficult for anyone barred from university education to work in science, this was not the 
case in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when few men or women were full-time 
or salaried scientists. Some, like Galileo, were resident astronomers at a princely court; 
Bacon and Leibniz were government ministers, as well as men of letters […] this looser 
organization of science was one factor allowing those barred from universities and 
academies to find their ways into scientific circles.
131
 
 
The case of Margaret Cavendish, who tried both with philosophical observation 
and with fancies to customize women to science, is particularly significant. She 
was mainly interested in philosophy, in such a deep way that no other woman of 
that time was. She devoted a large part of her prolific scientific production to the 
critiques to Hobbes’s Leviathan, the theory of vortex by Descartes, the proof of 
God by More, Helmot’s chemistry, etc. Anyway, the Duchess of Newcastle is 
interested in our discussion because of her strategy to gain knowledge in the 
society she lived in. She was well conscious that women could hardly be admitted 
in education, let alone in scientific institution. What they had to do, therefore, was 
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to take advantage of the male system itself, for only by marrying wealth and 
educated men could they share a high education and join the most influential 
intellectual circles. This is just the way she did, marrying William Cavendish, 
founder of the Newcastle circle, joined by Thomas Hobbes, Gassendi, Descartes, 
to name a few. This system left aside all the other women of lower rank or not in 
the possibility to join such a prestigious circle. That is why she remained almost 
isolated especially from women companionship, and she was the object of such 
deep critique by feminist writers throughout the century:  
 
Garish in her dress, eccentric in her habits, chaste in her conduct, coarse in her 
speech, she succeeded during her lifetime in drawing upon herself the ridicule of the 
great and the applause of the learned. But the last echoes of that clamor have now all 
died away; she lives only in the few splendid phrases that Lamb scattered upon her 
tomb; her poems, her plays, her philosophies, her orations, her discourses—all those 
folios and quartos in which, she protested, her real life was shrined—moulder in the 
gloom of public libraries, or are decanted into tiny thimbles which hold six drops of their 
profusion.132 
 
As the enthusiasm for new science grew women took advantage of a certain 
permissiveness in letting them studying the things of nature, still considered the 
book coming from a divine order, and thus, not conflicting with the principle of 
religious virtue women had to hold since Renaissance on. 
This phenomenon of the Scientific Lady lasted very long time, for it continued to 
populate the scenes of English culture till the next century, which was 
characterized by a particular form of women popularized science and culture, that 
of the magazine. Along with male magazines, customized almost large parts by 
gentlemen, many female magazines were spread, and of diverse topics. At the 
beginning of the century, for example, the Ladies Diary was published with the aim 
to teach women ―Writing, Arithmetic, Geometry, Trigonometry, the doctrine of the 
sphere, Astronomy, Algebra, with their Dependants, viz. Surveying, Gaugin, 
Dialling, Navigation, and all Mathematical Sciences‖133. It provided a large amount 
of scientific and everyday life suggestions: chronologies of famous women, articles 
regarding Robert Boyle’s experiment, advises on marriage. The more the 
magazine spread the more the editor, John Trippe, had to focus more on 
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mathematics than on cookery, since women reading seemed to prefer ‖enigmas 
and arithmetical questions‖. 
From 1744 to 1746 another magazine as popular as the precedent was 
published. It was the Female Spectator. Its editor was anonymous but was first 
known that it was by Eliza Haywood. Actress, dramatist and prolific writer, she has 
only recently been recognized within the ―Fair Triumvirate of Wit‖, together with 
Delarivier Manley and Aphra Behn. When the Female Spectator was published the 
Scientific Revolution hadn’t completed its course, but some points of its paradigm, 
mostly the question regarding the gaze could now be seen in a more conscious 
way. Moreover, restoration was complete and, thus, not all the conditions of the 
previous century were still operating. The distinction between the role of men and 
women got exacerbated, and what was previously accepted as an adorable 
eccentricity was now considered as immoral. That is why all the work of Eliza 
Haywood, mostly that done within the periodical, seems to have a particular value. 
What is particularly interesting for our discussion is just the consciousness the 
author held about the political impact of the gaze, mostly on a gendered ground. 
Probably her experience on the stage had an important role on this kind of 
thought, but it will be astonishing to notice, in the further chapters, how the author 
pioneered the comments on the look that, we saw, lead the nineteenth and 
twentieth century. It will be enough for the moment to stress that in questioning the 
male privilege of her time Haywood chose to struggle in a precise field: the 
privilege of observation, which in turn she tried to appropriate. It is immediately 
clear, indeed, the strategy by which she appropriated for the ―Mr Spectator‖ model 
but in a specular way. Thus, she tried not to reverse male privilege by posing 
herself as a male observer, but by assuming the weight of male stereotypes, the 
mask of the coquette in her case, however reporting an unexpected look: «As a 
coquette the Female Spectator had deliberately inserted herself into a specular 
field, seeking opportunities to ―show‖ herself. Ingeniously, her experience as an 
object, a position assumed to have epistemological limits, forms the basis for her 
knowledge and authority»134. As Merritt has argued, this strategy not only gave 
women the chance to find a new model to confront with, but, moreover, it showed 
a way by which the distance between subject and object could be overcome and 
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women could exchange the desire to be looked at with that to look at: «while the 
―all-seeing‖ nature of the world may create the human subject, it is also true that 
the embodied gaze that constitutes regimes of sight and seeing is not neutral or 
benign – women do experience, disproportionately to men, the adverse effects of 
an oppressive ocular regime»135. 
The contested terrain of early modern visual culture – intended as the complex 
system involving «vision (the mechanism of the eye), image-making devices (the 
microscope, the camera obscura), and visual skills (map-making, but also 
experimenting) as cultural resources»136 – is not confined only to the field of 
scientific revolution. Other great changes took place in a more broad and popular 
cultural related with theatrical representation. This long period, indeed, witnessed 
the whole course of the early modern English theatre, from the Jacobean and 
Caroline theatre to the Restoration theatre, beginning even before, with the court 
Masque, and ending with the Reformation society and the seventeenth century 
theatre. This complex course put on the stage a various number of changes in 
culture, both from a ―material‖ point of view, dealing with the new architectural 
apparatus and new mechanisms for the scenes, and with the less material but 
equally important new concerns about characters, players, writers and topics. 
On the side of the ―material point of view‖, concerns had to do with the making 
of new theatrical images. It must be noticed how the period we are considering is 
that of a turn from the court masque and the institutionalization of specific places 
outside the court, open to nobles as well as to other sections of the population, 
assisting the same play in the same place. This institutionalization established also 
a new and more stable corporatism and a legal recognition of the theatre 
companies, which managed and fought for public appreciation. Theatre 
entertainment, thus, turned from a court affair to a popular public matter, carrying 
many political effects as we will soon see. 
The masque was a particular kind of court entertainment that blended different 
kinds of performances, dance, music, acting, and it provided also precise and 
elaborate customs and framing architecture. In England it was particularly 
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welcomed in the court of King James I and, moreover, by her consort Queen Ann 
of Denmark. Both of them used to participate in these performances held in their 
court to celebrate particular events for the crown, or, even, as a means of 
publication of personal agenda. The central aspect of the masque consisted, as it 
is simply arguable, in the concealed identity of the character who started the 
performance and who reveled his or her identity only at the end of it. 
Recent studies within New History fields, such as those of David Bevington, 
have stressed the political importance of such performances137. To afford this 
question Bevington and Holbrook begin by quoting the statements of two main 
characters of the period, Francis Bacon and Ben Johnson, the first retraining the 
masques as well as the triumphs back to toys138, the second as the impossible 
work of amusing the audience of a divided court with political entertainment139. 
These two statements question a central matter, that of the triflingness or the 
seriousness of the genre, or better the medium, of masque. Indeed, as the two 
scholars claim, to define what is serious and what is not in the small closed society 
of the court is not so simple, for all the interpersonal relations were based on the 
appearance of gestures, manners and even dressing. In this contest the 
celebration of festivities of diverse sorts was a real training ground for power and 
standing, both of which being posed on ―public‖ display.  
Another important matter to be questioned is that of the masque in respect with 
its audience, questioning in which remains the deepest political meaning of this 
kind of representation. As New Historicism has already pointed out, especially in 
the study of Orgel on the Illusion of Power140, masque not only put on stage the 
embodiment of the will of the sovereign, but also the competition for power. Thus, 
it is definable as a true symbolic form of negotiation, in the sense Greenblatt 
describes the term: the masque is then the expression of conflicting voices rather 
than the definitive mise en scène of monarchic power. At this point the politics of 
the masque becomes clearer, standing not only in the ―political theology‖ of the 
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monarch but also in the «actual political processes through which things 
happened»141.  
In this court system, that now appears less organic than previously expected, 
even women gain a ―spatial arrangement‖ particularly significant in the encoding at 
once of the spectacle and of the power. It is particularly clear within the court of 
James I, especially concerning the role his consort, Queen Ann of Denmark, 
played not only metaphorically, together with her loyal courtesans, and the 
intellectual following her, a primary place occupying Ben Jonson and Inigo Jones 
who carried out her projects. In particular the masques she commissioned to both 
the play writer and the architect are striking for the unconventional model of 
woman they conceive, an astonishing femininity provoking anxiety in the male 
audience, still presenting herself as fashionable142. 
The fixed gender opposition of male and female continues to be challenged 
even in the period following Jacobean theatre, in which the masque results 
however changed. It is the period of reign of Charles I and Queen Henrietta Maria, 
the glory of the restored reign is no way contested in the Caroline masque that 
epitomizes the power of monarchy as harmonizing over the commonwealth and 
the whole universe. It is in this context that Margaret Cavendish creates her 
writing, experiencing the influence of the visual regime still working. Not only, 
indeed, as part of the Queen court she had surely witnessed and perhaps 
participated to masques, but her husband, one of Jonson’s patrons, had 
commissioned to the play writer two (expensive) masques for the pleasure of the 
King and Queen. When Margaret began to write the course of the masque was 
almost fading, and she couldn’t be defined as a masque play writer. However, the 
cultural influence this kind of representation had played in early modern England 
was still acting on her work, especially concerning the challenging of the role of 
woman and the ambiguous effect the dress had and the role playing. Instances in 
this respect are the Convent of Pleasure, written in 1668, and the Blazing World, 
which although not a theatre work creates customizing effect as played on a 
                                            
141
 David Bevington, Peter Holbrook, op. cit. p. 9. 
142
 It is precisely the case of two of these plays, The Masque of Blackness and Hymenaey, in which 
the Queen playing with her ladies and gentlemen puts at stake the role of her consort himself and 
presents her agenda. It is impossible at this point not recollect this kind of woman self-
representation to the reflection on masquerade and femme fatale already discussed with Mary Ann 
Doane. 
 82 
masque stage143. What is more interesting to note is how the techniques and the 
effects of the masque, as a means not only of cultural representation but also of 
political expression, were used by Cavendish as forms of personal positioning 
against the role women had to occupy during her age. In this way we can interpret 
her ―playing‖ during the visit at the Royal Society, when, wearing the masque for 
her own Empress, acted in the same way in which Queen Ann had acted within 
her court, astonishing and disorienting the male spectators with a performed 
femininity. 
As the century went on, however, a changing social order took place stimulating 
the already present need of negotiation. The rivalry within the court was now 
accompanied by the rivalry between the court and the city. The theatre was again 
the elected arena of this new tension, acting now between the public shows of 
London companies and the private masque of the sovereign court. The raising of 
the puritan movement and, moreover, the breaking out of the Civil War brought to 
the closures of the theatre, which were flourishing in London from Elizabethan age 
on. Public stages were closed in 1642 and would be reopened only 18 years later, 
with the restoration and the advent to the throne of Charles II, who acted 
personally for funding a new age of theatre. 
This new age was not only characterized by a new recognized settlement of the 
theatre companies, growing more and more under the royal protection, even if not 
in a peaceful surrounding, but also by new experiments in genres, roles and 
technology. The restoration theatre, indeed, witnessed a revolutionary gender turn 
realized in two striking phenomena like the ―she-tragedy‖ and the ―breeches role‖. 
Since the feminine characters were now allowed to be acted by actresses rather 
than by actors, for the very first time in the history of theatre, the subjects and the 
topics of drama were to be changed, thus creating stories in which the main 
character, formerly a hero, was replaced by a heroine, even mirroring the popular 
consideration of the new Queen Mary II, who ruled actively at the end of 
seventeenth century. 
                                            
143
 This case is specifically observable in a passage in which the Empress appeared as an Angel 
walking on the sea water. However, this image, quoting the spectacular mis en scéne of the court 
masque, is used by Cavendish not to embrace the astonishing effect, rather to denounce the 
fallacy of the image in this way displayed, revealing the trick: she own no super power, simply she 
has been accompanied by the ―fishmen‖ coming from the blazing world.  
 83 
This first step towards a realignment of gender role was accompanied with the 
raising of the breeching roles, in which the ambiguity in the identity of character, 
already experienced within the masque was amplified creating roles in which a 
female actress had to wear male costumes. 
The novelty of the women on ―public display‖ produced a growing curiosity in 
the audience, amused by the chance of ―watching and re-watching‖ again the 
actresses on the stage. However, this was not only the age of women on the stage 
but also beyond the stage, as the case of Aphra Behn demonstrates, being one of 
the most fruitful play writers of the century. 
Behn devoted the most part of her work to theatre, showing a particular attitude 
in the visual aspects of narration and in the way in which they could influence the 
audience. In this sense she played onto different fields: on one hand paying 
particular attention to the visual details of costumes, in order to carry the topics of 
misrecognition in vogue at that time; on the other experiencing all the visual 
opportunities offered by the early experiments made by William Davenant, 
especially in the period between 1661 and 1671. That was, indeed, a period of 
great development for theatrical techniques devoted to grasp new ways of putting 
on the scene eccentric spaces and times. This was the reason why new 
machineries and new assisting went on the scene, such as the sliding shutters, 
and the action space on the scene was spread around and behind the forestage. 
All these experiments were the result of the developments already brought by the 
stage architecture of Inigo Jones within the court masque, especially aware of the 
great chances, in terms of changes for actors and actions, offered by the rear 
stage. 
Many dramatists used the new devices to suggest simultaneously rather than 
sequencing, but Behn was particularly ingenious in producing a new sense of 
spatial relationship between the actors and the audience, manipulating it by 
widening or narrowing the limits of intimacy between the spectator and the 
observed scene. 
In the early eighteenth century the power of controlling the gaze, by making fun 
of it, was still at work. It is clearly showed by the works of Eliza Haywood who, as 
we have already seen, was very aware of the power of the gaze within theatre and 
who decided to bring her acquainted power throughout all her works. In fact all her 
works are characterized by a manipulation of the classical distinction among the 
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different gazes present in the narration. What she precisely does is, most often, to 
blend her own authorial point of view with that of the spectator, which not always is 
a visual spectator, but it is pretended to be. Confusing the levels of discursive 
authority Haywood put at stake the patriarchal visual dominance and performs an 
enchantment for female control on the gaze. 
Spaces of cultural resistance, within a system in crisis, were thus acting not 
only in the field of scientific revolution, questioning the goodness and the 
objectivity of human and mechanical vision, but another field opened the 
opportunity to challenge a (not too much different) kind of male vision: that of 
popular culture and politics. As Alpers has already showed, indeed, the practices 
of looking or, alternately, of making images are cultural resources that imply not 
only the images showed but also the ways in which they are showed, who show 
them, to whom, and especially why. The long lasting life of masque as a theatrical 
genre and as a means of representation of symbolic meaning, is the clearest 
example of the woman appropriation of a male sight in order to prove to himself 
how partial and dangerous it is, and how she can well manipulate it. 
The objectivity of sight was already in jeopardy, and the primary issues of a 
specular feminist vision were rising. No doubt the period between the seventeenth 
and the eighteenth century was that of the privileged sight, but a disturbing female 
point of view was already passing through the looking glass, undermining the 
foundations of this faith. Men would have to wait until the nineteenth century to 
comprehend this uncomfortable illusion. Women seem to be aware neither of their 
original intuition nor of their different sight. 
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II 
 
Explicit and implicit observers 
 
 
 
 
 
The observer with its more or less perceptible presence is one of the most 
crucial concerns of any research in visual culture. This is because, as Crary has 
pointed out, it represents in every scopic regime an element at times evident and 
problematic. The evidence in accounting it is a result of the legacy coming from 
the classical age of knowledge, as Foucault defined it, and stays in a precise 
system of perception grounded in Renaissance prospective. The subject of vision 
is, in this model, a central point of view dominating a restricted space in which its 
vision can reach every point. It was the result of the faith in sight promoted by the 
scientific and technological revolution that made this model fit throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, simply expanding the horizon of perception.  
As we have already seen in the previous chapter, the diffusion of optical 
devises during the whole early modern period produced not only the address at 
sight as the principle sense among others, but made it the foundation of a new 
science and of its pretended objectivity. Vision was the only means by which 
scientific observation could not alter either the subject or the object, and by which 
man could escape his carnality and reach a pure spiritual vision, that of the eye of 
the mind. It is quite obvious to remember how this convincement was rooted on 
the philosophical theories, from Descartes on, according to which the subject of 
knowledge was definitely divided by its object, and by his own corporality. Once 
vision was limited to individual space and purified from the fallacy of human limits, 
including space and time, objectivity was reached as the natural habitat of reason 
and mind, and the exclusive domain of male gaze. It was unrelated to subjectivity, 
feeling and nature, which were the attributes of the woman, i.e. the objects of this 
gaze. This schematic model, however, did not survive this period. It exploded in its 
complexity between the nineteenth and twentieth century, when new technological 
and cultural revolutions, primary that of psychoanalysis, unveiled the social 
mechanism under vision. The observer himself resulted in a model created by the 
force fields, rules and arrangements, «discussed, controlled and incarnated in 
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cultural and scientific practices»1. Thus, as Jonathan Crary claims again, a 
univocal observer never existed, but only a dominant model to which all the others 
had to attain. The primary result of this statement is that as the rules, 
arrangements and social practices change, so does the model of the observer. 
That is why the objectivity model, so much acclaimed between the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, couldn’t work anymore in an age in which all the parts 
playing in the field of vision are contested and modified in their own place and their 
own role. That is why, as Foucault demonstrated, an idle spectator doesn’t exist 
anymore, for no objective reality exists anymore. We now move within an 
epistemic world, or a symbolic one, in Derrida’s opinion, ruled by the relativity of 
sensual media. The most affecting matter in this modern age of knowledge is that 
of an object that is no longer passive and subjected to the observer, which has 
already lost his own singularity. Not only, in fact, this object is now able to return 
the gaze or, at least, is aware of the gaze addressed to it, but it (she or he) needs 
more and more qualities to be defined, and still escape a unique definition.  
One of the fundamental properties of the object is that of gender, which makes 
the field of vision more and more complex, harder to define than previously 
imagined. According to feminist critics, overall Donna Haraway, including the 
feminine in this discussion means fundamentally entering the point of view of the 
outsider, with all his/her rules and codes socially constructed as well as the 
insider’s one. But it also means another affirmation of the embodiment of vision 
and knowledge, still strictly connected, instead of the objectivity of the two 
processes. Going further Cixous, together with the feminist critics of film studies, 
unveils the resulting voyeuristic character of vision, till now masqueraded under 
the pretended disembodiment. The excursus through all the different declinations 
of this gender discussion on vision has already been done in the previous chapter. 
Here I want only to remind you how the twentieth century debates on the question, 
recovering the awareness of the embodiment of sight and of the gendered 
differences thus carried, has lead to a new consciousness of the responsibility of 
the observer addressing his or her gaze onto all the different kinds of object: 
scientific, sexual or exotic. 
                                            
1
 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in Nineteenth Century, 
Cambridge-London, MIT Press, 1992, p. 8. 
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As a result, another crucial question raising from all these new 
consciousnesses concerns the private or public situation in which this gaze is cast, 
for from this precise aspect derives the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the sight and 
all the resulting questions, such as the place the observer can or can’t occupy, the 
modes and the means he or she can use, etc. But also the visibility or the 
invisibility of his/her point of view, since most often the dominant gaze is that 
exerted in the invisible cell of the prison – as Foucault argued – or in the darkness 
of the cinema – from Mulvey’s point of view. Still, even the objects of the vision 
can manage their own space of vision, for instance casting their own gaze back 
under a mask, protecting themselves more than the observer, as we will soon see. 
The matter appears particularly interesting in the age of the affirmation of the 
Experimental Philosophy, during which, as Simon Shaffer shows, the rhetoric of 
evidence did at once involve both the vividness of the fact and its appeal, both on 
the experimenter and its public. Even if the institutionalization of the new science, 
according with the philosophy of the time, brought a growing disembodiment of the 
scientist, it, on the other hand, posed the body, as a privileged object of 
knowledge. On this body the collectiveness of practitioners exercised the power 
and the authority of an ―evidential context‖, in such a way as the totality of 
observers worked behind the medical gaze. This phenomenon, that Foucault calls 
―political anatomy‖2, showed a switch from the privacy of the laboratories to the 
showing of public displays. Public scientific representations, as well as theatrical 
ones3, stimulated two kinds of response: on one hand they irritated some 
intellectuals such as Samuel Richardson, on the other they seemed to be well 
accepted to the commercial economy of the institutions themselves. The first 
among these was the Royal Society that planned a precise and organized system 
of publicity (and advertisement). Except for some intellectual concerned about the 
superficiality of a so wide audience, the society of that age provided more and 
more sites where to practice public demonstrations, not only scientific but also 
political, and where to show their different objects, subjecting them to public 
gazes.  
                                            
2
 Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Paris, Gallimard, 1975, trans. A. 
Sheridan, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, New York, Vintage Book, 1979, p. 28. 
3
 Simon Schaffer, ―Self Evidence‖, in «Critical Inquiry» 18 (1992), pp. 327-362. 
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The question of the ―anatomical appointing‖ of object’s body, meanwhile 
disembodying the observer, had even from that age a gender and sexual meaning 
which, however, differs in some contents to that of the modern age. In fact, the 
question of polarized genders, between male and female, was hardly definable, 
since the years between the seventeenth and the eighteenth century when an 
endemic instability in the matter was witnessed. Scientific experiments, or at least 
observations onto subject neither completely female nor male, such as 
hermaphrodites, provoked a spread curiosity somehow allowed by the social 
codes in the name of the science. The acceptance of this phenomenon, 
particularly in British society as a natural phenomenon, produced a wide range of 
cultural effects: first of all the pretended hermaphrodism as a justification for 
homosexual relationships; secondly, but no less important, a flickering position of 
gender performances within the spectacle society of the period, characterized, as 
we have already seen, by the raising of more and more complex new subjects and 
actors. Justified by science, private questions became matters of a new ―publicly 
private mode‖4, new market places in which sexually curious images were 
legitimized as well as the gaze on them. It is not an accident that this is the period 
of the breeching roles for female actresses, roles that represent the complication 
of what masquerades were at the beginning of the seventeenth century. All these 
movements were obviously used as means of legitimated subversion of the codes, 
at the same time exposing their own arbitrariness5. 
What I am trying to prove is that the most part of the concerns raised in the 
twentieth century debate about the gaze and the observer were already at stake 
during the seventeenth century. Indeed, in the age in which faith in mechanical 
vision began to raise, someone questioned the invisibility and supremacy of the 
subject bringing on the literary scenes ―non-isomorphic‖6 points of view, not 
matching the dominant model, yet challenging it in the matter of stability. Optics 
was no more sufficient in instructing or aiding vision, but a more complex visual 
literacy was even then necessary. 
                                            
4
 Roberta C. Martin, "Beauteous Wonder of a Different Kind: Aphra Behn's Destabilization of 
Sexual Categories", in «College English» 61 (1998), pp. 192-210, p. 193. 
5
 Terry Castle, Masquerade and Civilization: The Carnivalesque in Eighteenth-Century English 
Culture and Fiction, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1986, p. 57. 
6
 This is a term, which we have already met, proposed by Donna Haraway in Situated Knowledges. 
The Science Question in Feminism and the Priviledge of Partila Perspective, in Muriel Lederman, 
Ingrid Bartsch (ed.), The Gender and Science Reader, London-New York, Routledge, 2001. 
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The disembodiment of the observer, subject of the scientific experiment, and 
the authority that derives from it, is somehow connected with a contemporary 
notion of the disembodiment of the writer, i.e. the subject and therefore the 
authority of the literary observation, sometimes turning to anonymity.  
This is a matter which particularly affects all three writers that we are examining, 
but in very different ways. Primarily with Cavendish, who definitely affirmed the 
corporality of the observer, and especially, of the writer. That is the result of her 
particular consideration of her own literary creations, at the same time physical 
instruments of resistance, proud and magnificent surrogate of her bashful and sick 
body, substitute for physical offspring (as she referred in Poems and fancies), 
physical means by which making her resistance. She referred to all this by calling 
her writings as Paper bodies7. As we will see, Margaret Cavendish escaped her 
dressage by both not being the kind of body that cultural control supposed she had 
to be, and by making discourses radically different from those that were allowed. 
Both her bodily and literary experiments seem to be oriented to a freeing of human 
beings, mostly women, from the social, psychological and gender constraints by 
means of self-transformation, and by reasserting a new women’s ―monarchy‖ and 
government8 over their own bodies and their own writings, claiming their right to 
the authorship and the ―observership‖. 
A different opinion was that of Aphra Behn, who was particularly fascinated by 
the question of writer not only as a literary artifice but also as a more metaphorical 
representation of the «gap between the physical act of writing and the immaterial 
                                            
7
 This is the way she referred to her writings lost in fire during the return journey from France, 
Margaret Cavendish, Letter CXLIII, in id, CCXI Sociable Letters, London, William Wilson, 1664, p. 
154. 
8
 Compare the vindication to the right of authorship in the The Preface to The Reader, in Margaret 
Cavendish, The Worlds Olio, London, S. Martin & S. Allestrye, 1655: «IT cannot be expected I 
should write so wisely or wittily as Men, being of the Effeminate Sex, whose Brains Nature hath 
mix'd with the coldest and softest Elements; and to give my Reason why we cannot be so wise as 
Men, I take leave and ask Pardon of my own Sex, and present my Reasons to the Judgement of 
Truth; […]rue it is, our Sex make great complaints, that men from their first Creation usurped a 
Supremacy to themselves, although we were made equal by Nature, which Tyrannical Government 
they have kept ever since, so that we could never come to be free, but rather more and more 
enslaved, using us either like Children, Fools, or Subjects, that is, to flatter or threaten us, to allure 
or force us to obey, and will not let us divide the World equally with them, as to Govern and 
Command, to direct and Dispose as they do; which Slavery hath so dejected our spirits, as we are 
become so stupid, that Beasts are but a Degree below us, and Men use us but a Degree above 
Beasts; whereas in Nature we have as clear an understanding as Men, if we were bred in Schools 
to mature our Brains, and to manure our Understandings, that we might bring forth the Fruits of 
Knowledge», p. 4. 
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result»9. This effect is more and more amplified by the print that increased the 
anonymity while increasing standardization: in the serial reproduction of identical 
copies the text loses its particular location being disseminated, mimicking the 
erasure of the writer. This is an outrage to the (not only literary) authority of 
patriarchal society. 
Time going on, the place of female authorship seems to gain more and more 
consciousness, even though the evolution towards a social recognition, or at least 
acceptance, has never been linear. Thus, between the beginning and the half of 
eighteenth century, women writers were occupying an authorized place, as long as 
they positioned themselves within the rules of the contemporary society, especially 
concerning the gender roles and values10. As Eliza Haywood soon realized, being 
the acceptance of these codes needed for women to publicly express their voice, 
they became a primary tool for their aims. Not only, in fact, codes allowed them to 
write their works, but by handling much more then the society accepted, or 
seemed to accept, they gave a more precise ground on which to play, and more 
definite goals to threaten the rules themselves. The new self-consciousness as a 
writer, thus, makes many critics, especially in twentieth century, recognize in 
Haywood one of the first real and original figures of female authorship. Moreover, 
for what attains our discourse, her concern of the authorial role is deeply woven 
with that of the observer, signing the highest point of the course we are following, 
from the seventeenth to eighteenth century, from Cavendish to Haywood, passing 
through Behn. The form of authorship staged by Haywood is, indeed, of a peculiar 
kind, in spite of the other authors. In her writings the author assumed 
simultaneously the role of writer and that of observer, leading to three different 
ways of looking: that of the ―scientific‖ or critical observer, that of the eye witness, 
and that of the spy. This is the special feature that makes her an author of 
―spectator texts‖, in which the writer/beholder makes a promise, that «seeing and 
writing, two forms of witnessing, can be united to buttress the authority of each 
other»11. Thus, the link between the linguistic and the visual forms of knowledge 
and of expression are not working together in order to attain a larger amount of 
                                            
9
 Catherine Gallagher, Oroonoko’s Blakness, in Janet Todd ed., Aphra Behn studies, Cambridge-
New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 236. 
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 Compare Juliett Meritt, Beyond Spectacle: Eliza Haywood’s Female Spectator, Toronto-Buffalo-
London, University of Toronto Press, 2004, p. 5.  
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 Ivi, p. 9. 
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consciousness over the world and over other people. Seeing is no longer the 
action of making something clear to the mind. It is an obscure process, made, 
most of the time, by a silent looker-on, exercising the gaze as a form of power on 
an unaware observer. The writer is a witness no more than he/she is a spy, over 
the private and public life of contemporary society.  
No surprise then if the widest and the most famous magazine of the time was 
The Spectator, and its editors, Addison and Steele, were concerned, as well as 
Haywood, about the relation between the means of sight and the power of the 
gaze, as well as between the means of writing and the power of the authorship. 
Two relations were linking a human activity and the implicit power coming from it, 
that not everybody was conscious of. The silent looker, exerting his or her gaze 
upon individuals, science and society is, anyway, in the two authors’ point of view, 
a male privileged spectatorship. As we will soon see, this will be the point of view 
Haywood started from in order to treat and destroy it, assuming the point of view of 
a political outsider actor, in such a way as only recently Haraway addressed. 
The resulting questions related to the matters of power of this observer and of 
the narration of this vision will be the object of the next chapters. What now is 
interesting to our discourse is the way in which this sovereign subjectivity is 
argued and unveiled in the returning gazes of Cavendish, Behn and Haywood. 
 
 
Another gaze through the Microscope 
 
The scientific and technological revolution that took place in the seventeenth 
century, brought to the forefront of the scientific and literary narratives new and 
submicroscopic size and, especially on the level of individual experience, the 
interior. The visions of worlds, bodies and realities never before perceived by 
human senses made man understand how, on the one hand, observation serves 
to imagine and describe new dimensions, new worlds on other planets, but, on the 
other hand, to imagine and describe other worlds invisible but actually existing in 
our own planet, or even in our own body. 
Although Robert Hooke was not the first natural philosopher to describe what 
he saw through the microscope, his Micrographia was the first and most important 
work, published at the height of the devastating revolution. So even though 
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Margaret Cavendish was not the first to set a story inside the human body, the 
Description of a New World Called The Blazing World was the first fancy setting a 
complex interior and articulated world not as a solely symbolic plot of 
psychological experience12. 
In whole her life, Margaret Cavendish wrote about thirteen books, half of which 
were devoted to scientific observations. From her first writing, Poems, and Fancies 
(1653), it was clear enough how she was embedded of the atomistic thought, but 
moreover that her scientific research was not seen as a controlling and powering 
knowledge, rather as a new expression and at times knowledge of the self. The 
topic will become more and more conscious, and the Observation upon 
experimental Philosophy as well as The Description of a New World Called The 
Blazing World, are the higher part of this course. 
A comparative reading of the two plays, Micrographia and Blazing World, so 
dissimilar, but having much in common, allows us to examine simultaneously two 
characteristics of the culture of the scientific revolution: first, the new frontiers of 
narrative description of the performance in scientific prose, but also in political 
imaginary; then, the different dialects and the emergence of gender division in the 
perspectives applied to the construction or literary description of the material or 
intangible world. 
The Description of a New World Called The Blazing World by Margaret 
Cavendish was first published in 1666 and then in 1688 as an appendix to 
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, and both works were written in 
opposition to the work of Hooke and the methods of the Royal Society. The two 
works are somehow one that mirrors the other. They represent the two poles at 
times adjacent and parallel by which simplify and reflect on the ambitions, errors 
and naiveté that allow men to believe to have or to be able to acquire absolute and 
incontrovertible knowledge. 
The novel tells the story of a young lady who during a trip remains the victim of 
a shipwreck and finds herself lost in a strange land in another dimension. The 
story is written on the model of the voyages to other worlds, very popular in that 
century and in the next, after the plurality of worlds of Fontenelle, Wilkins, Godwin 
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 Cfr. Mary Baine Campbell, Outside in. Hooke, Cavendish and the Invisible Worlds, in Id., 
Wonder and Science. Imagining Worlds Early Modern Europe, Cornell University Press, Ithaca-
London 1999, pp. 181-218. 
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and a rediscovered Lucian. As expected in this literary-philosophical genre, the 
―new world‖ is a mirror for the ―old‖ one, allowing the protagonist, and the writer 
herself – the two often coinciding – to reflect about the limits of her contemporary 
society and on the improvements it could gain and how. It is exactly what happens 
to the woman who, welcomed in the Blazing World, suddenly becomes the 
empress. The first difference between the two societies she can experience is 
quite an absolute equality between the two sexes. As a governor of an Empire, the 
protagonist – which somehow represents Cavendish’s desire of (not only literary) 
authorship – she immediately devotes her activity to better know the social, 
political and, moreover, cultural assets of her reign. She is particularly interested in 
knowing how the cultural and scientific activities of the intellectual are managed 
and work, and how she can improve it. What she found is a system very similar to 
that of ―our‖ world, in which the sciences are divided between natural science, 
philosophical science, astronomy, physics, chemistry, anatomy, logic etc, leading 
to a conflicting rather than a shared system of knowledge. Thus, some of these 
are too devoted to material instruments by which knowing, some others are too 
confident on the mental and abstract processes of knowledge. The scientific 
society, however, used to practice also another way of knowledge, very popular in 
the period in which Cavendish lived, the esoteric model of Kabbalah. Thanks to 
that the Empress can encounter the biggest souls of human knowledge and 
decides to establish a philosophical method on herself, but with the help of some 
other’s mental support, being that dead or still alive. The wise souls of the blazing 
world don’t suggest to her neither Gassendi, or Kepler or Galilei, rather a more 
humble but still witty living soul, that of the Duchess of Newcastle. The author 
enters, in second degree, in the story showing a split of personality that she has 
already showed in Sociable Letters. Not only will the two women share their 
philosophical reflections, but they will also amuse themselves by constructing 
interior worlds, no less real than the exterior, where to set in practice their ideas 
and manage them. The story ends with the description of the funny life the two 
noble women lived together with ―the most noble Sir William Cavendish‖. In the 
Epilogue to the Reader, the author explains how to interpret the whole fancy, 
making explicit what we have already argued: 
 
By this Poetical Description, you may perceive, that my ambition is not only to be Empress, but 
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Authoress of a whole World; and that the Worlds I have made, both the Blazing- and the other 
Philosophical World, mentioned in the first part of this description, are framed and composed of 
the most pure, that is, the rational parts of matter, which are the parts of my mind.
13
 
 
The whole literary-philosophical system attempts to refute the empirical source 
of the observations made by Hooke, absolutely confident in the possibilities 
offered by optical instruments that, as indicated by the Baconian thinking, would 
allow the «sincere hand and faithful eye to examine and record things as they 
themselves appear to be»14, finally making natural science free from the products 
of the mind and imagination. Rejecting this kind of mechanistic system - which 
makes the cycle of scientific observation work like to the bloodstream through the 
hands to the eye, then to the memory and reason - Margaret Cavendish proposes 
instead an essentially rationalistic system based on speech, intended as a witty 
exercise of the mind or as a rational inquiry in the causes of natural effects, the 
most honest source of knowledge. In fact, according to the author, this genuine 
knowledge does not seem to arise from the consideration of a deeper and 
objective ability of the rational method, rather from the recognition of the individual 
and unavoidable role of the subject observer who is both the limit and the wealth 
of experimental observation. 
 From this diversity of opinion stems of course, a different horizon of research.  
Hooke, in fact, analyzed the interior as well as she did, but the optical 
instruments he used deconstructed and fragmented, while Cavendish was still 
interested in describing its whole nature, an intangible and elusive one, but one 
that could still be representable. 
The work of Robert Hooke, with its attention to details and his very explicit 
language, is a full-fledged model of the narrative in science and its popularization 
in Europe in the seventeenth century, whose main characteristic is the likelihood. 
The detail seems to respond to two seemingly different goals: on one side an 
epistemological need, on the other a taste for the sensationalism. Data derived 
from the fragment, although never entirely free from theoretical context of analysis, 
were the starting point for the reform of the entire epistemological system, which 
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increasingly sought to draw attention to the material rather than the metaphysical. 
In order to reach a certain popularity, the more or less scientific work and even the 
new scientific guidelines had to promise realistic effect as well as a visual pleasure 
or a literary leisure, as Hooke openly claims: «I do not only propose this kind of 
Experimental Philosophy as a matter of high rapture and delight of the mind, but 
even as a material and sensible pleasure»15. In describing minute details 
belonging to plants, animals or minerals, in narrating of precise experiments that 
could be repeated at the close of private cabinets, he was participating at the 
process of the ―eroticization vision‖, Haraway and Keller denounced, that was 
addressing under different purposes also different objects, such as women sexual 
objects16. In the Preface to Micrographia Hooke expressed this interest - we would 
now call fetishistic - especially demanding to no longer compare his book to other 
publications of natural philosophy, but rather to compare ―his‖ small objects to 
larger and beautiful Works of Nature. The entire preface is modeled on an 
adventure story in which a hero (the scientist), compared to Alexander the Great, 
is about to commence an achievement, through the description of the tools that 
will allow him to push the boundaries of his senses, and will not only penetrate the 
already visible World, but also those who are, so far, invisible: 
 
to promote the use of Mechanical helps for the Senses, both in the Surveying of the 
already visible World, and for the discovery of many others hitherto unknown, and to 
make us, with the great Conqueror [Alexander], to be affected that we have not yet 
overcome one World when there are so many others to be discovered, every 
considerable improvement of Telescopes and Microscopes producing new Worlds and 
Terra Incognita’s to our view17 
 
The trip staged by Hooke not only travels to the discovery of distant and 
unknown lands, but also to the penetration and appropriation items of a higher 
female figure, that of Nature, whose "body" is «to be traced, not only in her 
ordinary course, but when she seems to be put to her shifts, to make many 
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doublings and turnings, and to use some kind of art in endeavoring to avoid our 
discovery»18. The scientific male literature, therefore, proposes the categories that 
are typical of the entire social structure and culture of the time: the growing 
materialism of the trade, colonialism of a restored monarchy, the supremacy of the 
male erotic gaze on the female body. 
While remaining at a similar level for what concerns proportions, as we said 
Margaret Cavendish wrote a work that allows her to distance herself not only from 
Sir Robert Hooke, but from the entire male tradition, both scientific and literary. 
The Duchess of Newcastle begins the description of her new world by 
distinguishing her work from the genre of lunar travel, very popular at the time, not 
only according to a strong sense of originality, which also characterizes her life 
and her work, but also because of what she intends to achieve with this novel. 
More than with the scientific treatise, is the invention, namely, of a new world, 
rather than the fantasy projection on it of an already existing world, such as that of 
the European science and culture. The moon, in fact, in fantastic literature, has 
always been the mirror or the utopian opposition to the real world. For years, then, 
it had come to coincide with the hyperbolic representation of America and, quite 
often, its inhabitants were described as descendants of human beings. This is 
precisely the mimetic character that Cavendish contrasts with her work. Unlike the 
utopian fiction - and its educational objectives - the Blazing World meets the need 
for something different, not necessarily better, as was in the intention of the 
patriarchal literature, but simply the need to represent the category of the ―other‖, 
which belonged to her gender and her history. The world she created on the basis 
of a long professed atomistic theory, is a world that sets new boundaries, not 
between America and Europe, between good government and bad government, 
but between inner and outer, between the self and the rest.  
Precisely the polarization between inside and outside generates the entire 
structure and the atmosphere of the novel. From the very beginning - from when 
the protagonist is shipwrecked in the cold polar ice and is then escorted into the 
blazing new world - we are led through devious and often labyrinthine passages 
from an external reality, recognizable and known, to one internal, unknown but 
bright, varied and reassuring. Throughout the novel, as well as in the scientific and 
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philosophical discussion that precedes it, visionary Cavendish - who conceives 
nature as a single organism whose parts are living an independent life and, 
simultaneously, repeat the characteristics of all - never divides sharply the two 
domains, but rather builds continuous short circuits between the most distinctive 
parts. So it is for the description of the Emperor's palace, which occupies the 
innermost part of the strange new world of labyrinthine topography. In turn the 
inner room of the inner palace - no coincidence that it’s the emperor's bedroom -, 
replicates the dazzling night sky that gives name to the whole wonderful world: 
«The walls whereof were of jet, and the floor of black marble; the roof was of 
mother of pearl, where the moon and blazing stars were represented by white 
diamonds, and his bed was made of diamonds and carbuncles»19. The same 
rotation of external and internal is repeated at the level of the individual, for 
example, when the soul is visited by the author herself, the Duchess of Newcastle, 
or when the souls of both move in the body of the Duke of Newcastle, intertwining 
a genuine platonic menage a trois.  
These are the mental representations which Margaret Cavendish will make us 
used to, amusing in complicating them. But they are still part of her philosophical 
ideas that bind outside organs with internal perceptual capacities20. 
The fantasy characterizing the whole novel doesn’t exclude, in any way, an 
ironic gaze on her contemporary society. That is why she presents an initial 
organization of intellectuals, the Empress herself promoted in the form of the 
Royal Society:   
 
The Bear-men were to be her Experimental Philosophers, the Bird-men her 
Astronomers, the Fly-wormers and Fish-men her Natural Philosophers, the Ape-men 
her Chymists, the Satyrs her Galenick Physicians, the Fox-men her Politicians, the 
Spider- and Lice-men her Mathematicians, the Jackdaw- Magpie- nd Parrot-men her 
Orators and Logicians, the Gyants her Architects21 
 
 This organization is not very productive for the development of knowledge, 
because the fragmentation of science and the subjectivism disguised as 
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empiricism produce nothing but constant clashes and disagreements between the 
various scientists, but also because of the constant codification of the process of 
scientific observation in order to gain the perfect objectivity. Cavendish as well as 
the other two writers doesn’t believe in the value of this principle, since, in her 
opinion, the subjective influence of the observer can’t be avoided. That is why she 
said, about microscopists: «They could as yet by no means contrive such glasses, 
by the help of which they could spy out a vacuum, with all its dimensions, nor 
immaterial substances, non-beings, and mixed beings, or such as are between 
something and nothing»22. 
The constant upheaval between inner and outer reality does not stop there to 
produce implications whose modernity continually surprises. Possibly the most 
revealing is the complex explosion of boundaries staged by Cavendish, which is 
carried out when the identity of the author meets that of the heroine, in order to 
reflect and write together about their own scientific and political observation from 
two different points of view. It is, thus, not a case of simple mirroring or 
identification with one's alter ego in the diegetic territory, but they are two distinct 
moments of meeting and separation. As we have already seen, the author 
presents herself as a genuine representative of rationalism and begins a journey 
through alternative methods of investigation in search of the more effective for the 
blazing world and the real.  
If the desire of knowledge is often connected to the desire of possessing, 
governing or dominating the world known, the blazing World, at the contrary is the 
demonstration of what a female scientist would gain: the dominion of a world, but 
of an interior world. It is precisely what the Duchess before and the Empress later 
aspire to do: to well know and well govern themselves. Knowledge is, in their/her 
opinion, the perfect management of own knowledge, perception, conviction, being 
the human ―body‖ constituted like the body of a society, needing science, religion 
and politics. Thus the two women start to build up worlds of their own, testing 
which of the systems proposed by the most respectable political and philosophical 
observations best fitted. The first almost successful attempt, after the model of the 
ancients from Thales to Aristotle, will try to build a world from the immaterial 
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Cartesian: 
 
But when she had made the Aethernal Globules, and set them a moving by a strong 
and lively imagination, her mind became so dizzy with their extraordinary swift turning 
around, that it almost put her into a swoon; for her thoughts, by their constant tottering, 
did so stagger, as if they had all been drunk: wherefore she dissolved that World, and 
began to make another23 
 
Then proceeding in an attempt according to the doctrine of Hobbes: 
 
But when all parts of this Imaginary World came to press and drive each other, they 
seemed like a company of Wolves that worry Sheep, or like so many Dogs that hunt 
after Hares; and when she found a reaction equal to those pressures, her mind was so 
squeezed together, that her thoughts could neither move forward nor backward, which 
caused such a horrible pain in her head, that although she had dissolved that World, 
yet she could not, without much difficulty, settle her mind, and free it from that pain 
which those pressures and reactions had caused in it.24 
 
Finally, since no model seems to work well for her cause, she eventually 
decided to create a world of ―her own invention‖: 
 
And this world was composed of sensitive and rational self-moving Matter; indeed, it 
was composed only of the rational, which is the subtlest and purest degree of Matter; 
for as the sensitive did move and act both to the perception and consistency of the 
body, so this degree of matter at the same point of time (for though the degrees are 
mixt, yet the several parts may move several ways at one time) did move to the 
Creation of the Imaginery World; which World after it was made, appear’d so curious 
and full of variety, so well order’d and wisely govern’d, that it cannot possibly be 
expressed by words, nor the delight and pleasure which the Duchess took in making 
this world of her own25 
 
In the essay Embracing the Absolute Catherine Gallagher interprets this 
complex fragmentation of reality and identity, and the structure of the inner world 
as a manifestation of the desire of the Duchess to be the absolute monarch of 
herself - both the real and the literary self - but also as the image of an infinite 
regression. The self is therefore seen as the sovereign of a microcosm that is itself 
the representation of a single part of this multiple self. So other microcosms are 
needed, which will be controlled by ―absolutist‖ author. That is why Gallagher talks 
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about the «Mis en abyme of the seventeenth century»26. 
The world, or better the worlds, constructed by the narration of Cavendish are 
so complex as to be once again a challenge to the impotence perspective of 
(male) experimental science in front of the multiplicity of plans of the invisibilia. Not 
only will the microscopists be subjected to the criticism of the Duchess, but also 
the similar category of astronomers and, moreover, their instruments will not be 
spared from her irony and that of her protagonist.  
 
To avoid hereafter tedious disputes, and have the truth of the Phenomena’s of 
Celestial bodies more exactly known, commanded the Bear-men, which were her 
Experimental Philosophers, to observe them through such Instruments as called 
Telescopes, which they did according to her Majesties Command; but these 
Telescopes caused more differences and divisions amongst them, the ever they had 
before.27 
 
Despite her clear desire to become a celestial object28, the Empress's 
comments on Astronomers are severe and negative enough to push her to wish 
that all the telescopes of the empire be destroyed. The reason for this aversion 
comes from the disappointment in the conduct of these scientists, which are 
unable to reach an agreement on the most relevant questions put to them, for 
example if the twinkling stars in the firmament are single stars that rise and rapidly 
decline, or whether the three separate stars could be observed with a favorable 
prospect: 
 
After they had thus argued, the Empress began to grow angry at their Telescopes, that 
they could give no better Intelligence; for she said, no I do plainly perceive, that your 
Glasses are false Informers, and instead of discovering the Truth, delude your senses; 
Wherefore I Command you to break them, and let the Bird-men trust only to their 
natural eyes, and examine Celestial objects by the motion of their own sense and 
reason29 
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The confusion attributed to these men of science, unable to effectively describe 
a phenomenon, is explained, according to the philosophy of Cavendish, with the 
myopia of the natural philosophers who do not realize that an image is not an 
object but an event and, therefore, by its nature unstable. Or better, seems to 
suggest Cavendish, they probably do realize, but they are so fully embedded by 
the pleasure to see for itself that they don’t want to renounce their instruments 
anymore, even though realizing their falsehood: 
 
The Bear-men being exceedingly troubled at her Majesties displeasure concerning 
their Telescopes, kneel’d down, and in the humblest manner petitioned that they might 
not be broken; for, said they, we take more delight in Artificial delusions, then in natural 
truths. Besides, we shall want employments for our senses, and subjects for 
arguments; for were there nothing but truth, and no falsehood, there would be no 
occasion for to dispute30 
 
Our extraordinary thinker realizes that this event does not attend once and for 
all, and that the eye that is watching is not an "absolute eye." In fact, the beholder 
is a particular individual, who not only works with his or her own eyes, but with the 
deepest part of his or her mind. 
The scientists try to remedy the disappointment of the Empress by offering her 
different kinds of "artificial lenses" including also different types of microscopes. 
These tools are used to stage performances of lice and other insects, enlarged so 
much as to reach the size of elephants. These images are taken directly from 
Hooke's Micrographia. Of course the Empress dislikes these "distorted images", 
and at the sight of the huge flea does not think of anything but the poor beggars 
who, while having nothing to eat, have to sustain the useless parasites of their 
own flesh and their blood. Once again, therefore, the author opposes the deathly 
image of the scientist with the vivid images of the individual. 
Margaret Cavendish takes, therefore, the distance from the world of new 
scientists, like Hooke, who operate within the confines of his laboratory, on dead 
natural objects, by means that seem to guarantee the objectivity of the 
observations and the certainty of the result. If, according to their opinion, 
microscopic nature is an unknown territory to be won for subsequent 
fragmentation, to be dominated from a point of view superior in proportion, 
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technology and intellect, and if nature in general is a body to be penetrated into its 
individual parts, then according to Cavendish new methods of experimental 
philosophy have already failed in their premises. Individuals ―shooting‖ through 
special optical instruments are likely to lose sight of the wider horizon which not 
only the observed object but the same observer belong to. Precisely the 
separation between observer and observed object and the alleged transparency of 
the medium of vision are other critical points on which our writer expresses 
opinions that are, once again, of an extraordinary modernity: 
 
When I say that the Exterior Object is the Agent, and the Sentient Body the Patient [...] 
I retain only those words, because they are used in Schools; But as for their Actions, I 
am quite of a contrary Opinion, that the sentient body is the principal Agent, and the 
external Body the Patient; for the motions of the sentient in act of perception, do figure 
out or imitate the motions of the object, so that the object is but a Copy that is [...] 
imitated by the sentient, which is the chiefly Agent in all transforming and perceptive 
actions.31 
 
Margaret Cavendish was passionate about the new horizon offered by new 
optical devices, as well as Hooke was. However, the character of the two 
enthusiastic positions were different: the latter looking at these new horizons like 
at space of self-affirmation and growing power, the former as an occasion to 
recognize and to free all microcosms of her own identity32. 
 
 
Improper spectator 
 
Aphra Behn was an uncomfortable character in the culture and politics of her 
age for her shameless display of gender overturning, played on the stages of 
social rules by incorporating male codes and demonstrating their own arbitrariness 
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and reversibility. As a spy and a professional play-writer she immediately 
appeared as a shattered identity challenging the gender division both in social and 
in cultural affairs. She decided not by accident to fight this battle on the ground of 
vision, as showed in the prologue of her first play: 
 
Women those charming Victors, in whose Eyes 
Lie all their Arts, and their Artilleries, 
Not being contended with the Wounds they made 
Would by new Stratagems our Lives invade
33 
 
Precisely this way of playing on the gender roles not denying, but rather using 
them in a subversive way, scaring the same ones who invented the codes, brings 
us back to the question of Masquerade, which we have already met as a question 
of both female image and female spectatorship in the films studies debate. Tracing 
the question back to the historical situation in which Behn wrote, and using the 
interpretation Heate made of the Masquerade as a disruptive entering in 
patriarchal representation34, Salzman somehow reassures feminist debate on the 
disturbing rather than accepting use of the medium, showing how Behn’s dramatic 
plays, but not only those, are full of precisely constructed transpositions of voices, 
of gazes, of rules between the two sexes which are no more so definable35. 
The transposition of voices is played through her own activity as a writer, an 
activity usually inscribed in male wit or in indecent women. In introducing herself in 
this adverse world, or we had better say market-place, Behn decides to make a 
mimicry of the masculine world while metamorphosing it in a feminine perspective. 
Thus many of her poems, such as those collected in Poems on Several 
Occasions, put on stage a relation seducer/seduced turned upside down within the 
gender field, making her female characters speaking in male terms, terms of 
desiring, conquering, invasive drives like in The Reflection: A Song: 
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Alas how long in vain you strove 
My coldness to divert! 
How long besieg’d it round with Love 
Before you won the Hearth. 
What Arts you us’d what Presents made, 
What sings, what Letters writ: 
And left no Charm that sou’d invade, 
Or with your Eyes or Wit.36 
 
Since the seducer is no more the man but the woman, Behn produces poems 
articulating a negotiation between male and female desire. Woman is no more, or 
not only, an exclusively passive object of this desire, but also an active temptress, 
turning back the male gaze. This is how her gaze addresses the body of a young 
boy: 
 
It was too much, ye Gods, to see and hear; 
Receiving wounds both from the eye and ear:  
…. 
 
I saw the Softness that compos’d  
While your attention heighten'd every grace: 
Your mouth all full of sweetness and content, 
And your fine killing eyes of languishment: 
Your bosom now and then a sigh wou'd move, 
(For Music has the same effects with Love) 
Your body easy and all tempting lay, 
Inspiring wishes which the eyes betray, 
In all that have the fate to glance that way: 
A careless and a lovely negligence, 
Did a new charm to every limb dispense37 
 
 More than this, what is astonishing is the way in which her reversal of gender 
categories affects and also strikes the political matters. The transposing of roles 
Behn acted, indeed, wasn’t realized only in masquerade and diverse sorts of 
plays, but much more in the poems she dedicated to the different monarchs 
succeeding once during her life, with a particular regard to the Queens. Even in 
different occasions, in fact, Behn always decided to focus her attention on the 
female monarch in two different but contemporary manners: addressing her official 
role and presence, that of sovereignty, and to her corporeal and, mostly, female 
body. Sovereignty and femininity are thus displayed in the Pindaric poem written 
on occasion of the death of Charles II, but addressed to Queen Catherine: 
                                            
36
 Aphra Behn, The Reflection: A Song, in id., The Works of Aphra Behn, cit., p. 75. 
37
 Aphra Behn, To Lysander at the Music-Meeting, in id., The Works of Aphra Behn, cit., p. 94. 
 105 
 
Your Valu’d Loss a Noysey Grief disdain’d 
Fixt you heart, no outward sign remain’d; 
Though the soft Woman bow’d and dy’d within; 
Without, Majestock Grace maintain’d the Queen38 
 
Once the monarch changed, the gender interest of Behn didn’t change and in 
occasion of the coronation of James II, the poet turns the attention again from the 
King to his consort, imagined as a Muse, fully seducing and inspiring: 
 
Bless the soft Muse that cou’d express 
Beauty and Majesty in such a dress, 
As all the World Adoring shall confess! 
Oh fond seducer of my Noble part, 
Thou soft insinuating Muse39 
 
In spite of the cultural trend dividing the body and the mind, the sovereignty 
embodied by women is at once symbolic and carnal, reconciling, in a troubled 
moment, different multitudes. 
From masquerade to sovereignty womanliness is always challenging men roles 
and authority. Indeed, her political involvement was not restrained to the poems 
we have talked about, but it is more spread and deep, for, as Al Coppola claims, 
her purpose was that of provoking her audience – otherwise uncritical – on several 
fronts, from the aesthetic to the scientific, from the political to the most material 
culture.    
Probably the most famous example of a play staging all these issues under the 
most critical aspect is one of the late work by Aphra Behn, The Emperor of The 
Moon, written in 1684, but staged only three years later, during which many 
significant changes had taken place affecting the transmission of the text. The plot 
is about a solitary scholar, Doctor Baliardo, passionate about astronomy and 
collector of the most recent optical devices, especially telescopes as big as he can 
buy. His passion for his studies, mostly devoted to the Moon, makes him neglect 
the world surrounding him, especially the two young ladies, his daughter and his 
niece, Elaria and Bellamante, who he should be taking care of. The two ladies, 
desperate to realize their amorous projects, architect together with Scaramouch, 
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the servant of Doctor Baliardo, and their lovers, Cinthio and Charmante, a true 
Masquerade – actually more than one – to convince Baliardo that the two guys are 
princes from the Moon, and to let them marry the two young ladies. The play is a 
typical comedy inspired by the Italian Commedia dell’Arte, in which the action is 
carried on by a sequence of betrayal leading to a happy ending in which the 
deception is revealed and harmony is established. 
As Aphra Behn herself claims in the dedication to Lord Marques Of Worcester, 
the play was inspired by a previous work played in Paris by Giuseppe Domenico 
Biancolelli first and Evaristo Gherardi later, between 1660 and 1688. It was 
Harlequin roi dans la Lune, a play that even Goldoni talked about in his Memories 
and worked on. It was one of the typical adventures of Harlequin, who was in love 
with Colombine, and tried several tricks and transvestitism, such as that of the 
Emperor of the Moon. This last character creates a place, like always in this genre, 
to criticize the way of life and habits of the contemporaries. 
In readapting the sketch of the comedy Behn extends and defines the actions, 
paying particular attention to the question of the gaze, creating an illuminated 
critique of the misplaced spectatorship and the enthusiastic credulity of the now 
born society of spectacle, intended in a broad sense. Indeed, as Coppola suggests 
in his study on the play40, the plain project of Behn can be fully understood only by 
considering the precise historical moment in which it was written and staged. 
It was a very difficult political moment for England, just exiting the Civil War, 
resetting the political power now shared between the restored sovereign and the 
parliament, trying to make peaceful contacts between Anglican and Catholic 
movements. In particular the years between 1678 and 1685 were crossed by very 
striking political events, which affected social assets for many years to come. In 
1678, the group of Titus Oates leaded a conspiracy arguing that a group of Roman 
Catholic subversives would try to assassinate King Charles II. The web invented 
and woven by Oates lasted for three years bringing out dangerous phobia against 
catholic people. Eventually, once discovered the plot, Oates was arrested for 
perjury. The political climate didn’t calm down, and the Whigs plotted a new 
mischief between 1681 and 1682, trying to exclude James II from the throne 
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because of his catholic faith. Charles II opposed the complot known as The 
Exclusion Crisis. Finally in 1685, one year later Behn had written The Emperor of 
the Moon, Charles II died and James II accessed the throne. 
This historical setting full of plot and conspiracy, in which adverse political 
powers tried to resist the opposite by manipulating the thrust of the people from 
one side to another, worried Behn, whose political involvement was well known, 
particularly for what concerns the recent ways of conducting political affairs. 
Thus the Emperor of the Moon was created as an education for the audience, 
to wake up their trustworthiness. She intended to unveiling the spectacular 
character politics was adopting, not only in conspiracy but, from Charles II on, in 
the public conducting of the court work, more and more characterized by royal 
ceremonies and public display of power and harmony, in such a way that we could 
today see as a Hegemonic apparatus. The play is the result of an interrogation on 
improper spectatorship not only for what concerns the political field but a much 
broader question on spectatorship, dealing with enthusiasm in optical devises and, 
accordingly, with vision; with the ludicrous or dishonest rather than scientific 
background vision; and with the manipulation of a passive audience. 
The enthusiasm involved in the diffusion of optical devices together with the 
raising of Natural Philosophy, gradually changed science from an exclusive art to a 
popular entertainment. Even an institution like the Royal Society, in order to 
amplify the number of its member in a period of crisis, promoted a sequence of 
works not addressed to the same circle of the society, rather to a wider circle of 
―curious‖ who in that period organized physical cabinets in private houses or public 
space. Even though this project was intended, or at least was pretended, to 
discipline the correct use of devices and the faithful reproduction of experiment, it 
ended up, and it was the strongest fear of many scholars of the time, producing a 
―spectacular science‖ with no or poor development in knowledge. 
This was exactly one of the primary points of Behn’s worry against the 
indiscriminate popularization especially of optics in people who didn’t have any 
skill to well understand what they were doing or assisting on, producing false faith 
and wrong visions. This is precisely what is embodied in the main character of The 
Emperor, who is so much devoted to the observation of the moon as to become 
victim of his own convictions and, thus, manipulable in the most unbelievable 
fantasies. 
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At the beginning of the play, indeed, the doctor is showed as a ―lunatic‖ not to 
say a maniac: 
 
Scar: You must know, Madam, your Father (my Master, the Doctor) is a little whimsical, 
romantick, or Don-Quicksottish, or so. 
Ela: Or rather mad. 
Scar: That were uncivil to be supposed by me; but lunatic we may call him, without 
breaking the Decorum of good Manners; for he is always travelling to the Moon. 
Ela. And so religiously believes there is a World there, that he Discourses as gravely of 
the People, their Government, Institutions, Laws, Manners, Religion, and Constitution, 
as if he had been bred a Machiavel there. 
Scar. How came he thus infected first? 
Ela. With reading foolish Books, Lucian's Dialogue of the Lofty Traveller, who flew up to 
the Moon, and thence to Heaven; an heroick Business, call'd The Man in the Moon, if 
you'll believe a Spaniard, who was carried thither, upon an Engine drawn by wild 
Geese; with another Philosophical Piece, A Discourse of the World in the Moon; with a 
thousand other ridiculous Volumes, too hard to name.41 
 
Thus not only the Doctor is showed as a mad man or a visionary, believing in 
stories he himself created, adapting the social structures of his world to those of 
another supposedly better, but making him the object of a not too much respectful 
mirth. This is why the company will be able to convince him of the most incredible 
things, such as the visit of aliens from the moon and their interest in marring the 
two young ladies. Primarily responsible for this growing credulity is a particular 
genre of literature very spread at the time, which Elaria shows to be accustomed 
to. This very popular literature begins with the work of Lucian Icaromenippus, The 
Man in the Moon, and lead to more recent works such as The Man in the Moon, by 
Francis Godwin and, moreover, The Discovery of A World in The Moone, first 
published in London in 1638, and some other less philosophical but also well 
known literary fancies such as A Discourse of The World in The Moon, by Cyrano 
de Bergerac, not to mention the Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes (1686) by 
Fontenelle, that Behn will translate the following year. Offspring of the speculations 
brought about the believing in sight and its microscopic and telescopic media, the 
literature on new worlds penetrated the imagination of the seventeenth century 
and the next, when the belief was widespread that the Earth and the Universe 
known so far were only a small portion of a reality soon revealed. Time and space 
exploded in front of the new fields of vision offered by the microscope and the 
telescope, and the plurality of worlds was a doctrine increasingly discussed 
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between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. In Behn’s opinion, this is 
that kind of popular literature that, being woven of fantasies rather than scientific or 
philosophical arguments, makes people believe in extra-terrestrial worlds more 
than in the one they live in, losing any contact with reality. The irony Behn 
addressed to the matter is clearer and clearer, this time through the voice of 
Mopsophil, Governess to the young Ladies: 
 
Mop. Run, run, Scaramouch, my Master's conjuring for you like mad below, he calls up 
all his little Devils with horrid Names, his Microscope, his Horoscope, his Telescope, 
and all his Scopes.42 
 
When the ―credulous Master‖ enters the second scene the audience is ready to 
see clumsy rather than a self-confident scholar. Indeed; 
 
Enter Doctor, with all manner of Mathematical Instruments hanging at his Girdle; 
Scaramouch bearing a Telescope twenty (or more) Foot long. 
[…] 
Doct.: Set down the Telescope.—Let me see, what Hour is it? 
Scar.: About six a Clock, Sir. 
Doct.: Then 'tis about the Hour that the great Monarch of the Upper World enters into 
his Closet; Mount, mount the Telescope. 
Scar: What to do, Sir? 
Doct: I understand, at certain moments critical, one may be snatch'd of such a mighty 
consequence, to let the Sight into the Secret Closet.43 
 
The notation on the size of the telescope is not an accident. It responded to a 
fashion at the time to own great telescopes, mostly produced in Italy, becoming in 
such a way a status symbol. Since Baliardo enters the scene for the very first time 
it is immediately clear how his main interest isn’t in scientific observations, rather 
in the research, or better peeping, of titillating secrets dealing with sexual pleasure 
and political implication. That is why young men are architecting a way to attract 
the doctor’s trust, or Behn would better say to manipulate it, showing him a sexy 
image to peer, precisely facing the audience, thus directly addressed, with the 
ludicrous and misogynous character of his gaze. Being a man of science, not 
made for mortal women, he will be allowed to ―try his purity‖ about the world of the 
Moon and, moreover, the people populating it, by seeing them as nobody before: 
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Char. The most beautiful of all the Sons and Daughters of the Universe: Fancy, 
Imagination is not half so charming 
[…] 
Doct. Ay, Sir, what Virtues or what Merits can accomplish me for that great Honour? 
Char. An absolute abstinence from carnal thought, devout and pure of Spirit; 
free from Sin. 
[…] 
Char. Kneel then, and try your strength of Virtue. Sir,—Keep your Eye fix'd and open.  
 
[He looks in the Telescope. While he is looking, Charmante goes to the Door to 
Scaramouch, who waited on purpose without, and takes a Glass with a Picture of a 
Nymph on it, and a Light behind it; that as he brings it, it shews to the Audience. Goes 
to the end of the Telescope.] 
 
—Can you discern, Sir? 
Doct. Methinks, I see a kind of glorious Cloud drawn up—and now, 'tis gone again. 
Char. Saw you no Fuger? 
Doct. None. 
Char. Then make a short Prayer to Alikin, the Spirit of the East; shake off all earthly 
Thoughts, and look again. 
 
[He prays. Charmante puts the Glass into the Mouth of the Telescope.] 
 
Doct.—Astonish'd, ravish'd with Delight, I see a Beauty young and Angel-like, leaning 
upon a Cloud. 
Char. Seems she on a Bed? Then she’s reposing, and you must not gaze. 
Doct. Now a Cloud veils her from me. 
Char. She saw you peeping then, and drew the Curtain of the Air between.44 
 
In this single scene Behn achieves a double end: on one side she clearly shows 
how what is seen through such instruments as the telescope is not always the 
pure reality, but it depends on how the instrument is used, and also why, and by 
whom. Making Charmante more aware of the technology and of its modifiability, so 
that the telescope is transformed into a magic lantern, makes him believe an 
image to be reality. On the other hand much irony is devoted in constantly showing 
the voyeuristic pleasure leading the doctor gaze, of which he is the only 
unconscious. So if Charmante claims that the only one who may look deeply is the 
one without sin, the illuminated beholder, purged from vice, it is immediately clear 
how only the vice is pushing him as Charmante first suggests - «Seems she on a 
Bed? Then she’s reposing, and you must not gaze»45 - and then clearly declares – 
«She saw you peeping then, and drew the Curtain of the Air between»46. The 
disembodied vision all philosophers and scientists were preaching is thus reduced 
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by Behn’s irony in screen, justifying vision otherwise forbidden. However, this 
maniacal pleasure in seeing could become something really dangerous if it 
reduces all the pleasure a man can enjoy in the laboratories, scientific or not.  
Baliardo, closed in his room alone with his long telescope, interested only in 
what it can see, and in nothing else perceivable by other senses, so far to be 
interested more in the image of a nymph on the moon then in a ―mortal woman‖, is 
full of all the sexual deviations linked to vision that only the twentieth century 
reflection would bring to light. It wouldn’t seem too risky to bring this subject back 
to those Laura Mulvey argued in the visual pleasure of Hitchcock cinema. The 
character of the doctor is, in fact, somehow reliable to that of Jeffreys in Rear 
Window, equally affected of a pushed voyeurism, being both on the right way to 
become ―peeping toms‖, as the two servants seem to say, just with a distance of 
three hundred years. Even the same misogyny is acting on both stages: 
 
Doct. Let not thy female Ignorance profane the highest Mysteries of natural Philosophy: 
To Fools it seems In-chantment —but I've a Sense can reach it—sit and expect the 
Event.—Hark, I am amaz'd, but must conceal my Wonder, that Joy of Fools—and 
appear wise in Gravity. 
Which is particularly ironic since all the audience is looking at him as a profane 
ignorant being constantly manipulated by women, through his own means.47 
 
The most dangerous way in which vision can be used for is in spying or 
influencing the political life of a nation. Behn, having lived through the years of the 
The Popish Plot and of The Exclusion Crisis, and living now the spectacle 
mediation in Charles II reign, is fully aware of the risk one can encounter. Thus her 
laugh on the doctor reveals a little bitter in unveiling dark business: 
 
Doct. Then 'tis about the Hour that the great Monarch of the Upper World enters into 
his Closet; Mount, mount the Telescope. 
Scar. What to do, Sir? 
Doct. I understand, at certain moments critical, one may be snatch'd of such a 
mighty 
consequence, to let the Sight into the Secret Closet. 
Scar. How, Sir, peep into the King's Closet! under favour, Sir, that will be something 
uncivil. 
Doct. Uncivil! it were flat Treason if it should be known; but thus unseen, and as 
wise Politicians shou'd, I take survey of all: This is the Statesman's Peeping-hole, 
thorow which he steals the Secrets of his King, and seems to wink at distance.48 
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This passage is evidently full of the political awareness of Aphra Behn, who is 
not only showing an idiot character embedded by false beliefs, manipulable and 
dishonest, but, moreover, he has become a means for those who want to 
destabilize a state through the new media created for science. These media 
divorced from their original context become means of political control. The Doctor 
has till now interiorized the scopophiliac activity which is now the clear example of 
that implicit observer that, staying hidden behind his telescope, presumes to be in 
a controlling position. To the contrary, Behn’s play, as well as Hitchcock’s film, 
demonstrates how dangerous the gaze can be for the subject itself. The gaze can 
always come back, or at least be discovered and in turn displayed, becoming the 
object of many different gazes.  
As Bergson has observed we look from a single point of view but we are 
looked-at from several points of view. Thus, the credulous doctor in the last scene 
– not by chance the scene of a masquerade where everyone is wearing a mask 
but the Beholder – is looked at by all the possible points of view: that of the two 
young ladies, using his own means for liberating from their captivity; the two young 
men, facing the man with all his credulity; even the viceroy and the servants are 
judging him. The privacy of individual observer has been metamorphosed into the 
observed spectator. He can’t do anything else but accept his idiocy and his defeat: 
 
Doct. Are not you then the Emperor of the Moon? And you the Prince of Thunderland? 
Cin. There's no such Person, Sir. These Stories are the Fantoms of mad Brains, To 
puzzle Fools withal—the Wise laugh at 'em— Come, Sir, you shall no longer be 
impos'd upon. 
Doct. No Emperor of the Moon, and no Moon World! 
Char. Ridiculous Inventions. If we 'ad not lov'd you you'ad been still impos'd on; You 
had brought a Scandal on your learned Name, And all succeeding Ages had despis'd 
it. 
[…] 
Doct. Burn all my Books and let my study blaze, Burn all to Ashes, and be sure the 
Wind Scatter the vile contagious monstrous Lyes. —Most Noble Youths—you've 
honour'd me with your Alliance, and you, and all your Friends, Assistances in this 
glorious Miracle, I invite to Night to revel with me.—Come all and see my happy 
Recantation of all the Follies, Fables have inspir'd till now. Be pleasant to repeat your 
Story, to tell me by what kind degrees you cozen'd me. I see there's nothing in 
Philosophy—49 
 
The phantoms of folly made people laugh, and Behn’s audience is now 
laughing. But after this ―laughing cure‖, the spectators must be aware and identify 
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themselves with the same character they were most distant from during all the 
play. The ridiculous inventions have been built up to make him and them aware of 
the risks of the new spectacle society, mostly controlled by the unseen politics, 
both Whigs and the court, trying to make people believe in the images they 
construct in order to reach power. But as Baliardo has been reeducated so the 
audience looking through her play can challenge its own passivity. 
 
 
Outsider gaze 
 
After Cavendish, who tried to manage vision on the same field of the male gaze 
even though showing its unconscious subjectivity, and Behn, who denounced the 
ludicrous character of this gaze, Eliza Haywood wrote her plays in order to subvert 
the male model of vision and to reappropriate a female point of view. Female 
authorship, first considered, with Cavendish, as harmless madness, and then, with 
Behn, uncomfortable expression of otherness, becomes with Haywood a threating 
denounce to male authority as a whole, but such a popular one to be hardly 
opposed. 
Eliza (Flower) Haywood was represented as ambiguous to her contemporaries, 
divided between the coquette and social critics, that is between a performing 
character and an ―authorial persona‖, and she still represents a double problem 
nowadays. She began her work as self-standing woman as an actress, eventually 
devoting her work to editing and writing. She wrote her first novel, Love in Excess, 
in 1715, it was the first of a long series of amatory fiction, leading to a spread 
account on her as essentially an amorous stories writer. Only in the twentieth 
century have literary and feminist critics discovered a more social implication in 
her writings than priorly expected, even though some critiques still position her as 
a love stories teller50. The largest part of critics agree nowadays in attributing her a 
role as a deep observer of her contemporary society even overturning the 
traditional division of her work in three phases: an amatory phase – characterized 
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by titillating works, during the first years of 1720s –, a political phase – focusing on 
questions of social rights, mostly women rights, about 1730 – and a domestic 
fictions phase – in which a wiser Haywood makes different recommendation to 
young ladies and sees marriage as a good chance for self expression, between 
1740-175051. However, many critics, such as Marta Kvande, suggest how these 
phases are really reductive if considering how, in one way or another, all her works 
are embedded in social and political concerns. In her work on the ―outsider 
narrator‖, Kvande notes that two main points are made about her amatory fiction: 
the self presentation of the narrator (he or she) as a political figure, and the display 
the strict influence of the private sphere on the public one, one affecting the other 
in reason of morals, corruption, self interest and economic as well as sex 
business. In introducing herself (not being seen) within the private place in which 
social destiny is discussed and managed no less then in the houses of the 
parliament, Haywood discovered and denounced the ambiguous and immoral 
character of politics in her age, a very difficult one and particularly affecting the 
Tory party she belonged to as well as Behn before her.  
In fact, in 1715, exactly the year in which Haywood started her work, after the 
House of Hannover gained the throne, the Jacobian rebellion, already existing 
since 1688, exploded in the First Jacobite Rebellion. After this attempt in favor of 
Stuart house, the Tories lose much of their power by getting into an opposition 
role. Between 1720 and 1721, a speculation scandal known as the South Sea 
Scandal implied Robert Walpole First Lord of the Treasury, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and Leader of the House of Commons, probably the most powerful 
man of the age, member of the Whig party. Accused to have avoided the 
economic disaster dealing with the bankruptcy of the South Sea Company, he was 
addressed of a conspiracy by a coalition of both Tories and disempowered Whigs.  
Both the real facts and the general humor of the age were reported by 
Haywood, who depicted the corruption style and the conspiracy ways of managing 
politics during those years. Thus in Memoirs of a Certain Island, she explicitly 
makes references to the South Sea Company, and in Invisible Spy shows how 
private houses, coffee houses and the parliament houses, were all places of 
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private and public dominion. The point of view she assumes is not merged with 
that of the Tory’s party, she somehow belonged to, for if they occupied by that time 
a role of opposition it was anyway an opposition ruled on the same ground of the 
opponents, and by the same means of lies, conspiracy and cheat. This, Haywood 
denounces, is the male way to look at politics in a personal way. Women, on the 
contrary look at it from the point of view of the outsider, of course because they 
are not allowed to do any other way. By the way, even this same role assigned to 
them by men can be a useful means and a good point of view to act politically 
through literature. A really modern argument, especially considered by a cultural 
studies point of view, which seems very fitting especially with the accounts of 
feminist visual culture we have examined, such as the reflections made by Donna 
Haraway, Evelyn Fox Keller and Heléne Cixous. 
If the Memoirs of a Certain Island52 and The Court of Caramania53, because of 
the utopian genre Haywood choose, represent a distant discussion of a whole 
political and social asset, and the role of the outsider is peculiarly narrative, 
another work, one of the last she wrote, represents a closer framing, addressing 
specific political matter, public and private, where the role of outsider merges both 
the writer and the observer in a double challenge, which is peculiar in Haywood’s 
literature: this is The invisible Spy54. 
The novel was published under the pseudonym of Exploralibus, in 1755, just a 
year before Haywood’s death, and, just because of this late period it is usually 
linked to the ―domestic phase‖, in which a much wiser Haywood, according to 
some critics, kept her writings far from the sexual scenes she was once used to 
and adopted a ―moral‖ behavior. This depiction is however reductive if considering, 
as we will soon do, all the political and moral implication expressively addressed 
by the author. It was a great success being republished in four successive 
editions. This great success is most probably due to the sensational and scandal 
mongering subject it proposes, making still more difficult to accept the nexus 
between the last period of Haywood’s work with a more domestic interest. In fact, 
the protagonist of the story, the invisible spy, doesn’t act in an imaginary or 
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utopian world, rather in a very well recognizable London, and in a precise social 
and, moreover, political asset, when the parliament, with or without people in 
agreement, was involved in promulgating such laws, which would have serious 
repercussions on citizens and British culture, as the Jews Naturalization Act 
(1753) – by which Jews even though forbidden of English citizenship, could 
anyway gain the status of ―naturalized‖ – and the Mariage Bill (1755) – by which 
any woman should obey not only to the will of the father for her marriage but to 
that of any tutor in case of the father’s death. As a consequence almost all the 
characters who encounter the invisible spy are real and covered only by fictitious 
names, since the protagonist will not attend affairs dealing within halls of justice or 
meeting for election, neither cabinets of princes or ministers of state, but wholly 
privates places, as private houses, and semi-public places, such as coffee-
houses. 
The four volumes long story, begins with the introduction, made by the narrator, 
within the cabinets of curiosities, of a very wise man, and friend of the eventual 
spy, who, at death’s door, wants to give his last gifts to his friend, gifts to be 
chosen within this cabinet. This is a place in which all the very curiosities of man, 
especially of that period, were placed: telescopes, horoscopes, microscopes, 
talismans, multipliers, magnifiers of all degree, but also ―The Illusive powder‖ – 
able to generate splendid visions or universal terror and dismay –, ―The 
simpathetic Bell‖, the ―Salts of Meditation‖, correcting the «vague and wandering 
thoughts»55, ―The Shrinking Cap‖ – making persons «small enough to enter into 
the mouth of a lady’s tea-pot»56. None of these wonders, anyway, attracts our 
narrator, who judges the majority of them as amusing or astonishing rather than 
useful tools. But two other wonders make his curiosity finally raise: ―The Belt of 
Invisibility‖ and ―The wonderful Tablet‖. The first, which «fastened round the body 
next the skin, no sooner becomes warm than it renders the party invisible to all 
human eyes»57, amuses his fancy with all the «promises discoveries highly 
flattering to the inquisitiveness of [...] humor»58. The second, which «in whatever 
place it is spread open, receives the impression of every word that is spoken»59, 
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amuses his memory. The choice doesn’t surprise the old friend already aware that 
«curiosity is the most prevailing passion of the human mind»60. 
Now that these two devices are attained our character, whose sex will remain 
obscure for the entire first book, can begin his inspections, being able of invisibly 
seeing and translating images into words in order to remember them better, just 
like a modern spy. 
Being an invisible observer, seeing more or less private scenes, his activities 
are surely voyeuristic, constructing an asymmetrical observer/observed relation, 
putting in a public display private affairs. In so doing the invisible spy, from the 
second book on discovered as a man, seems to represent all the three elements 
distinguishing the male objectivity oriented vision, which Keller suggested61: a 
dynamic neutrality, by which observation is not affected by the subject gaze; a 
dependence on distance, here sharpened by the visible/invisible relation that 
divided the different objects from the subject; a simultaneity of vision, which 
extends the presence of the object particularly amplified by the device of the 
tablet. 
Thus, Haywood seems to stage a purely male gaze. But a closer reading of the 
text will show that, even if every one of these elements belongs to the male way of 
seeing, they are not employed in a faithful way. The question of voyeurism, 
indeed, is showed in a completely different way, first of all being completely devoid 
from any sexual meaning. The numerous chances in which the spy exits the 
scenes becoming too private, demonstrate his distance from any power intents. If, 
indeed, he is surely in a privileged position, to see without being seen, he never 
acts in order to obtain knowledge to be used against someone. Most of the time he 
uses his recorded visions to redeem the reputation of the innocent, or to unmask 
the bad faith of the dishonest: 
 
I have it in my power to pluck off the mask of hypocrisy from the seeming saint, – to 
expose vice and folly in all their various modes and attitudes; to strip a bad action of all 
the specious pretences made to conceal or palliate it, and shew it in its native ugliness. 
– At the same time, I have also the means to rescue injur’d innocence from the cruel 
attacks begun by envy and scandal, and propagated by prejudice and ill-nature. – In 
fine, I am enabled, by this precious gift, to set both things and persons in their proper 
                                            
60
 Ivi, vol. 1, p. 12. 
61
 infra cap. 1 
 118 
colours; and not in such as either, thro’ malice, or partial favour, they are frequently 
made to appear.62 
 
The neutrality of his vision, however, confirms even that neither the distance 
from the object is due to a desire to better control of his objects, in front of 
activities in which he remains as an innocent witness never interfering with them. 
In fact he quite never intervenes, manipulates or acts to change the course of the 
events. His objectives indeed are no way related to action, rather to report the 
scenes he had witnessed and the reflection about human nature he always 
derives from them: 
 
I should never have ventur’d to speak so positively in many things as I have done, if 
the gift of Invisibility had not offered me an opportunity of accompanying them when 
they thought themselves entirely alone, and of beholding them in those unguarded 
attitudes which are the best, and, indeed, the only certain discoverers of the inward 
workings of the human mind.63 
 
The final end to which his entire project is devoted is to reveal the disparity of 
the behavior people, of the highest or lowest level of society, mask, and moreover 
to denounce the lack of connection between the public appearance and the private 
substance, which is not always very welcome: «Yet, I know not how it is, but the title 
of this work has, by some means or other, taken air, and I perceive has sounded an alarm 
in the ears of those who blush to be told of what they do not blush to act»64. The letters 
the author receives, which he shows us in the third volumes, are all evidence of 
the uncomfortable reactions and the warnings he (or she) caused: 
 
Human prudence has taught us to elude the scrutiny of all known examiners; but who 
can guard against they do not see? – You may be at our very elbows without our 
knowing you are; – you may explore all the necessary arts and mysteries of our several 
avocations, without our having it in our power to tribe you to secrecy: – What therefore 
can you expect, as there is no other way of dealing with you, but to have your book 
damn’d.65 
 
The quotation above and the one below, are also evidences of how his own 
activity in instructing on the dangers of modern society put him in a position far 
from, or at least uncomfortable for, the society, which makes us reflect on how 
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vision can barely be innocent, all depending on who, why and by what means it is 
exercised: 
 
There are a lot of men about this town who pick up a pretty tolerable living by 
inspecting into the secrets of the press; – they are a sort of Spies as well as yourself, 
and as Invisible as you can pretend to be; – they find means to steal the title of every 
new book long before it is advertised, and almost as soon as the letters which form it 
are put together by the compositor it is by one of those very useful persons I am 
informed of your work.66 
 
The invisibility of the spy has produced the visibility of all the citizens of London 
who, now, feel a sort of threat in being in the possibility to be seen without 
permission and without seeing in their turn. He acts, therefore, as the jailer of the 
Panopticon in Foucault’s reflection about discipline and punishment. His physical 
presence is no more needed, in this case it has never existed, because the effects 
of his vision have already been interiorized. But a great difference divided the spy 
from the jailer. The former is not an acting legal power, is not casting a gaze by 
law, for he is not performing a control prescribed by power, not assuming a point 
of view inner to power. He is completely outside, and therefore he is showing no 
real power having direct consequences. 
This is the point of view of what we have called the outsider, and we have now 
to relate to the observer more than to the writer, even though the two are often 
connected. As we have already seen in the previous chapter, both Haraway and 
Keller agree in discovering the peculiar female point of view in that of the outsider, 
that is someone who, having been marginalized, sees from below, making of this 
disadvantaged vision a way to discover the lacks of the dominating gaze. Such 
lacks reside in precise points of the visual process: in the pretension of dominating 
an immediate, transcendent and disembodied vision, and, as a result, in the lack 
of responsibility in vision and its effects.  
Eliza Haywood, created in the eighteenth century a character who, even though 
under male shape, responds point by point to this model. Both the true author and 
the fictitious narrator, indeed, cast marginal gazes: the first being a woman in a 
fully patriarchal society, the second being a character somehow distant from the 
society of which he can neither stand vices nor recognize virtues.  
Thus if Haywood seems to accept a needed distance between the subject and 
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the object of observation, it is not to be intended in a male way. That is, it is not to 
better control her object that the narrator detached him/herself from the object and 
the entire world it belonged to, but rather to reach an outsider point of view. The 
outsider in Haywood is not someone who chooses a definitive separation to the 
world, no longer participating in its activities. It is rather someone who has been 
excluded, against his or her will, from public discourses by corrupted forms of 
power. Anyway, he or she doesn’t accept this exile and takes place, a little from 
the central scene, in order to better observe, witness and then denounce the 
corruption, not only of power, but of morals and customs, in public as well as in 
private circumstances, being the two places not detached one from another. 
Moreover, both of them are far aware of the embodied and mediate nature of 
their vision. The invisible spy, in fact, stresses more than once on the character of 
his vision being strictly linked to the means he adopts to see that way, the invisible 
coat as well as the one devoted to register what memory couldn’t resume with no 
adjunction or subtraction. Without the two means he would have never been able 
to make us these accounts. However, they never put him in a superior position in 
which his gaze and his own body are safe. He is always at stake, always liable to 
be discovered, because the medium of invisibility doesn’t erase his own 
corporality. It is shown both in a metaphoric and a material way. The first is, in fact, 
the cause of his choice of the places where he exerts his activities: 
 
They would in vain seek me at court-balls, city-feasts, the halls of justice, or meetings 
for elections - a nor do I much haunt the opera or play-houses: in fine, I avoid all 
crouds, all mix'd assemblies, except the masquerade and Venetian balls […] I revere 
regal authority, but seldom visit the cabinet of princes, because they are generally so 
filled with a thick fog, that the christaline texture of my Tablets could not receive what 
was said there, so as to be read distinctly; nor do I much care to venture myself among 
their ministers of state, or any of their underworking tools; the floors of their rooms, in 
which their cabals are held, are composed of such slippery materials that the least faux 
pas might endanger my Invisibility, if not my neck.67 
 
The risks a spy takes, or even any other kind of observer, in endeavoring such 
a survey, are not only metaphoric, involving question of morality and corruption in 
the rooms of political power, but also physical since the observer, being in the right 
place in which phenomena is to happen, can always find himself involved in 
accident or unpredictable reactions. This is what happened when our spy assists 
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the plain project by a grenadier in defending the honor of his wife from his 
seductive officer attacks: 
 
My leader had not advanced above five or six steps of the stairs, when he receiv’d a 
violent blow on the head, which, together with the surprise it gave him, made him reel 
back and like to fall on poor Invisible; but I hastily and prundently withdrew to the 
middle of the entry, and stood aloof to hear, at a more safe distance, what would be the 
end pf this affair […] for my own part, after I got home, the satisfaction of finding myself 
safe from the dangers into which my curiosity had brought me, was succeeded by 
some considerations on the passages I had been witness of.68 
 
The project of the invisible spy is fated to the end, when the last innocent 
remaining in the city, and guarded by him, loses her own innocence. The label on 
the wonderful tablet, indeed, said that it couldn’t «be expunged, but by the breath 
of a virgin, of so pure an innocence as not to have even thought on the difference 
of sexes»69. The only way to obtain such a pure woman was to raise a girl 
preserving her innocence. But this task was much too difficult, or rather impossible 
for the protagonist. The innocence has to end sooner or later, and having been 
lost by his girl, his tablet, no more ―expungable‖, puts and end to his reports. 
Nature, or may be society, never falls under the uncontrolled gaze of individuals, 
being them curious or wise. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Within the first question of vision, that of the positioning and construction of the 
observer, the three writers of the period we are analyzing, pose themselves in not 
homogeneous but coherent positions, presenting interesting points in common 
with the critics of twentieth century.  
The first point is that concerning the distance patriarchal society poses between 
the subject and the object of vision, and not only of that. As The Blazing World of 
Margaret Cavendish showed us, it is an unacceptable model for the vision of 
women and scientific research. In her point of view the subject and the object of 
the research coincide, Behn and Haywood agreed, not only because the subject is 
anyway affecting the object through his or her gaze, but primarily because the first 
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target of this research is the subject him- or herself. It produces a double result. 
First of all, all the most blazing wonders that man can discover are inside and not 
only outside himself, which also means that the primary means of knowledge is 
the reason more than the senses and the witty exercise of the mind. It doesn’t 
means that Cavendish is returning in a Cartesian disjunction of the body and the 
soul, the inner mind and the outer one, for the two work together, as the blending 
of the Empress’s body and of the Author’s soul, and vice versa. Cavendish, being 
a Natural Philosopher, knows very well the importance that optical devices 
represent for human knowledge, and she is not criticizing them. Rather she is 
warning about an excessive faith in what the nineteenth century will suppose to be 
―mechanical vision‖. Because, for what man can do to avoid his personal influence 
in observation, his eye, meaning a biological and not divine eye, is his primary and 
inescapable medium. 
These statements lead immediately to the other two results from our research in 
this chapter: the pretension of objectivity, and the invisible place of female 
beholder.  
As the Emperor of the Moon has showed us, the objective target of scientific 
surveys, is a coverage for the real ends of mediated looking. What is man peeping 
at through the lenses, addressing gazes to the secrets of nature (and not only of 
nature)? He is trying to affirm once again his power, over nature, penetrated in 
every part, and within the society of the seventeenth century, in which spying and 
constructing false images were becoming the new trend in political affairs. Closing 
his observation to those aims, brings this observer to the sole result of an auto-
infatuation, in which the mind, lost in the infinite worlds achievable thanks to the 
devices invented by itself, becomes the first victim of an illusionary system, in 
which everything can be trusted and every link with the real world is broken. 
But, when the spy is not a member of the dominating part of society, rather an 
outcast and silenced object forced to become a beholder ―from above‖, he or she 
can also represent a threat for the same system that created him or her. If the 
outsider, as Keller and Haraway argue, is him- or herself produced by the same 
linguistic and culture codes of the insider, then it is not a romantic character, rather 
a possible thief of the secrets of this system, able to understand where to look for 
its weaknesses, and how to denounce them. His or her invisibility is the first arm to 
be used, as Foucault and Haywood have demonstrated. 
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How can we describe, therefore, the observer of this primary female gaze?  
He or she seems to me a subjective observer, by which I mean an observer 
conscious of his or her own embodiment, carnality and mediacy: 
 
Listen to a woman […] it's with her body that she vitally supports the "logic" of her 
speech. Her flesh speaks true. She lays herself bare. In fact, she physically 
materializes what she's thinking; she signifies it with her body. In a certain way she 
inscribes what she's saying, because she doesn't deny her drives the intractable and 
impassioned part they have in speaking. Her speech, even when "theoretical" or  
political, is never simple or linear or "objectified," generalized: she draws her story into 
history.70 
 
 The target of this ―discourse‖ is not that of empowering rather to free, not to 
catch rather to report, not to distance the point of view rather to experience what 
she is looking for, not being afraid to be scared. 
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III 
 
 
Displaying Objects 
 
 
There will have been the long history of gynocide. 
H. Cixous 
 
 
 
According to the theory about scopic regimes by Jonathan Crary1 and the 
related “observations on the observer” by Martin Jay2, the beholder is the product 
of the cultural system of vision, being related to the practices, the rules, the 
means, and the targets involved. As a first result it is also the producer of the 
object of his or her own gaze, that is the responsible of the resulting image, which, 
in turn, is inserted in the same processes, practices, rules, means, etc. Thus, if the 
shape of the subject changes as the scopic regime changes, also the object 
changes accordingly. As a second result, but primarily for our research, the shape 
of the observer resulting from the practices of looking between the seventeenth 
and the eighteenth century leads us to the second matter of our project, that of the 
observed and the ways in which it is controlled, manipulated and, on the other 
hand, the tactics he/she/it tries to resist.  
Even though all the elements of the regime are strictly connected, this process, 
as we are trying to demonstrate, is never stable or univocal. In fact, as the analysis 
conducted in the previous chapter shows, the same possibility of a determinable 
system of vision has always been at stake, from the very moment of its birth. The 
shape of the beholder in all three examples by Cavendish, Behn and Haywood is 
that of a system already in crisis on three different grounds: the distance between 
the subject and the object of vision; the turning roles of observer and observed; 
the corporality of the process of vision.  
                                            
1
 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in Nineteenth Century, 
Cambridge-London, MIT Press, 1992. 
2
 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993. 
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The first attack against the stability of any scopic regime is the confutation of 
the distance between the object and the subject of vision, which was born with the 
perspective regime and pretended to work till the nineteenth century. We have 
seen this issue to be contested in Cavendish because of a supposed coincidence 
of the two opposite sites of vision, something we could nowadays refer to as a sort 
of “autoscopy”, in the words of Merleau-Ponty and his further discussion on the 
“narcissism of vision”3. This is no longer a dominant vision, a vision from above, 
just distancing the subject from the object, but rather pushing the desire of this 
subject into entering a world made of his own flesh, a flesh that is not perfectly 
opaque or totally transparent. This encounter happens in a precise punctum 
caecum in which the visible meets the invisible. This looks exactly like the 
description of what Cavendish made happen in the encounter between the author 
herself and her protagonist, the Empress, in The Blazing World. 
This reduction or even abolition of distance produces also an overturn in which 
the observer becomes the observed, and this is the second ground of crisis for the 
beholder. The observed spectator, as Foucault has already argued4, is the primary 
sign of the crisis of the ocularcentrism, by which the privacy of observation is no 
longer guaranteed. Thus, since the points of view have been multiplied, the 
observer becomes his own or other’s object. What happens to Doctor Baliardo, in 
Behn’s The Emperor of the Moon, is the downfall of the whole Cartesian system. 
Vision becomes an adversarial relation among all the elements, in which each of 
them can take over the others, and put the subject in front of his own illusory 
authority5. 
Probably the most decisive turning point in this reflection is the third ground, 
that is the awareness of the corporality of both the object and the subject involved 
in a process that, as we can now see, is affecting the two. Not only the elements 
the beholder is looking at – being those a specimen, an actress, an “Other” – but 
the beholder him- or herself is implied in the process of vision as a body, a surface 
on which the signs of difference are inscribed, traced by the gaze(s). They are 
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 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, L’Œil et l’esprit, Paris, Gallimard, 1961, trans. Carleton Dallery, 'Eye and 
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5
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both engaged and endangered in a process of vision that can always be inverted, 
but moreover, in which the incorporated observer must realize the responsibility 
his position attributes to him. Like The Invisible Spy of Haywood, the subject must 
consider the responsibility deriving from the lack of permission in which she or, 
mostly, he is acting. A lack that can only be accepted, if ever it can be accepted, 
because of noble aims, contributing to general safeness or social improvement, 
such as the discovery of physical defects, or defective social dynamics. Thus, 
Haywood seems to have already tried to fill the vacuum between subject and 
object, realizing the individuation of a historical subject that Irigaray proposed as 
the female way of seeing6. Through the pens of these three writers the subject has 
been historicized, that is traced back to a precise moment and in a precise 
material place, thus reducing his or her horizon of action as well. Also, the true 
means of his or her vision has been circumstantiated, threatening any reasonable 
chance of mechanic observation, and, therefore, of absolute objectivity.  
The question or, better, the questionability of the objectiveness was at stake in 
the early modern period thanks to great revolutions that took place in science, 
spectacle, and print. The first of which was a new, even though not completely 
aware, consideration of the power of vision, in controlling objects such as a 
specimen in the laboratory through new microscopes, a character on the stage 
through new theatrical mechanisms, a topic in printing through literature or 
magazines. The instrumental aids to vision, considered as fundamental 
improvements without which knowledge would not have reached the level it is at, 
are not sufficient, according to our authors, to construct the true image of realty. In 
fact, as Cavendish first argued, the optical devices often become the target 
themselves of observation, or the sufficient reason to make that vision 
authoritative. This leads, most of the time, to “artificial illusion” that has nothing to 
do with a true understanding of mind. Behn pictured these instruments as peeping 
tools that don’t always help in distinguishing reality from fiction, both being, as 
Haywood added, liable of punishment7.  
This is neither the worst threat the beholder can afford, for what can really be 
most dangerous is the control of vision, and of its power, shifting under the control 
                                            
6
 Luce Irigaray, J'aime à toi. Esquisse d'une félicité dans l'histoire, Paris, B. Grasset, 1992, trans. 
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7
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of the observed, making the beholder become beheld. In this case many things 
could be unmasked: scientific fictions under scientific facts, political conspiracies 
under innocent observations and publications, social hypocrisies under 
respectable appearances. 
Thus depicting the characters and the process taking part in vision, the power 
related to it seems no more to reside above the lens of vision, but neither entirely 
below. It doesn’t seem to stay in a precise point at all. It is now seen as a power to 
be negotiated when not to be conquered, for if the perspective regime supposed 
the dominating eye to be able to define, once and for all, the objects to be 
penetrated in the whole of their bodies – being those the body of nature, the body 
of the woman, the body of the Other – it wasn’t be able to predict, and then to 
control, the casting back of all those eyes toward the subject.  
Fortunately for this subject this process backwards, going up the tube of the 
microscope, wasn’t so simple or immediate, in so far as it has not yet been finally 
completed. It is a process played by multiple subjects, or better said, objects, the 
same the phallocularcentric8 regime had created and had simplified in the 
category of otherness. All these “othernesses”, being conscious of their multiple 
differences, have been played not on the basis of a strategy, rather on that of 
single and multiple tactics, in order both to free their subjected bodies and their 
denied gaze. These “othernesses”, are those of women, of colonial subjects, and 
of all the marginalized voices that the dominating models of vision have always 
casted outside. But, what all these nodes of the web have in common is not only 
the attempt of turning the microscope upside down, but also to be aware of their 
own otherness, which allows them to construct scopic regimes completely different 
from that of colonizing man. Analyzing the tactics of one of these nodes9, 
therefore, could help us to open the route of a better comprehension of many other 
ways of seeing. 
These are all subjects of the contemporary debate about the different speaking, 
but also looking, identities, especially within cultural studies. Yet, once again, the 
debate on looking, and be-looked seems to be rooted in the early modern period, 
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and the three writers we are analyzing can offer a good perspective on the fighting 
scopic regimes between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Two of these strategies have already been detected in the previous chapter, 
and consist in the appropriation of a particular point of view and on the resulting 
manipulation of the related scopic regime. The third strategy will be the subject 
matter of this chapter. 
 
 
Mimicry and mask                
 
The inspecting and controlling power of vision has always been exerted on the 
body of the object – being that the body of nature, the body of woman, the body of 
the colonized. As Foucault argued, it assumed two different peculiarities between 
the two ages of knowledge: a conquering power over the body’s surface in 
classical age, and a penetrating one during the modern age10. It is not by 
coincidence that Bacon spoke about science as a conquering activity over nature: 
«for you have but to follow and as it were hound nature in her wanderings, and 
you will be able, when you like, to lead and drive her afterwards to the same place 
again»11. To know, thus, means primarily to discover nature’s secrets in order to 
control and manage them according to human will. 
This scientific aim becomes an ordinary practice of looking, by which all the 
objects of male curiosity are observed and displayed, justifying this intimate survey 
with the goal of knowledge. This goal allowed the gaze to wander over the 
surfaces of these bodies because of their innate inferiority. The first to fall under 
the gaze of “science” were the “inferior men” of the colonies, and the women 
sharing a natural passivity, and being introduced in scopic regimes under the 
common roles of the “to-be-look-at ness”, because of the color of their skin or 
because of their sex. Neither the former nor the latter seemed to accept this 
position, and they started to use these same roles to fight or reinvent their 
marginal positions. 
                                            
10
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Throughout this research the medium of the masquerade has been cited more 
than once as a very popular genre of public entertainment in the English court in 
the first half of the seventeenth century, and later even out of the court in English 
theatre till the eighteenth century. It was a peculiar form of mis en scene playing 
with the subversion of roles, even gender roles, especially appreciated by women. 
In twentieth-century film studies, scholars such as Mary Ann Doane have detected 
this kind of transvestitism as a particular means of disturbance12. This female 
tactic is somehow linked to the question of mimicry. This is a question discussed in 
two different ways by Homi Bhabha, who defined it as an “ironic compromise”13, 
and by Luce Irigaray, who defined it as an interim strategy for dealing with the 
realm of the discourse14. Both the female and the black objects, indeed can be 
defined as “locus of a legitimate form of ownership”15, and share a triple kind of 
gaze: that of a subject, that of an object, and that of a double character being 
aware both of his/her “look” and the “to-be-looked”.  
Within this compromise the “Other” is recognized as a “subject of difference that 
is almost the same, but not quite”16. On the other hand, the she-subject is a 
hysterical subject, staging the disbelief and the oppression, while exiting the 
censorship of the “master” beholder17. Assuming the masks attributed by the 
dominant visual regime doesn’t mean, for the two both, simply accepting to be an 
object, rather to use the resulting partiality and the virtuality as a means of 
resistance, with no intention of harmonizing the differences. Under the mask of 
desiring gazes, objects do not stop to be looked at, but what is really looked at is 
the image already made by the observers. The real subject with all his or her 
peculiarities is (more or less) safe under this image and he/she is returning the 
gaze, even though the beholder doesn’t know it, or at least he or she is 
somewhere else. 
Although made similar by the same hidden phallogularcentric gaze, mimicry 
and masquerade, as means of using this apparatus to unmask its own attempt to 
homologate the differences, differ in something. Irigaray defines the masquerade 
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in a more diffident way: «an alienated or false version of femininity arising from the 
woman’s awareness of the man’s desire for her to be his other, the masquerade 
permits woman to experience desire not in her own right but as the man’s desire 
situates her»18. I propose, somehow not agreeing with Irigaray, to distinguish the 
two terms on the basis of three fundamental differences: the space of action, the 
trend towards similarity or towards difference, the related gain to be seen or to be 
not seen.  
As Doane showed, women within the medium of masquerade act in the same 
way but also in the same space in which dominant men act. The peculiarity of 
these spectacles is, indeed, the complete abolition of the space between actors 
and the audience. It is exactly this lack of distance that makes the masquerade a 
preferred terrain for making a different scopic regime, because it’s difficult to 
define who is looking at whom. This chance was offered by the overturning of 
roles, which was supposed to be under control. As it is showed by its use within 
the court of King James I19, the political use of the masquerade was already clear 
at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and also questions of gender were 
staged in public. Under the masks women were giving back their gaze in ways 
they couldn’t otherwise, but playing by the rules. On the contrary the mimicry 
doesn’t act on the same stage as the “original” shape, since only one of the two 
parts involved wear, in this case the mask. It can still be seen as a means of 
putting the dominant vision in front of the screen on which the image of the other is 
projected, leaving out all its differences, barely leading to a crossing of the roles or 
an overturning of the rules. More then a performance made with political effects, it 
is an accusation with social purposes. 
The second point of difference has to do with the orientation of the mask, being 
devoted to a differentiation, in the first case, and to the “similarization” in the 
second case, although both the two instances are faded. By wearing the mask, 
women never stopped being women, but they were the true women they used to 
be. The function of the masquerade resides precisely in that everybody knows that 
the pretended character is not real, which means that he or she is allowed just for 
                                            
18
 Ivi, p. 220. 
19
 For a wider discussion about the seventeenth and eighteenth century masquerade see Chap. I, 
pp. 63-66. 
 131 
that moment to break the rules20. The mask of womanliness or of blackness, at the 
contrary, has not been freely chosen, and it isn’t allowed to break any rules, or to 
enter any forbidden space. In mimicry what happens is the conflagration between 
difference, “naturally” inscribed onto the black skin and the female sex, and 
similarity, artificially superimposed to make that difference acceptable. 
The ultimate aim, then, is different. While the aim of the masquerade is to 
attract the gaze of the master observer, even though with a “medusan” intent – 
that is to threaten that gaze and show how it can be dismissed and substituted – 
that of mimicry is not to be seen any longer – that is to erase from the black skin or 
the female body all the historical categories which have now become naturalized 
epidermal schema21. 
The two models of mimicry and masquerade have been already tested by 
Cavendish, Behn, and Haywood, putting on stage not only their own marginality 
but also that of the others. 
 
 
A queer masquerade 
 
In Le rire de la Meduse, written in 1975, Hélène Cixous invites women to the re-
appropriation at once of their own writing and of their own body, being those 
carried off by male phallogularcentrism, «for the same reasons, by the same law, 
with the same fatal goal»22. Their body has been divided from their expression to 
become the pure object of male gaze, staged as the place itself of sin, mistake or 
sexual desire. Now women need to create a new language, a new weapon to 
contrast their own imprisonment, and this language is the language of flesh. It is a 
very meaningful language, whose end is neither that of generalization or 
objectification, nor that of internalization or manipulation, but rather that of 
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freedom. A new space is now opened, a space in-between where identities are not 
defined once and for ever, but where the “Others” are welcomed not only as 
objects but as shifting subjects, for what really interests this new language is the 
process that leads from the same to the other. 
Re-appropriating her female body and her female writing was the essential plan 
of Margaret Cavendish who seems to have anticipated Cixous by three centuries. 
In her plays she attempted to stage the female subject by showing not only her 
“natural” corporality but also the masks she can wear, either chosen by her own 
will or not. For this reason Joyce Devlin Mosher refers to her strategy as that of the 
female spectacle in which the power of dressing and the display of masks, more or 
less fitting the male apparatus, serve her desire of self-realization. It is the precise 
aesthetics that shaped her personal life and her works as well. 
It is well known how she designed her physical presence as a structured 
demonstration of her elusive identity, described by her contemporaries under the 
simplified category of “bizarre and garish”. From a less myopic point of view, we 
can nowadays see the design under this personal masquerade as an assumption 
of «the artificial in order to transcend it»23. In this case the artificial was the 
constructed fashion she produced for herself – with jewels, dressing and all kinds 
of accessories – and for her feminine characters, which had something more than 
the pure desire to be addressed by the gazes of everyone as a goal, for the crowd 
addressed their mask and not their self.  
It has been long debated the apparent discrepancy between her innate shyness 
and this kind of showing off, staged for example during the visit of the Duchess to 
the Royal Society. Lisa T. Sarasohn frames this visit within the consideration that 
age had of female writing: a queer phenomenon considered as unnatural and 
curious as the monstrous, the hermafroditism, in short the in-between. An 
undefined object Cavendish took advantage of, not only in order to manage it as a 
new subject, not yet enclosed within dominant categories, but also as a mirror 
reflecting the same spectacularity under which the Royal scientists masked their 
activity, thus manipulating the audience. The spectacle by which Cavendish 
showed the Royal society her “self” was, then, the mirror of the Royal Society 
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Spectacle itself24, although most of the audience didn’t realize it. The popular 
ballad by John Evelyn thus describe the event:  
 
But Jo her headgear was so pretty 
I ne’er saw anything so witty 
Tho I was half a feard 
God bless us when I first did see her 
She looked so like a Cavalier 
But that she had no beard.25 
 
While being the first woman to enter the Royal Society sessions, Cavendish, 
who used to wear extra-feminine dress, decided to show herself in male clothing 
and performed a parade with pages and maids accompanying her. This is a 
performance that we will soon see in one of her plays, acting like Irigaray 
supposes the woman to act within mimicry: laying the sexual nature bare, which at 
the same time prevented her “self” from being absorbed. In doing so Cavendish 
reached a triple target: to make visible what was suppose to be and to stay 
invisible; to “jam” the theoretical machinery, which manages both this visibility and 
invisibility; to suspend the pretended truth which masks the univocal meanings this 
machinery produces26. 
Far from being a passive observer of Boyle’s “spectacles”, since in this way his 
displayed experiments were defined by the society itself, Cavendish was 
converting the planes of representation. Diverting the gazes from the supposed 
spectacle to herself, she became the object of vision, rather than the spectator, but 
a specific kind of object, since the body addressed was not her true body, the one 
she refers to as a defective one, but a masked one, the blazing body of her 
empress/knight to be adored and worshiped.  
No longer a passive object or a controlled one, rather an object conscious of 
being looked at, she used and manipulated the whole system included in the 
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general visual regime. She was not only conscious of the way in which the most 
acclaimed scientists were making science spectacular – i.e. an amusement rather 
than a profession –, but she was also very well acquainted with the whole visual 
society, which staged diverse sorts of bodies involving both the subjects displaying 
and the objects displayed. These confused stages were multiplied as well as the 
audiences, for the seventeenth century, as Rebecca D’Montè argued27, was a 
period of “endemic performances”: masquerades, overturning class and gender 
rules; circuses and fairs, showing wonders and bestialities; museums and curious 
cabinets of private gentlemen, displaying desire and voyeurism; parades «used by 
Kings and lord mayors to present their sanctified selves to the gaze of adoring 
public»28. 
Understanding what was the “provided place” of women is not so simple. They, 
of course, were neither the directing subjects of these spectacles, but often, nor 
were they the object, such as during the public parade. Moreover, Burke argued, 
they were neither part of the intellectual elite, being “semi-educated”, or part of the 
social non-elite, being part of the upper-class. Women were somehow the 
“mediators” between the former, who managed their own spectacles, and the 
latter, who assisted adoring these spectacles29. 
Not satisfied of this frame Cavendish decided to use it in order to subvert it, 
through a complex, articulated and long lasting design, which was perfectly 
manifested in a curious debate within Female Orations between women who 
accepted the author’s invitation to make a «Frequentation, Association, and 
Combination amongst our Selves and Free, Happy, and Famous as Men»30. The 
main topic of this debate is whether women should aspire to be similar or different 
than men, in order to gain freedom and happiness. This is how the question is 
conducted between the lady in oration number IV and that in oration number V: 
 
Wherefore my advise is we should imitate men, so will our bodies and minds appear 
more masculine and our power will increase by our actions. 
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[…] 
 
To have female bodies, and yet to act masculine, will be very preposterous and 
unnatural; in truth, we shall make ourselves like as defects of nature, as to be 
hermaphoditical, as neither to be perfect women nor perfect men, but corrupt and 
imperfect creatures31 
 
Cavendish seems to turn her tactic from a mimicry of male customs to a 
masquerade, with the same mask men attribute to women. She did subversively 
appropriate her defective body, a body on which cultural schemes seemed to be 
unable to have control, but on which she studied to have control because 
«although her body is barren and incapacitated, her mind is industrious and 
restless to live»32. As all of her work shows, this was a life-long project of 
discovering and inventing a new version of herself, a version by which rejecting 
the social categories, which radically differentiated the male body from the female 
body and constrained the female body to a repression and a devaluation. This big 
project was led by means of both her life and habits and her work.  
By means of self-fashioning, Margaret Cavendish communicated not only her 
distance and her difference from the society she belonged to, enjoying herself in 
creating her own clothes and jewelry, but even that of her heroines and 
characters, always distinguished in the symbolism of their majestic dressing – 
such as that of the Empress of The Blazing World – or in the masculine habits; 
criticizing the fixed gender polarity between male and female – such as those of 
multiple faces heroine in The Convent of Pleasure.  
In this play the heroine Lady Happy, refuses her feminine role and builds up a 
feminine reign in which there’s no place for men. In this safe enclosure the twenty-
one women discover a new freedom recognizing the relativity of gender roles and 
having new experiences which step by step repudiate heterosexuality and 
reinvented new gendered politics «joining in the experimental pleasures of erotic 
friendship, cross-dressing, and role playing, the category of woman does not stand 
as a single uncontested constant; its cultural meaning is explored, destabilized 
and challenged»33. 
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The play in which more than in others Margaret Cavendish displays the female 
object as an excessive femininity, in the reversal of gender and the appropriation 
of the roles, is Bell in Campo, published in 166234. It narrates two, or even more, 
different kinds of femininity within the frame of the war between the “Kingdome of 
Reformation” and the “Kingdome of Faction”. As the man of the Kingdome of 
Reformation are preparing everything to go to battle, their woman react in different 
ways: Lady Victoria, the real main character and possibly the alter ego of 
Cavendish, asks her husband the Lord General to carry her with him, finally 
succeeding in convincing him; Madam Whiffell convinces her husband Captain 
Whiffell that she is too tender to effort the fatigues of war; the young and virtuous 
Madame Jantil, doesn’t succeed in making her husband, Seigneur Valoroso, carry 
her with him; and finally the aged Madam Passionate, who doesn’t succeed in 
convincing her husband, Monsieur la Hardy, not to go to the war because he is of 
age and she wouldn’t survive their separation. Lady Victoria’s example is followed 
by many ladies, who march together with their husband. Just before arriving to the 
camp the male council decides to leave all the women in a Garrison Town, and 
continues towards the borders of the kingdom. The ladies don’t agree with this 
decision and decide in their turn to put together an army of their own, headed by 
Lady Victoria. She convinces them all, manages the rules, and plans the strategy 
to go and help their men, husbands, fathers, brothers, friends, lovers. The plan 
remain secret till the ladies rise to conquest the power of the town they have been 
left in, conquering the arms kept there and the horses of the peasants living 
around the town. Now their project is discovered and, although the “male army” 
tries to convince them to desist they keep on organizing their strategy and 
managing their martial new life with exercises and ceremonies, deciding to 
demonstrate how they can assume even male roles, and how much they can help 
men, despite the marginal roles they have reserved to their women. In the 
meantime bad news arrives about the war to both the female army and the women 
who stay at home, among which only Madame Jantil and Madame Passionate 
really seem to suffer. The army of the Kingdome of Restoration suffers from heavy 
defeats, during which Seigneur Valoroso is killed and Monsieur la Hardy is made 
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prisoner and badly wounded. Thus the female army decides to intervene before a 
second attack, while the two ladies at home react in completely different ways: the 
young lady with a profound but dignified melancholy, and the older with theatrical 
and expectable swoons.  Although men order the Female army to stop its march, it 
keeps on and defeats the army of the Kingdome of Faction, eventually even 
conquering some new places. In the meantime the melancholic lady, soon after 
burying her husband, dies of a broken heart, while the aged woman, whose 
husband is finally died, is ready to accept new proposals in marriage.  
At this point Cavendish can unmask how the Female army has to fight not only 
with the opposing army but also with the allied one. Once the enemy has definitely 
been defeated, men want to reassume the command and to come back home 
victorious. Otherwise the entire army and the whole country should accept the 
primary role of female and the whole social asset should be modified. Of course 
the women are not disposed to do that and even the King must surrender to the 
evident equality, even superiority, of women in all fields of civil and military life. A 
great parade is organized to celebrate the victory, to recognize the merit of a new 
knight, Lady Victoria, and to make the Female Army official. 
The war allowed the whole kingdom to discover many masked realities, all 
sharing a common principle that not all women are equal and that the vices of 
some of them can’t obscure the great value of all the others. Not even men can 
obscure it. In moving her thousand women army, whose ranks will be enriched as 
they met other noble women not along their way, Lady Victoria, alias Margaret 
Cavendish, proclaims the manifest of her (their) true fight, that won against the 
devaluation of female virtue. If all their unlucky fate derives from the delicacy and 
softness of their appearance, the first step must be to change it, to re-appropriate 
the body men have transformed in a text on which to write a story by their will and 
their fancy. This text can be erased and built up again, in order to change the plot 
and the end of this story: 
 
our Bodies seem weak, being delicate and beautiful, and our minds seem fearful, 
being compassionate and gentle natured, but if we were both weak and fearful, as 
they imagine us to be, yet custom which is a second Nature will encourage the one 
and strengthen the other, and had our educations been answerable to theirs, we 
might have proved as good Soldiers and Privy Counselors, Rulers and 
Commanders, Navigators and Architects, and as learned Sholars both in Arts and 
Sciences, as men are; for Time and Custom is the Father and Mother of Strength 
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and Knowledge, they make all things easy and facil, clear and prospitious; they 
bring acquaintance, and make friendship of everything; they make Courage and 
Fear, Strength and Weakness, Difficulty and Facility, Dangers and Securities, 
Labors and Recreations, Life and Death, all to take and shake as it were hands 
together; wherefore if we would but accustom our selves we may do such actions, 
as may gain us such a reputation, as men might change their opinions, insomuch as 
to believe we are fit to be Copartners in their Governments, and to help to rule the 
World, where now we are kept as Slaves forced to obey35 
 
The real goal of this fight, is not exclusively a military one, in fact this army 
doesn’t move like the male. The areas they want to conquer are those of art, and 
science, of government and freedom, and mostly that of the authorship of their 
own reputation. If most of the time, as the study conducted by Riviere has 
demonstrated, womanliness means to wear the mask of perfection, as man 
created it, than it is first of all by wearing a different mask that women can free 
themselves. However in Cavendish’s opinion, it can’t be without an audience: it is 
by strongly showing this astonishing or even uncomfortable presence that women 
can claim a social role, being neither marginal nor secondary, nor subjected. 
The required and not simply exhibitionistic ostentation of their new aspect, 
between male and female, is a recurrent motif of the whole play, and begins with 
the ritual ceremonies in which Lady Victoria inserts the rules of the new army. As 
the male army uses ceremonies, parade, songs and instrumental music in order to 
enforce the will of its officer, so will the female army, but creating songs, 
ceremonies and even deities precisely suited on their characters. 
Fighting the gender structures of the patriarchal gaze was her primary end, 
pursued by means of a self-representation as excessive femininity, but also 
through the representation of disorienting feminine characters – in great part queer 
characters – whose sex is not always defined nor definable within the traditional 
categories, all playing in a continuous gender crossing. What seems more 
interesting is that in this way – which we could call a masquerade way – not only 
the gender categories are confused but the same mastery position of man is 
threatened. All this is not left to the personal feelings and behaviors of individuals, 
for women don’t act, as men think, only by feelings and instincts, but also by 
reason and rules. But women themselves found these rules on their own models. 
In fact, the ceremonial is instituted by the further rules: 
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Reader: Twelfthly, Be it known, observed and practised, that when the Army marches, 
that the Souldiers shall sing in their march the heroical actions done in former times by 
heroical women. 
Lady Victoria: The reason of this is, that the remembrance of the actions of gallant 
persons inflames the Spirit to the like, and begets a courage to a like action, and the 
reason of singing of heroical actions only of women, is that we are women our selves36. 
 
The changing of roles implies also an inversion in the matter of discipline and 
attention. Thus all the vain characters usually attributed to women is now projected 
over men. In fact, they could be more dangerous acting on women’s minds than 
vice versa, because they could claim the power of their social roles: 
 
Reader: Fourteenthly, Be it known, observed and practised, that none of this 
Effeminate Army admits of the Company of men, whilst they are in Arms or Warlike 
actions, not so much as to exchange words, without the Generalless her leave or 
privilege thereto. 
Lady Victoria: The reason of this is, that men are apt to corrupt the noble minds of 
women, and to alter their gallant, worthy, and wise resolutions, with their flattering 
words, and pleasing and subtle insinuations, and if they have any Authority over them, 
as Husbands, Fathers, Brothers, or the like, they are apt to fright them with threats into 
a slavish obedience; yet there shall be chosen some of the most inferior of this Female 
Army, to go into the Masculine Army, to learn their designs, and give us intelligence of 
their removals, that we may order our incampings and removings according as we shall 
think best; but these women shall neither be of the Body of our Army, nor keep 
amongst the Army, nor come within the Trenches, but ly without the works in Huts, 
which shall be set up for that purpose37 
 
Now that the female martial discipline and symbolism has been founded, the 
amazons can enter the scene and show themselves to male eyes, through a not 
reassuring difference. It is not by chance that Cavendish creates the scene to be 
described by a male voice, playing the role of audience: 
 
upon this defeat came in the Female Army, in the time that some of the Enemy was 
busy in gathering up the Conquered spoils, others in persuit of the remainders of our 
men, others were binding up the Prisoners, […]but when the Female Army came to 
encounter them, they found their charge so hot and furious as made them give place, 
which advantage they took with that prudence and dexterity, as they did not only rout 
this Army of Faction, killing and wounding many, and set their own Countrymen at 
liberty, and recovered their losses, and gained many spoils, and took numbers of 
Prisoners of their Enemies with Bag and Baggage, but they pursued those that fled into 
their Trenches, and beat them out of their works, and took possession thereof, where 
they found much riches; these Trenches being taken, the Lady Victoria took 
possession, and made them her Quarters, calling all her Female Soldiers to enter 
therein by the sound of Flutes, which they always used instead of Trumpets, and their 
                                            
36
 Ivi, p. 593. 
37
 Ivi, p. 594. 
 140 
Drums were Kettel-Drums38 
 
This new female role is so uncomfortable and threatening that the male army 
perceives it as a double defeat: 
 
the Masculine Sex of the Army of Reformation was much out of Countenance, being 
doubly or trebly overcome, twice by their Enemy, and then by the gallant actions of the 
Females which out-did them, yet they thought it best to take their advantage whilst the 
Victory was fresh and flourishing, and their Enemies weak and fearful, to lay siege to 
the next Towns in the Enemies Country39  
 
Unfortunately for them the ladies are now well acquainted with military affairs, 
but not well disposed in losing the power they have conquered: 
 
whereupon the Lady Victoria and her Female Soldiers hearing of the Army of 
Reformations designs, for they had sent the men to their own Quarters as soon as the 
Battel was won and Victory got […] whereupon they sent a Messenger like as an 
Embassadour to tell the Masculine Army they did wonder at their ingratitude, that they 
should forget so much their relievers as to go upon any Warlike design without making 
them acquainted therewith, striving as it were to steal the Victory out of their hands, but 
said they, since we are become victorious over our Enemies, and Masters, and 
Mistresses of the Field, by our own valiant actions and prudent conducts, we will 
maintain our power by our own strengths, for our Army is become now numerous, full 
and flourishing, formed, and conformable by our Discipline, skilful by our practice, 
valiant by our resolutions, powerful by our victory, terrible to our Enemies, honourable 
to our Friends, and a subject of Envy to the Masculine Sex; but your Army is weak and 
decrepid, fitter for an Hospital than for a Field of War, your power is lost, your courage 
is cold, your discipline disorderous, and your command sleighted, despised by your 
Enemies, pittied by your Friends, forsaken of good Fortune, and made subject unto our 
Effeminate Sex, which we will use by our power like Slaves.40 
 
The letter of apology men are eventually constrained to send to Lady Victoria is 
thus commented: «All the women fall into a great laughter, ha, ha, ha, ha»41, 
which sounds a little bit like the laugh of Medusa. 
A new main stage is now set for the definitive triumph of the Ladies’ army, Lady 
Victoria being the protagonist of this spectacular masqueraded parade: 
 
Enter many Prisoners which march by two and two, then enter many that carry the 
Conquered spoils, then enters the Lady Victoria in a gilt Chariot drawn with eight white 
Horses, four on a breast, the Horses covered with Cloth of gold, and great plumes of 
feathers on their heads. 
The Lady Victoria was adorned after this manner; she had a Coat on all imbrodered 
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with silver and gold, which Coat reach'd no further than the Calfs of her leggs, and on 
her leggs and feet she had Buskins and Sandals imbroidered suitable to her Coat; on 
her head she had a Wreath or Garland of Lawrel, and her hair curl'd and loosely 
flowing; in her hand a Crystall Bolt headed with gold at each end, and after the Chariot 
marched all her Female Officers with Lawrel Branches in their hands, and after them 
the inferiour she Souldiers, then going through the Stage, as through the City, and so 
entring again, where on the midst of the Stage as if it were the midst of the City, the 
Magistrates meet her, so her Chariot makes a stand, and one as the Recorder speaks 
a Speech to her.42 
 
The costume worn by Lady Victoria looks very much like that worn by Margaret 
Cavendish during the visit to the Royal Society, and, since we know very well how 
symbolic and meaningful dressing is for Cavendish, we can attribute the words of 
the amazon, moving her ladies towards the fight, to the author moving all women 
towards writing: 
 
for shall Men only sit in Honours chair, and Women stand as waiters by? shall only 
Men in Triumphant Chariots ride, and Women run as Captives by? shall only men be 
Conquerors, and women Slaves? shall only men live by Fame, and women dy in 
Oblivion? no, no, gallant Heroicks raise your Spirits to a noble pitch, to a deaticall 
height, to get an everlasting Renown, and infinite praises, by honourable, but unusual 
actions: for honourable Fame is not got only by contemplating thoughts which lie lasily 
in the Womb of the Mind, and prove Abortive, if not brought forth in living deeds; but 
worthy Heroickesses, at this time Fortune desires to be the Midwife, and if the Gods 
and Goddesses did not intend to favour our proceedings with a safe deliverance, they 
would not have offered us so fair and fit an opportunity to be the Mothers of glorious 
Actions, and everlasting Fame, which if you be so unnatural to strangle in the Birth by 
fearfull Cowardize, may you be blasted with Infamy, which is worse than to dye and be 
forgotten43 
 
Four years after this play was written, the architecture of the Blazing World 
seems to pursue the same aim, with the settlement of the female power, the 
sapphic relationship between the Empress and the Duchess herself, and the 
pushed spectacle. But it is not a single case. The Convent of Pleasure, for 
instance, plays on the same ground, with continuing transvestitism. However Bell 
in Campo remains the play that best designs this project. That is the literary 
construction of a contrasting straight female (queer) identity, placed on the stage 
as a dangerous and subversive femininity to be looked at as the Medusa’s head. 
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Black Heroes, White Savages 
 
The openness in indefinite places within male definite structures, the over 
turnings of social, gender and even race roles, and, moreover the re-appropriation 
of body and meaningful corporality, disclose, in women’s writings, an open space 
to other differences, using their own speech for another discourse and vice versa. 
This is exactly what happens in many of Behn’s works in which the voices 
differently marginalized speak one for the other in order to subvert the stereotypes 
in which they are inscribed, and to make cultural, social, gender, racial differences 
instruments of dramatic narrative. The aim of this project is that to construct a 
harmonious discourse between differences, in which, however the single 
peculiarities are not erased, for they are not defined once and for all44. The 
narration or the stage of race is always told through the visual and cultural 
categories of white male dominant regime, but it is not in order to make the two 
coincide, rather to demonstrate the arbitrariness of these categories. In short, as 
the female subjects react to gender roles by means of the masquerade – that is 
not by excluding the gaze, but by making it work for their goals – the “black” 
subjects react to racial roles by means of the mimicry – that is creating subjects 
that, although look similar are actually different, and, moreover, are different both 
from white identities and from black identities as constructed by white men. This is 
precisely what happens in particular in Oroonoko, Or The Royal Slave, in which 
Behn uses racial categories, or racist categories, to build up a terrain of shattering 
identities in order to prove their artificiality, reversing and recreating them as in-
between. This “in-betweeness” is of a particular materiality. It is hidden in the 
body, which is not only natural but cultural as well. It is just in vindicating the 
artificiality of their own body that marginalized blacks and women can realize a 
true re-appropriation. But, they have to be aware that the signs inscribed in their 
skin are mostly produced by others. 
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After what we have already seen, the question of re-vindication in the field of 
post colonial studies, from Fanon to Bhabha, seems to be played between two 
opposite demands of identity – as stasis within a synchronic vision – and of 
difference – as change throughout the diachronic history. What these two 
instances have in common is a shared problem of authority, in which the black 
man cannot ever act as an auto-representation, since he is always an “object of 
information”, and never a “subject of communication”45. This difference in authority 
remains, in Fanon’s opinion, in the corporeal schema of knowledge, which we 
have already seen in the first chapter working in Merelau-Ponty’s account of 
vision. According to the French philosopher, indeed, vision is a full corporeal 
sense, which allows the body to interact with its historical world in a mutual 
interchange of knowledge and modifications. What Fanon opposes to Merleau-
Ponty is that this scheme works only with the white subject, and not with the black 
one, who experiences a screen between his own body and the external world, 
being it represented by white mythos. In order, then, to overcome this obstacle, 
the black subject can only adopt the agency of the other. This is the mimicry in 
Fanon’s point of view, a mimicry loosing much more self-agency and the 
peculiarity of identity, than the one proposed by Bhabha.  
The pessimistic vision of Fanon is based on the visual signification of black skin 
that has been superimposed by the white gaze. Under this gaze historical and 
mythological narratives are inscribed on the black bodies. They have no means of 
changing these narratives that have become the textual surface on which whites 
write their “epidermal racial schema”46. 
Already in 1668, Aphra Behn seems to be aware of the naturalization of such 
cultural superimpositions, and denounces their supposed self evidence with the 
novel Oroonoko, in which these epidermal schema are not only subverted, but 
moreover scattered in multiple definitions of multiple characters, according to 
different categories. In fact, the protagonist of the novel, the unique hero of the 
plot, is a man showed as “very, very black”, “more black” then all the others, a man 
who in all his blackness must be seen and cannot be erased under any of the 
white categories. 
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This novel allows Behn to talk about many of the racial-gendered structures on 
which occidental cultural is grounded, especially those that subjected marginalized 
individuals, blacks as well as women, to their gaze. A gaze pretended to be 
objective, impartial and only devoted to disembodied observation useful to the 
society and the economy. This supposed honesty, however, is repeatedly 
unmasked, especially for what concerns the binary and simplistic opposition 
between civilized white and uncivilized black. In fact, the whole plot reverses this 
opposition on three grounds. First of all the barbarity, that is the cruelty and the 
lack of human nature, a “very, very black” characteristic Oroonoko never falls into. 
Then the fine culture, which is no longer prerogative of white men, since the black 
prince has been educated by the most illuminated European masters. Finally the 
facial features, which show how racist schemes have no evidence or foundation, 
being the aspect of the main character and that of his spouse Imoinda more 
similar to Greek divinities than many English people. While Oroonoko never loses 
his principles of sincerity and honesty, white men are always showed like 
dishonest and faithless, ready to sacrifice the friendship with a honorable and 
precious man in order to gain more money and manage better commercial affairs. 
Another way in which the narration of Aphra Behn turns racial schemes upside 
down is in multiplying and spreading out different points of view within different 
cultures, making the whites be in turn the observer and the observed, thus 
showing how the subject of vision is always a historical and cultural subject as well 
as the images he or she produces through his or her vision, or by through other 
gazes. 
This question is immediately related to that of the distinction of what is natural 
and what is cultural, for white men usually depicted themselves as the cultural side 
of the discussion, while representing the black men as the voice of nature, 
curiously as well as women. This perspective may affect even the overturned 
portrait made by our author, through which one can easily see the blacks, both 
men and women, not being naturally barbaric, cruel or inferior, but naturally 
human, educated and honest. Behn is very clear in individuating just in this 
supposed “naturality” the key role for the oppression of blacks, and women. The 
whole novel, in fact, is constructed to demonstrate how culture is not prerogative 
of white man, and that white culture is not the only possible culture in this world. 
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Thus as we look at others by means of our culture’s lens, the others look at us by 
means of their culture’s lens that make us appear as an “other”. 
The last feature of this novel, we have to discuss before presenting the plot and 
its visual characteristics, is the role of the author herself. Indeed, Behn presents 
herself not only as the authoritative, because she is a well known writer, but also 
as the eye witness of the vicissitudes, who has assisted the scenes not from 
above, but from a very close point of view. This closeness implies not only a more 
reliable and plausible description, but, moreover, a personal implication in the 
story as a member, by the way, of white culture, of which she often has to 
complain. 
The well known plot of the brief novel narrates the unlucky vicissitudes of two 
noble young Africans, the prince Oroonoko and Imoinda, the daughter of the 
mayor general of the King. A history which Behn pretends to have been witness of 
during a trip in Suriname with her family. Both Oroonoko and Imoinda are 
remarkable for their beauty, and not only Oroonoko falls in love with her, but even 
the king can’t resist her beauty, and constrains her to become one of the women 
of his harem. The two young guys, plan an escape, but the king eventually 
discovers it and sells Imoinda as a slave. Even Oroonoko, victim of a trap ordered 
by the English captain, once his friend, is sold as a slave and is delivered to a 
sugar plantation in Suriname, the same place where Imoinda lives. The two, now 
renamed with the European names of Caesar and Clemene, can marry even 
though in slave conditions. Over time his status becomes unbearable to Oroonoko 
especially when Clemene discovers to be pregnant, although he conducts a life of 
liberal man in the plantation, as a friend of whites rather than as a slave,. 
Therefore he plans a rebellion among all black people. Unfortunately it does not 
succeed, and for fear that Clemene could fall under the violent white men while he 
is killed, Oroonoko kills his wife with her consent. He remains there watching her 
body for three days till white men discover and punish him by dismemberment. 
As this brief summary shows the novel is full of racial questions related to the 
gaze. In fact, the plea to the reader is both dedicated to the curiosity of the reader 
gaze – «but all you can see, you see at once, and every moment see; and where 
there is no novelty, there can be no curiosity»47 – and an advocacy of authoritative 
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voice as an eye witness. Not only that, but the eyes are protagonists of many 
important events of the plot, such as the death of the valorous general, Imoinda’s 
father, killed by an arrow in his eye, and the falling in love of Oroonoko with 
Imoinda: 
 
this fair Queen of Night, whose face and person was so exceeding all he had ever 
beheld, that lovely modesty with which she received him, that softness in her look and 
sighs […] he told her with his eyes that he was not insensible of her charms; while 
Imoinda, who wished for nothing more than so glorious a conquest, was pleased to 
believe she understood that silent language of new-born love; and, from that moment, 
put on all her additions to beauty48 
 
Anyway, the primary characteristic of the novel is the introduction of Oroonoko, 
as a example of all European cultural, political and even physical values, which 
are incorporated in a black body. This ends up with subverting, for difference, the 
values of real European behavior: 
 
He had nothing of barbarity in his nature, but in all points addressed himself as if his 
education had been in some European court […] He was pretty tall, but of a shape the 
most exact that can be fancied: the most famous statuary could not form the figure of a 
man more admirably turned from head to foot. His face was not of that brown rusty 
black which most of that nation are, but of perfect ebony, or polished jet. His eyes were 
the most awful that could be seen, and very piercing; the white of 'em being like snow, 
as were his teeth. His nose was rising and Roman, instead of African and flat. His 
mouth the finest shaped that could be seen; far from those great turned lips which are 
so natural to the rest of the negroes. The whole proportion and air of his face was so 
nobly and exactly formed that, bating his color, there could be nothing in nature more 
beautiful, agreeable, and handsome. There was no one grace wanting that bears the 
standard of true beauty. His hair came down to his shoulders, by the aids of art, which 
was by pulling it out with a quill, and keeping it combed; of which he took particular 
care.49 
 
 
Thus, the first introduction of the hero with all the characteristics of a good 
European man, seems to responds to that kind of mimicry Fanon talks about, in 
which the black subject, if he is never a subject, must assume the categories of 
whiteness in order to become an agency or, at least, not to be seen as different. 
This difference, which mimicry tends to loose, is somehow overturned by the most 
important attribute Behn gives her hero, that of blazing blackness, a kind of 
blackness that distinguishes him not only from white, but also from the other 
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“brown negroes”, making of him, thus, something different somehow as Bhabha’s 
mimicry seems to suggest. Just this “in-betweeness”, makes Catherine Gallagher 
talk about a blackness that has to be seen as «authentically and unnaturally 
African»50, because there is no doubt he is African but not in the way white people 
intend. In fact: 
 
Nor did the perfections of his mind come short of those of his person; for his discourse 
was admirable upon almost any subject: and whoever had heard him speak would 
have been convinced of their errors, that all fine wit is confined to the white men, 
especially to those of Christendom; and would have confessed that Oroonoko was as 
capable even of reigning well, and of governing as wisely, had as great a soul, as 
politic maxims, and was as sensible of power, as any prince civilized in the most 
refined schools of humanity and learning, or the most illustrious courts51 
 
The un-naturalness Gallagher individuates is not only made up of a missing 
correspondence with white categories, but also of the opposite characteristics to 
the naturalness, that of artificiality, that is culture. Both the body of Oroonoko and 
of Imoinda, indeed, are bodies that not only carry the masks of blackness, 
constructed by whites, but also the inscription of their own culture. By means of 
those “proper” signs they seem to re-appropriate these bodies, and discover 
definitely their identity: 
 
from her being carv'd in fine Flowers and Birds all over her Body, we took her to be of 
Quality before, yet, when we knew Clemene was Imoinda, we cou'd not enough admire 
her. I had forgot to tell you, that those who are Nobly born of that Country, are so 
delicately Cut and Rac'd all over the fore-part of the Trunk of their Bodies, that it looks 
as if it were Japan'd; the Works being raised like high Poynt round the Edges of the 
Flowers: Some are only Carv'd with a little Flower, or Bird, at the Sides of the Temples, 
as was Cæsar; and those who are so Carv'd over the Body, resemble our Ancient 
Picts, that are figur'd in the Chronicles, but these Carvings are more delicate.52 
 
This consideration produces a domino effect over the white bodies as well, 
since, in fact, the blackness has been discovered not to be a natural category, but 
a cultural one, and since even the cultural category can’t define a man or each of 
his peculiarities in a definitive way. Then neither is the “whiteness” a natural 
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category nor a definitive one. Behn demonstrates this by turning the places of 
white, who from being the observer of blacks and Indians, become observed from 
both black and Indians, who judge them in physical and moral aspects. This 
occurs when a delegacy of whites, even the narrator joining it, leaves the 
plantation and encounters an Indian population. An encounter Behn describes as 
a double difference encounter: 
 
Now none of us speaking the Language of the People, and imagining we shou'd have a 
half Diversion in Gazing only; and not knowing what they said, we took a Fisherman 
that liv'd at the Mouth of the River, who had been a long Inhabitant there, and oblig'd 
him to go with us: But because he was known to the Indians, as trading among 'em; 
and being, by long Living there, become a perfect Indian in Colour […]They were all 
Naked, and we were Dress'd, so as is most, comode for the hot Countries, very 
Glittering and Rich […]taking their Hair up in their Hands, and spreading it wide to 
those they call'd out too; as if they would say (as indeed it signify'd) Numberless 
Wonders , or not to be recounted, no more than to number the Hair of their Heads. By 
degrees they grew more bold, and from gazing upon us round, they touch'd us; laving 
their Hands upon all the Features of our Faces, feeling our Breasts and Arms, taking 
up one Petticoat, then wondering to see another; admiring our Shooes and Stockings, 
but more our Garters, which we gave 'em […]cry'd, Amora Tiguamy , which is as much 
as, How do you , or Welcome Friend; and all, with one din, began to gabble to him, and 
ask'd, If we had Sense, and Wit? if we cou'd talk of affairs of Life, and War, as they 
cou'd do? if we cou'd Hunt, Swim, and do a thousand things they use? He answer'd 
'em, We cou'd.53 
 
The novel, however, is not an utopian one, and Behn knows that subverting 
points of view can help in denouncing the power related to the male gaze, which 
imprints meanings over the Others’ bodies, but it can scarcely subvert the power it 
already owns. Thus, in order to make his wife free from this white power, that 
possesses the commodity of her and his body, he can only kill her: 
 
All that Love cou'd say in such cases, being ended; and all the intermitting Irresolutions 
being adjusted, the Lovely, Young, and Ador'd Victim lays her self down, before the 
Sacrificer; while he, with a Hand resolv'd, and a Heart breaking within, gave the Fatal 
Stroke; first, cutting her Throat, and then severing her, yet Smiling, Face from that 
Delicate Body, pregnant as it was with Fruits of tend'rest Love. As soon as he had 
done, he laid the Body decently on Leaves and Flowers; of which he made a Bed, and 
conceal'd it under the same cover-lid of Nature; only her Face he left yet bare to look 
on: But when he found she was Dead, and past all Retrieve, never more to bless him 
with her Eyes, and soft Language; his Grief swell'd up to Rage54 
 
                                            
53
 Aphra Behn, Oroonoko, quoted, pp. 165-169. 
54
 Ivi, pp. 220-221. 
 149 
Severing the face from that body that neither she nor he owned anylonger is the 
only way to make not only her soul free but also the only carnal thing she still 
possesses. The noble prince, instead, will never re-appropriate his body. That text 
on which were inscribed the signs of his nobility, and then those of his slavery, will 
become the whole sign of his punishment, perpetrated by whom now possesses 
that body: 
 
He had learn'd to take Tobaco; and when he was assur'd he should Dye, he desir'd 
they would give him a Pipe in his Mouth, ready Lighted, which they did; and the 
Executioner came, and first cut off his Members, and threw them into the Fire; after 
that, with an ill-favoured Knife, they cut his Ears, and his Nose, and burn'd them; he still 
Smoak'd on, as if nothing had touch'd him; then they hack'd off one of his Arms, and 
still he bore up, and held his Pipe; but at the cutting off the other Arm, his Head sunk, 
and his Pipe drop'd; and he gave up the Ghost, without a Groan, or a Reproach. My 
Mother and Sister were by him all the while, but not suffer'd to save him; so rude and 
wild were the Rabble, and so inhumane were the Justices, who stood by to see the 
Execution, who after paid dearly enough for their Insolence. They cut Cæsar in 
Quarters, and sent them to several of the chief Plantations: One Quarter was sent to 
Colonel Martin , who refus'd it; and swore, he had rather see the Quarters of Banister , 
and the Governor himself, than those of Cæsar , on his Plantations; and that he cou'd 
govern his Negroes without Terrifying and Grieving them with frightful Spectacles of a 
mangl'd King.55 
 
The punishment is barbaric, cruel and inhuman, all characteristics that fit very 
well with white men, Behn thinks. They would never celebrate the man who was 
about to subvert not only their economic power, but also their cultural dominance. 
Only a woman, from a closer marginalized point of view could devote her pen to 
this hero, hoping her reputation would be enough for his greatness: 
 
Thus Dy'd this Great Man; worthy of a better Fate, and a more sublime Wit than mine 
to write his Praise; yet, I hope, the Reputation of my Pen is considerable enough to 
make his Glorious Name to survive to all Ages; with that of the Brave, the Beautiful, 
and the Constant Imoinda.56 
 
In presenting her hero, Behn has to mimic features that white eyes could 
recognize as virtues, so Oroonoko had to mimic white virtues. But, Behn seems to 
ask, are the white men, in dismembering Oroonoko, mimicking the vices usually 
inscribed on black skin? Finally everyone seems to mimic himself, according to the 
power he or she possesses. 
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Thus, black men and women have recognized themselves as the objects of 
white gaze, a gaze that has constructed them as an image, or better as a screen 
onto which to project the product of their imagery. But, in mimicking this model 
they can appropriate this screen and discover it to be a mirror. Actually this is the 
action Behn does with Oroonoko, a novel of course not written for black people but 
for white colonialists that are now looking at an uncanny image by themselves. It is 
an image, which has everything they supposed it must have: white humanity, white 
education, even a white profile face. But what makes the uncanny emerges is the 
very, very black surface on which these features are woven. The black skin, 
usually bearing completely opposite epidermal schema, is now giving back the 
look through the looking glass. And what he or she is looking at is a monster, full 
of cruelty, uneducated in meeting the others’ culture, only interested in material 
affairs, in short a myopic. In this crossing gaze, white man hadn’t foreseen that the 
one that is more afraid is the white side. If blacks, and also women, become aware 
of the arbitrariness again of the visual regime, which provides who must be the 
subject and who must be the object, the rules are overwhelmed, and they could 
lose the slaving power of their own gaze.  
This is the way in which Bhabha intended mimicry, not as a passive 
coincidence of an object to the subject model, erasing all the differences even 
though in the name of freedom, but as a strategy of appropriation as the subject 
weapon to use against white gaze power. Moreover, in posing herself as the 
authoritative writer, white but woman, Behn plays the role of a witness for the 
blacks. She is a medium point between the reversing points of the subject and the 
objects gaze, testifying not only their arbitrariness but also their reversibility. It is 
another point in which male vision is attacked: after having demonstrated that 
scientific vision is subject oriented, she demonstrates that black inferiority is as 
well a product of the same partial vision. Once again, as Burke showed, the 
seventeenth century woman plays the role of a medium, accepting her non-elite 
place, but finding it to be fruitful, even though not comfortable, to give voice to 
herself and others, and to give light to their gaze. 
Mimicry and masquerade, then, seem to be her weapon, and the seventeenth 
century will refine the technique. 
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Masking desire, unmasking possession 
 
Another space, after the political and the colonial, waiting for a reversal, not 
completely erasing the codes of male representation, is the space of the 
representation of female body as a sexual desire object. If the political reversal 
has turned the women from an undefended object to a defender subject, the 
colonial reversal has made blackness the place of human values, we cannot 
expect anything less than the reversal desire that makes women the active 
manager of sexual addresses. 
As we have already seen in the previous chapter, the desire writer for 
excellence, within our triad, is Eliza Haywood, that being intended in two ways: as 
a superficial and commercial vendor of popular writing, or as a sincere denouncer 
of private and public blanks in pruderie. In this case Haywood shows us the novel 
that has been considered as a «greater threat to patriarchal order than perhaps 
any other masquerade text of the early eighteenth century»57, Fantomina: or Love 
in A Maze58. Although definitely ascribable within the genre of novel, it is also a 
real masquerade, for the plot is completely focused on the disguises of a woman 
stages in order to obtain and maintain the “favors” of her preferred, Beauplaisir. 
We don’t know her real name, what we only know is that she is «A young Lady of 
distinguished Birth, Beauty, Wit, and Spirit»59. 
If the political reversal in Cavendish is acted by means of a hysterical mimicry, 
the desire reversal is here acted by means of the masquerade. It means that the 
mask, or better the masks, woman will put on her face is not that resembling male 
roles, pretending to stay in his play, rather and probably in a subtler way, the mask 
of femininity man has shaped for woman. It is, thus, through her artifact image that 
the unnamed woman of the novel acts against this system. I argue, then, that by 
using the means of her oppression, that one that made of her a passive object of 
the male sexual gaze, she plays the role of the sexual choicer, the one that 
somehow renounces her role of choosing who has already chosen her, making the 
one who doesn’t chose her own choice. It is in fact not meaningless that the man 
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for who our heroine plays the masquerade is someone who isn’t interested in her. 
This makes her the actor of the relationship, the one who chooses and forces the 
other sharing her choice, even more unmasking as predictable as men choices 
are, and how simply and funny women can play with them. What is more fun, in 
Haywood’s heroine continually clapping at her own games, is that everything is 
played by the rules of the male chauvinistic society. Its constraints end up 
disclosing her multiple ways of playing. 
Once again, the, womanliness is seen as a mask, and her only way to act is 
that of the masquerade. Precisely this enclosure within the space of the 
camouflage has been object of different critiques, especially within feminist 
studies, between those who saw the danger for women to lose her own identity, 
and those who, conversely focus on the distance between the mask and person 
under it, found in it a tactic of both defense and control. 
On the “dark side” of masquerade seems to be Luce Irigaray who, in her 
arguments in This Sex Which Is Not One60, defines the masquerade in a double 
way, on one hand as the attempt of woman to recuperate her desire, and on the 
other, as the attempt to participate in man’s desire, which finally means 
«renouncing their own»61. Entering the space of the masquerade of femininity 
means accepting to become, or better to stay, as the object of male desire, of 
sexual enjoyment in which she is never the subject or, in Irigaray’s opinions, the 
one who enjoys. 
But is this really the only way in which she can act within the masquerade? Isn’t 
any deviant way provided or discovered to become the actor of this play?  
Terry Castle individuates the characteristics of the eighteenth century 
masquerade in three elements: the voyeurism, i.e. the pleasure one takes in look; 
the exhibitionism or, how Castle says, the self-display, i.e. the pleasure one takes 
in being looked; and the anonymity of the subject is wearing the mask62. This last 
characteristic is particularly fitting with the masquerade Haywood stages, as for 
the example we have already seen in The Invisible Spy, in which it was described 
as the world upside-down, everyone feeling free to act in a way the unmasked 
version of him or herself would never allow. We have also seen that it could be 
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even very dangerous. But in this new diverted realm one can no longer say who is 
looked at, who is displayed, who is the subject and who is the object of vision. The 
phallogularcentrism is threatened, and women can both exit from sexual 
domination or enter the realm of their own desiring influence.  
This invisibility, so dear to Haywood, produces another effect on identity, in 
Castle’s opinion, that of alienating the inner identity from the outer aspect. This is 
precisely what happens in Fantomina in which the main character is unknown to 
both the other main character and the reader himself. This allows her both to 
defend her identity from the risk of being the object of man’s desire, and to be 
uncensored by the patriarchal rules.  
Helen Thompson argues how Haywood’s heroine unmasks the invisibility of 
patriarchal rules, without going out of these same laws while, somehow observing 
them. Actually the way in which Fantomina seems to act is not easily definable 
since she at once observes and attacks patriarchal laws, she is at once 
constrained within this system and free to move within this same system. This is 
what Thompson defines as “the power of deception”, which accounts this heroine’s 
power not just in «a theory of disguise that corroborates her narrative, but one of 
performance»63. Her masquerade, indeed, is not limited to the “change of dress” 
but it is acted in a more complex way, implying even a fine work of gestures and 
accent, in so far as the narrator stresses how she was able to embody every kind 
of subject.  
Her masquerades, are more than “simple” transvestitism, they are plain 
examples of performances, thus able of action rather than absorption. Moreover 
the fact that these performances are repeated, makes this kind of masquerade 
closer to the “playful repetition” Irigaray talks about as the assumption of a sexual 
gesture in order to discover a sexual difference rather than a sexual indifference. 
This also means that the provided feminine role is assumed, but in a deliberate 
way, in order to force the same male system to admit its own consequences64.  
Drawing attention to the female sex role, and to its own difference to be 
discovered, leads Irigaray to account just this difference that resides in a particular 
characteristic, that of plurality. Female sex is not one, thus neither her pleasure 
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can be one. In face of this plurality phallocentrism can say nothing but erase this 
plurality in nullity. This plurality, however, can always return, like everything that is 
repressed. In fact, rather than see Fantomina’s protagonist as playing 
undifferentiated objects, Thompson proposes to see her masquerades as the 
embodiment of whole bodies, and we can add, together with Irigaray, multiple 
female pleasure. In this way the masquerade is closer than we previously 
expected to Irigaray’s mimicry, and moreover the persisting density of the same 
subject, unwavering in the pursuit of her pleasure, makes consistency rather than 
fragility her primary feature65. Indeed, the change of dress and so even of 
identities is not endless, and does not even end with the absorption of the 
protagonist into the patriarchal system of marriage. The young lady will finally 
reproduce another woman again, who isn’t herself, rather a daughter. She will 
keep this daughter without a father, thus producing an outsider woman in front of 
patriarchy, and installed within a matrilineal system. 
Let’s analyze this novel in detail. 
The story begins with the brief presentation of the young well educate lady who, 
attending a theatre play, notes how men that night, especially Beauplaisir who she 
likes in turn, seem to all be attracted to a prostitute, and wonders how it is possible 
that those gentlemen would enjoy company like that. Pushed from this wondering 
the lady decides to make a sort of experiment: she will disguise herself as a 
prostitute the next night. Under that appearance she goes to the theatre and, as 
was predictable, she becomes the focus of the attentions of all men, and 
especially of those of Beauplaisir, who barely noticed her the night before. Now 
the “virtuous” young66 seems to be falling in love with the young prostitute 
Fantomina, who continues the masquerade to maintain his interest, even though it 
means to lose her honor. But since her true identity will remain a secret, and she 
will maintain faithful to one man, her honor is not threatened, she argues. 
However, after a while the courtesies of Fantomina end up with boring Beauplaisir, 
who justifying with the bath’s season and with how improper it would be to be 
accompanied by a prostitute, convince Fantomina to not follow him. Or at least this 
is what he thinks. In fact, the young lady architects a new disguise: this time she 
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will be Celia, the mistress of the Bath’s house where he will lodge during his trip. 
Once again her disguise is successful, and he immediately seems to be in love 
with her. But once again he will show his inconstancy, and a few weeks later he 
will be ready to leave her. But the inverse is not true. Changing dress again she is 
sure to obtain his attention again. In fact the young widow Bloomer will attract him 
during the trip back to the city, and he affirms to be ready to enjoy her company 
until she leaves the city in order to take care of her husband’s fortune. But his 
constancy will not last so long. Tired of changing again and again, and struck by 
the undifferentiated focus of his attention, she decides to stage the vanity itself of 
his loves, and seduces him as an anonymous girl disguised under a mask, and 
once again she wins. But something happens that stops this performance, her 
mother is back in the city, and the young lady must return to her original house 
and dress. She will eventually discover to be pregnant. Together with her mother 
she decides to go away from the city that gave her no more fun but suffering, but 
she will enjoy the last ball. During the feast, with no mask protecting her she 
experiences for the first time the heaviness of male gaze onto her body: now 
acting the role prescribed for her, she has no means to escape or at least manage 
her “objectness”. The shock, together with the first pains of labor, makes her 
swoon. While delivering “the fine girl” all her architecture has to be unveiled, and 
her mother requires the man responsible to be called. The deception by which he 
has been seduced surprises him, who not being due to marry the lady, anyway 
offers himself to take care of the baby girl. But that girl is only the daughter of the 
young lady and she will carry her far from the city, in a convent under the cares of 
a French Abbess, the mother’s dearest friend. 
From the very first time in which the young lady disguises herself, it seems clear 
that her intent is that of showing how sexual categories, that the male society has 
constructed to enclose the female sexuality and desire, are the first means by 
which women can deceive men rather than vice versa. All the plot goes on 
overturning the desiring categories of objects and subjects: she is the first desiring 
character who gives life to the plot of masquerades and disguise, and Beauplaisir 
is the real object of her feminine desire that satisfies her pleasure playing with the 
social categories in first place. All the social categories of women, in fact, that she 
chooses are wise games of social balance and personal confusion. 
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The first dress she wears is, not by chance that of prostitute, because this 
character, at the same time marginal and central in social life, represents someone 
who, although addressed with moral blame of dishonor and perdition, is actually 
the only category of women to be free to express her own desires and pleasures. 
Of course this freedom leads to the contemporary freedom of men in approaching 
them. But, as our author will soon demonstrate, they rarely use better kindness to 
more honest women. Indeed, it is under this mask that the young lady can better 
observe “this kind” of man: 
 
A Crowd of Purchasers of all Degrees and Capacities were in a Moment gather'd about 
her, each endeavouring to out-bid the other, in offering her a Price for her Embraces. 
She listen'd to 'em all, and was not a little diverted in her Mind at the Disappointment 
she shou'd give to so many, each of which thought himself secure of gaining her […] 
She was naturally vain, and receiv'd no small Pleasure in hearing herself prais'd, tho' in 
the Person of another, and a suppos'd Prostitute; but she dispatch'd as soon as she 
cou'd all that had hitherto attack'd her, when she saw the accomplish'd Beauplaisir was 
making his Way thro' the Crowd as fast as he was able, to reach the Bench she sat on. 
She had often seen him in the Drawing-Room, had talk'd with him; but then her Quality 
and reputed Virtue kept him from using her with that Freedom she now expected he 
wou'd do, and had discover'd something in him, which had made her often think she 
shou'd not be displeas'd, if he wou'd abate some Part of his Reserve.67 
 
The first concerns Fantomina is interested in are those of morality and decency, 
and immediately patriarchal codes fall down under the pressure of male desire. 
Thus it is interesting to notice how the same woman who the day before didn’t 
interest Beauplaisir, as a honest woman, now immediately attracts his attention as 
a prostitute. Further in the text, when Fantomina abandons herself to her pleasure, 
risking losing her honor, she wonders what is it in her that is wrong? What in her 
behavior could really allow her think of herself as a prostitute: she doesn’t accept 
any money from Beauplaisir; she cedes only blandishments of love to Beauplaisir. 
Actually his behavior seems to fit better in this category: he changes the person 
with whom he shares his love very often; he doesn’t seem to fall in love with any of 
the women he meets; neither does he want to renounce any of them: 
 
But he varied not so much from his Sex as to be able to prolong Desire, to any great 
Length after Possession […]but with her Sex's Modesty, she had not also thrown off 
another Virtue equally valuable, tho' generally unfortunate, Constancy : She loved 
Beauplaisir ; it was only he whose Solicitations could give her Pleasure; and had she 
seen the whole Species despairing, dying for her sake, it might, perhaps, have been a 
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Satisfaction to her Pride, but none to her more tender Inclination.68 
 
Even if she wears the mask of a mistress, she is by the way the same woman 
who enjoys Beauplaisir in her fictive lodging, and then attends the Royal chapel, or 
the Opera, but he is not able to recognize her: «adorn'd with all the Blaze of 
Jewels, has he, in less than an Hour after, beheld at the Royal Chapel, the Palace 
Gardens, Drawing-Room, Opera, or Play, the Haughty Awe-inspiring Lady»69. 
In order to maintain his desire, as we have already seen, she will change many 
dresses, and the narrator tries to explain how it is possible that he never 
recognizes the same woman. The explanation attributes to her performance ability 
the reason of this credulity, even if with a little bit of irony, which sounds more like 
a reinsurance for all men rather than as a reasonable enlightenment: 
 
I know there are Men who will swear it is an Impossiblity, and that no Disguise could 
hinder them from knowing a Woman they had once enjoy'd. In answer to these 
Scruples, I can only say, that besides the Alteration which the Change of Dress made 
in her, she was so admirably skill'd in the Art of feigning, that she had the Power of 
putting on almost what Face she pleas'd, and knew so exactly how to form her 
Behaviour to the Character she represented, that all the Comedians at both 
Playhouses are infinitely short of her Performances: She, could vary her very Glances, 
tune her Voice to Accents the most different imaginable from those in which she spoke 
when she appear'd herself.70 
 
Once she has repeatedly proven his faithless, and what risks she has 
preserved herself thanks to her disguises, she threatens his self-confidence in 
making coincide the desires of two of her women, the widow and the prostitute. 
Finding himself in an embarrassing situation, in which honesty could not represent 
a way out, he tries to deceive both the women, but she argues «while he thinks to 
fool me, is himself the only beguiled Person […] which led her again into 
Reflections on the Unaccountableness of Men's Fancies, who still prefer the last 
Conquest, only because it is the last»71.  
This she will prove unequivocally with the last mask, this time a true mask. If 
this man is interested in no woman, but in every woman, no matter what census, 
what morality, probably neither what shape, she could be able to seduce him, 
without neither pretending an identity. She is quite right even in this case. But this 
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time there’s a very significant difference. Keeping her identity completely unknown 
to him and to everyone else, gives her a dominant position, knowing very well all 
the others, but being known from no one, which means also that she looks at 
everyone but she is not looked at by anyone. This position of inferiority is 
unbearable for Beauplaisir who, after only a night with Incognita, refuses to see 
her again. 
Paradoxically, as Castle imagined, this masked female power has as a 
counterpart the weakness of the unmasked young and wealthy woman at the ball: 
 
It was there she was seiz'd with those Pangs, which none in her Condition are exempt 
from: She could not conceal the sudden Rack which all at once invaded her; or had her 
Tongue been mute, her wildly rolling Eyes, the Distortion of her Features, and the 
Convulsione [sic] which shook her whole Frame, in spite of her, would have reveal'd she 
labour'd under some terrible Shock of Nature. Every Body was surpris'd, every Body was 
concern'd, but few guessed at the Occasion72 
 
Haywood, of course, comprehends very well that a woman who is free only 
under a mask is not a free woman in any way. Indeed, the final destiny of the 
young lady will be in a convent, for shame has fallen over her. But if the faith for a 
free woman doesn’t reside neither in Fantomina, nor in Celia, nor in Widow 
Bloomer or in Incognita, not all hopes are lost for the little girl, born with no 
patriarchy. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the constitution of a female gaze we are attending to, the second step after 
having destabilized the male subject of the vision is, thus, scattering the object of 
this process that, thanks to a series of displacing and disguising, becomes less 
definable, detectable and, thus controllable.  
As we have seen within this chapter, the patriarchal power of gaze has been 
threatened while practicing his own political power, which had destined women in 
a marginal position on the basis of a supposed physical inferiority, making them 
unable for political government and military conquest. As Cavendish’s Lady 
Victoria showed, this inferiority is only a result of the exercise and the custom 
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women had been forbidden to. In fact, since they decided to react to this situation 
and to wear similar habits they succeed in male roles, or even excel in their 
opposite league.  
If women, therefore, are considered objects of the male gaze, it only depends 
on the point of view. It suffices to put on the male rules mask to turn the 
dominating point of view upside down, to see with a new sense of proportion its 
subject and, thus, even its object. In order to construct, once again, a new concept 
of scopic regime, historically and materially defined, women have to use the same 
system of codes which has marginalized them, but never renouncing to their and 
others’ masked differences. 
Once the primary role of male gaze has been affected, and its female object 
has discovered her body to be a written text and read by the same look, the path is 
open to other objects discovering the artificiality of their subjected position, 
depending only on a particular asset of the scopic regime.  
The gaze can be rejected or at least returned. In this process women have 
often been mediators to others’ instances, as Behn’s Oroonoko demonstrates. 
Epidermal schemes are other texts marked by white male, which made black skin 
the sign of bad values. But in overturning and re-appropriating these schemes 
themselves the point of view of blacks faces the reversal of the mirror and the 
discovery of the whites as to be the cruel one. And women are their witnesses. 
Once again the mask designed by whites while covering the real aspect of the 
marginal, guarantees him or her a favorable and secret point of view that attacks 
the same auto-perception of white man. 
More than one scheme, however, is impressed on the female body: that of the 
prostitute, that of the maid, that of the widow, and that of wealthy and well 
educated women. Each of these is also provided with specific rules, all however 
enclosed in the sphere of man’s desire. And the more these roles go toward upper 
places in society, the more strict their constraints seem to be. But, what patriarchal 
society has not considered is how hard it is to hide a pleasure that is so multiple, 
and that will do nothing less than overwhelm the borders once again, even though 
not breaking any constituted rule, which is even worse. That is why, in Fantomina, 
the protagonist, instead of accepting to be refused by the man she likes, uses all 
these codes to gain her own pleasure and a new genre of woman free of men. 
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The male pleasure and the dominating scopic regime has once again been 
turned upside down, and the masks man had designed to lock his objects in their 
passive roles have become the hiding-place of uncanny observing objects. 
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IV 
FACTS AND FICTIONS 
 
 
 
 
A painting is immediately formed […]  
on the inner surface of the brain 
that looks towards his concavities 
R. Descartes 
 
 
 
 
The relativization of the point of view, to whom female gaze participated in the 
seventeenth and the eighteenth century, has produced the multiplication and the 
diffraction of the subject and the object of vision. In fact, the two instances have 
become confused once the observer has discovered to be looked at, and the 
observed has started to look back at him or her. The highest product of these 
fragmentary visions has been the scattering of the third element of the scopic 
regime: the image. Since, in fact, subject and object are no more defined either in 
their place or in their actions, neither can the image be seen as fixed and univocal. 
Many questions derive from this third problematic point. Who produces this 
image? Is it the subject, the object or the medium? Is there something beyond this 
image? Is it the object, or do image and object differ? Is the image itself the object 
of vision? Or there is something beyond the image? Could the image be the 
meeting point between subject and object?  
These questions seem to be implied in all the discourses Cavendish, Behn and 
Haywood have until now had. From the images of outer and inner of The Blazing 
World to the masks of femininity and masculinity of Bell in Campo, the point of 
Cavendish is the mediating (and sometimes distorting) value of the object‟s image 
built by subjects. Between The Emperor of The Moon and Oroonoko, Behn built up 
a theory of image as a text on which subjects write their beliefs making them 
coincide with the object, while the objects try to use it to reveal the illusion of the 
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subject. Finally Haywood has demonstrated, with her Invisible Spy and Fantomina, 
how hard it is to see what is behind the image, and how little men seem to be 
interested in this kind of survey. 
Once again the questions of our triad are striking for their modernity. In fact, we 
are still questioning on what images are, and how they work. 
W.J.T. Mitchell has demonstrated how difficult is to define what images are and 
how problematic it could be both from a historical and an epistemological point of 
view1. First of all Mitchell faces the complexity of images species, designing a 
family tree that allows us to define our territory between the perceptual, the verbal 
and the mental images. The first kind of image occupies a border place between 
physical and psychological imagery. This is the space of action of the «"species" 
or "sensible forms" which (according to Aristotle) emanate from objects and imprint 
themselves on the waxlike receptacles of our senses like a signet ring»2. This is 
the region in which scientists, psychologists, art historians, literary critics and 
philosophers work, more or less together, on sense data, species and 
appearances. The combination of these three “members of the family” is at risk in 
our discussion, starting from female (but not only) relativization of faith in sense 
data and arriving to the question of appearances, i.e. of what fits between the 
individual and reality, which is commonly conceived as image. Verbal images are 
the precise matter of literary critic, interested in metaphors, descriptions and 
writing. They are, thus, the fields in which the critic of vision of our triad is more 
concentrated, especially when they set the goal of unveiling the false images of 
male power of vision, or when they try to convey difficult scientific images to 
uneducated audience, especially female audience. Mental images, which “belong” 
to epistemology and psychology, comprehend dreams, memories, ideas and 
fantasmata. These last ones are the «revived versions of those impressions called 
up by the imagination in the absence of the objects that originally stimulated 
them»3. Imagination and the impressions it produces are the focal point of this 
chapter. 
According to Mitchell imagination is a member of this family not only insofar it 
belongs to mental images, but also to verbal images. Especially in the seventeenth 
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and eighteenth century, in fact, the consideration of verbal activity in producing 
“sincere” images, even more vividly than nature could do, was very wide spread. It 
derives as well that verbal images as related to the production of mental images, 
within imagination, were considered a good means to introduce not very educated 
people to notions of natural philosophy or to some scientific observation. 
In the introduction to the French edition of Binswanger‟s Dream and Existence, 
Foucault warns about the similarity between image and imagination. In his opinion, 
image, as a crystallized form, is just the renouncement to imagination, which is not 
reduced to the space of the image. Imagination is the process by which any single 
identity found deep below the perceptual world4. It is not perfectly clear, however 
what kind of image Foucault means. 
Going beyond perceptual world, imagination seems to have played a particular 
role in the age we are focusing on. On one hand it might be seen as what moves 
to overcome what is already known, “imaging” something deeper or higher; on the 
other hand it produced, thanks to unimaginable discoveries reached by New 
Science, the fruitful effect of wonder. In this sense wonder is not only an aesthetic 
experience but also a more historically funded phenomenon. Many scholars such 
as Mary Campbell and Lorraine Daston have argued that the astonishing facts of 
New Science could have conversely produced the insurgence of wonderful 
fictions, differently considered as a positive alternative way of knowing or as “a 
broken knowledge”5. Whatever is the consideration of wonder this phenomenon 
was considered in a double way: as a dangerous way through which the 
disciplines of the scientific discourse can lose themselves; or as a way to attract a 
broader audience and amateurs to the knowledge of Natural Philosophy. While 
literates, philosophers and scientists discussed about that, a new cultural effect 
was produced, between scientific amusement and wild fancy, the science fiction. 
Daston and Campbell have traced the issue to its historical roots. Indeed, if 
“science fiction” genre can be studied starting from its medieval origins, and if the 
writings by Thomas More6, Giordano Bruno7 and Francis Bacon8 can be seen as a 
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following step, the connection between the imagination of new and different worlds 
with the new and different discovers in astronomy, microscopy and geography, 
witnesses the most important cultural impact in early modern society. The 
supposed objectivity of the New Science is thus once again threatened. 
The new approach to Natural Philosophy developed mainly in a new field of 
investigation that divides and joins together the scientific empiricism and 
metaphysical question, thus giving a rather ambiguous role to human senses, first 
and foremost that of sight. 
As we have already seen, despite Descartes attributing a servile and minor role 
compared to the horizons of human knowledge, he argued, in Dioptrics (Dioptrice) 
that how we conduct our lives depends in large part by these same senses, 
among which that of sight is the most noble and universal. The French philosopher 
deduced, then, that inventions aimed at strengthening this sense would have been 
the most useful to human progress. This statement reflects the ambition of the 
century, oriented to an extension of knowledge in this world, rather than to the 
liberation from the sensory world. These ambitions were oriented not only to the 
borders of the natural view of man, but also to horizons that the human 
imagination had ever achieved. As new discoveries and the resulting speculations 
spread from laboratories, academies and scientific societies in the cabinets of 
amateurs, magazines, and popularizing literature, new worlds penetrated the 
common imagery also reflecting through the imagination, the humor and the 
critique of literature of the seventeenth century and the next. Now the awareness 
that the Earth and the Universe known so far were only a small portion of the 
newly revealed reality was complete. Time and space exploded in front of the new 
fields of vision offered by the microscope and the telescope, and the plurality of 
worlds was a doctrine increasingly discussed between the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. 
European literature of the eighteenth century showed, therefore, an 
extraordinary sensitivity to new theories that placed the man in a precarious 
balance between the infinitely distant and the infinitely small, reducing it as an 
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insignificant speck of sand in an endless universe9. In early literature about the 
microscope and telescope two different characters could then be distinguished: on 
the one hand the exaltation of the glory of God, revealed by the magnificence of 
the universe through the new instruments; on the other hand, especially by non-
scientific authors, the resizing of the nature of man in his relationship with God in a 
universe in which, as Addison says, if the entire solar system were to be 
annihilated, nothing would change in the universal order 10. 
Witnesses of this revolution are observers of society as Fontenelle and 
Addison, who, with their non-scientific publications facilitated the widest 
dissemination of new ideas. One of the more common treatise for the 
popularization of the late seventeenth century philosophy was in fact 
Conversations on The Plurality of Worlds, which we have already mentioned, in 
which Fontenelle enjoyed his student lady, promising the possibility of 
extraterrestrial life to be logically and empirically acceptable. After the 
observations of Bishop Cassini, new instruments had already allowed us to find on 
the moon something similar to our mountains and our seas. Why, then, not think 
that those territories were inhabited like ours? Resizing the human point of view is 
the thread that weaves all the work of Fontenelle, who goes so far as to imagine 
what may be the opinions of the inhabitants of the moon about the solar system, 
which they also belong to, and on our planet: 
 
I would give any thing that I could possibly divine the awkard Reasonings of the 
Philosophers of their World, upon our Earth‟s appearing immoveable to them, when all 
the other Celestial Bodies rise and set over their Heads, within the Compass of fifteen 
Days. „Tis plain they attribute this Immobility to her Bigness, for she is forty times 
bigger than the Moon, and when their Poets are in the mind to extol unactive and 
indolent Princes, I doubt not but they take care to compare their Inactivity to this 
Majestic Repose of the Earth.11 
 
 The Earth thus became not only one of many stars in the sky, but also a source 
of poetic inspiration and, above all (less easy to accept at that time) a source of 
entertainment and pleasure: 
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They must very sensibly perceive in the Moon, that our Earth turns upon her own 
Center. For Instance, imagine that our Europe, Asia, and America present themselves 
one after another to them in little, and in different Shapes and Figures, almost as we 
see them upon our Maps. Now this Sight must be a Novelty to such Travelers as pass 
from that Moiety of the Moon which never sees us, to that which always does. 
 
These conversations, halfway between astronomy, philosophy and fantasy 
show the disappointment of the French philosopher about the short-sighted 
humanity, whose greatest folly is to believe that all of nature without exception has 
been created for its exclusive use. In that century, however, evidences of the exact 
opposite flourished abundantly, which revealed how reality goes far beyond the 
borders of human senses. The human power with regard to creation, both in terms 
of domination and in terms of knowledge, appears limited also on another front: 
 
For do you believe we discover (as I may say) all the Inhabitants of The Earth? There 
are as many Kinds of Invisible, as visible Creatures; we see from the Elephant to the 
very Hand-Worm, beyond which our Sight fails us, and yet counting from that minute 
Creature, there are an infinity of lesser Animals, which would be imperceptible, without 
the aid of Glasses. We see with Magnifying Glasses that the least Drops of Rain 
Water, Vinegar, and all other liquids, are full of little Fishes, or Serpents, which we 
could never have suspected there.12 
 
Through the microscope, complex social structures, living beings endowed with 
great physical skills, and possibly intellectual, filled the empty spaces of the 
vacuum so far considered. The cultural upheaval caused by this revolution, which 
is at the basis of our own conception of the world and nature, was really explosive 
in society at the time, a specimen of a crucial relativization of the landmarks and 
human measurements. In the relativizing climate that followed the development of 
modern science, even the perception of space and time, due to the enlargement or 
the shrinking of the dimensions of reality, was the trait d'union of the (scientific) 
writings of the era. 
If the measurement of the large and small could no longer aspire to any 
absolute value, in fact it had become a mere result of comparative mechanism, 
then the measurement of space and time were affected accordingly. Thus the 
different shapes of creatures that inhabit possible worlds, which is slowly 
becoming familiar to men, necessarily leads to a different perception and 
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knowledge of the surrounding space according to the proportions of the creature 
that is experiencing it. Not only, therefore, man lost his confidence to be the 
measure of the universe, to learn about space through absolute measures, but the 
immediate perception of time itself - that which governs the rhythms of animal life 
even more than human, that is free from social conventions - came back in what 
must have seemed to many like a whirlwind comparison. 
The origin of this difficult awareness is The Search After Truth (Recherche de la 
vérité. Oy l’on traite de la nature de l’esprit de l’homme et de l’usage qu’il en doit 
faire pour éviter l’erreur dans les sciences) (1675) in which Nicolas Malebranche 
envisaged the possibility that there were creatures for which half an hour 
amounted to a thousand of “human years” and others for which one of our minutes 
was worth one hour, a week, a month, an entire era.  
The philosophical theory of a new conception of time and duration that would 
have permanently changed the way of thinking was, however, that presented by 
John Locke in Essay on Human Understanding (1690), that definitively sanctioned 
the derivation of the perception of time by the speed of succession of the ideas 
formulated by the perceiving mind. Not only, therefore, it was explained how the 
same individual could perceive differently the passage of time – being the speed 
directly proportional to the number of ideas that occupy his mind – but, deducting 
even more attractively the landscape that we are observing, we assume that 
creatures of different mental faculties could feel the life in a completely different 
time. 
The transition from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century witnessed the 
clash between a conception of human knowledge based on reason, being able a 
priori to know the surrounding world, and one based on the senses, the only 
means of empirical knowledge and therefore limited to the perceptions of those 
experiences. The English empiricism provoked some skepticism based on the limit 
of the human senses, but the dissemination of contemporary technological tools 
such as the telescope and microscope, and above all the revolutionary scientific 
discoveries related to them, seemed to open new horizons for scientists and 
philosophers.  
This whole panorama depicts this cultural revolution as the foreground of the 
science fiction, that is a literature in which imagination is not simply an amusement 
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that entertains and distracts, but an aesthetic rooted on scientific observation. One 
of the peculiarities of literature between the seventeenth and the eighteenth 
century is just this complex union of knowledge, through emphasized senses, and 
imagination in which narrative sometimes accompanied science, sometimes 
overcame it. It is, indeed, the age in which Galilei and Kepler wrote amusing 
narrations besides scientific treatise. It is sufficient to think about Somnium by 
Kepler, in which a voyage to the moon becomes the occasion of a full description 
of Moon‟s geography, and the asset of time. However, the world showed in this 
fiction has no aims to make people believe in the possibility of an extra-terrestrial 
world, rather those to explain Galilei‟s and Tycho Brahe‟s observations. 
Imagination has here only a pretext reason, since it is dangerous to talk to 
uneducated people too deep in reason. The voyage on the moon is a way to make 
them accustomed to such questions, without confusing them: «The purpose of my 
Dream is to use the example of the moon to build up an argument in favor of the 
motion of the earth, or rather to overcome objections taken from the universal 
opposition of mankind»13. The purpose of Kepler is, thus, a scientific-pedagogical 
one. Imagination is not a kind of knowledge, but rather a medium. 
When Francis Godwin wrote his Man in the Moone, in 1638, something 
happened. In the preface authored by a certain E. M., the aim of verisimilitude 
seems to be primary. While Kepler never expected his dream to be acquainted as 
real, Godwin, writing in an age in which Copernican Revolution was already 
spread, wants his reader to suspend his disbelief. The aim is that of imagination 
and entertainment, still funded on scientific grounds, but somehow going further in 
demonstrating how something previously unbelievable could be scientifically 
possible: 
 
To the Ingenious Reader. Thou hast here an essay of Fancy, where Invention is 
shewed with Judgment. It was not the Author's intention (I presume) to discourse thee 
into a beliefe of each particular circumstance. Tis fit thou allow him a liberty of conceive 
where thou takest to thy selfe a liberty of judgment. In substance thou hast here a new 
discovery of a new world, which perchance may finde little better entertainment in thy 
opinion, than that of Columbus at first, in the esteeme of all men […]But the knowledge 
of this may seeme more properly reserv'd for this our discovering age: In which our 
Galilaeusses, can by advantage of their spectacles gaze the Sunne into spots, & 
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descry mountaines in the Moon. But this, and more in the ensuing discourse I leave to 
thy candid censure, & the faithful relation of the little eye-witnesse, our great 
discoverer.14 
 
Thus, imagination doesn‟t need science anymore, but can even go further. This 
is why Arthur B. Evans distinguishes two different kinds of fiction in that period, 
which he agrees to detect as the origin of modern science fiction:  
 
It is not unreasonable to discern in these two "ur-texts" of science fiction criticism the 
origins of two distinct but interwoven traditions in the history of science fiction itself: 
"didactic science fiction," which is pedagogical by design and gives primacy to scientific 
exposition over the fictional narrative […] versus "romance science fiction" which is 
more visionary by nature and gives primacy to the fiction over the science-or pseudo-
science-embedded within it.15 
 
All this leads our discourse to a comparison between the objective New Science 
expected to achieve and the space it opened to imagination, its precise opposite, 
because of the innumerable wonders it discovered. It was, indeed, a period not 
only of astronomic and microscopic discovery, but also of geographical endeavors. 
Thus the encounter with new world was not only imaginative, but also real, as, for 
example, the analysis of Behn‟s Oroonoko showed us.  
It was, therefore, not only a question of imagination, but rather a question of 
wonder, that is a suspension of our normal way of reacting in front of something 
we didn‟t know before. In other words it is a way of reacting to knowledge when it 
isn‟t reliable to anything known before. It is in this sense that Mary B. Campbell 
talks about it as a state whose symptoms are speechless and a kind of paralysis: 
«It arrests the gaze, the intellect, the emotions, because (consciously at least) it 
leads nowhere, reminds us of nothing. It has no use value. As a result, wonder is a 
form of perception now mostly associated with innocence: with children, the 
uneducated (that is, the poor), women, lunatics, and non-Western cultures»16. This 
passage explains the problems very well connected with such an experience 
which Bacon referred to as the “art of inquiry and invention”, as a part of man‟s 
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labor for knowledge that comes first from the invention of what he is seeking. At a 
first glance, then, imagination seems to be the first promoter of human knowledge, 
especially of scientific knowledge since it is what Bacon is analyzing. Bacon goes 
on demonstrating that the invention both of science and of art is a deficient 
knowledge, since it is founded by chance17. But chance and the suspension of 
activity related to wonder and imagination are two characteristics a man of science 
can‟t accept, especially in a period when the activity of the human mind seemed to 
achieve borders beyond any suspicion. That is why it is confined to marginal 
subjects such as women or different cultures. 
Anyway the cultural revolution of the seventeenth and the eighteenth century, 
with the encounters with real new societies and cultures, the philosophy of multiple 
worlds within and outside our world, the new heliocentric system, and the related 
thrust towards discovering, understanding, penetrating these abnormalities, could 
hardly propose a total refusal of the wonder however produced. In fact, it was not 
only a conscious way of producing narrative unreality but also another way of 
inquiry and represent by means of the fictional. Thus, as Campbell demonstrates, 
together with the literary work mentioned above, which were somehow conscious 
of the imaginative effects it would produce, other works with less fancy aims 
produced a wide imagery none the less powerful. It suffices to mention 
Micrographia, by Robert Hooke, and Sidereus Nuncius, by Galilei, which anyway 
stimulate not only curiosity but also a complex cultural wonder about the invisible 
worlds represented with unprecedented vividness. 
This consciousness of the unavoidable wonder produced by New Science, and 
the frightening inventions it could produce in uneducated or not fully educated 
subjects, was probably one of the reasons that produced the institutionalization of 
science within precise places, such as academies, and the division into 
compartments of the intelligible world, which in this way could be controlled and 
possessed better.  
It is, ultimately, a kind of awareness of the limits of vision itself, for what we see 
through telescope and microscope is at once to be reduced to that tool. Different 
means produce different images and thus different objects, irreducible to them. 
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Thus, the images produced in laboratory never arrest within that space, in fact 
they start to re-produce themselves in an uncontrollable way. 
The question opened about imagination leads back to our first problem, that of 
images. If what appears through the most sophisticated optical devices is not a 
univocally interpretable sign, rather something that can be read in different ways 
according to the system to which it is related, and, moreover, if this same sign can 
be brought equally to scientific observation or to fantastic invention, then we may 
affirm that these images, at least, do not seem to exist by their own. In fact they 
are to be interpreted like any other human sign.  
A different way of dealing with the issue was that of a different popular 
literature, particularly that of magazine. The genre of this literature could be 
defined, in opposition to science fiction, as educational fiction. As we have already 
showed in the first chapter, especially during the shifting between the seventeenth 
and the eighteenth century the great popularization of magazine raised. It was 
devoted to the education of “large” parts of population. The Tatler (1709-1711) and 
the Spectator (1711-1712), edited by Addison and Steele were devoted to the 
education of men who weren‟t used to the principles of new science and 
philosophy, from which the new imagery came from. This imagery we have 
analyzed – made of magnified images of bugs, and reduced images of a plurality 
of worlds – was, in fact, leaving academies, willy-nilly, and the effect it could 
produce was worrying intellectual circles. The audience to be educated, in order to 
be protected, by this wonderful imagery comprehended even women, the least 
part of English education, in the seventeenth as well as in the eighteenth century. 
This is why some of these educators or popularizers devoted their work 
specifically to them. It is the case of John Dutton who edited the issues of both 
Athenian Mercury and Ladies’ Mercury.  
The education of women in such matters as Experimental Philosophy, but also 
Politics and other sciences was controversial. Ladies‟ Mercury is just a proof of the 
fact that very often the public intent of educating women was led more by an intent 
of managing the chance of knowledge opened by the new, amusing science. Thus 
Dutton pretends to be a woman speaking to other women erasing the possibility of 
a female authorship, and attributing to women the place of a passive 
comprehension of what men would transmit to them. It was more or less the same 
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vision governing Fontenelle‟s Entretiens, a vision neither Behn appreciated, as we 
will soon see, nor Haywood completely accepted. In fact she founded the first 
woman magazine, addressed only to women, issued only by women. Both women 
writers made a re-appropriation of the female right to authorship to make the free 
knowledge available then to any possible patriarchal control. What they especially 
criticize was just the fictional images often used to vehicle complex scientific 
topics. Their opinion about the wonderful semi-scientific images then circulating 
was almost similar: images such as those proposed by Micrographia could be 
useful to better conceive questions hard to be taught to not well educated people, 
including women, but false images, flourished by fancy in so far as to forget the 
origin of their own reason, could only confuse those people, and thus have to be 
avoided for educational purposes. That is why especially Haywood tried to make a 
proposal for women‟s education, especially for what concerns natural philosophy, 
based on a strict observation, rather than on abstract speculations. 
Diversely interested in this deviant production of “imagined images” are our 
triad‟s writings, which articulated in different ways the relation between facts and 
fictions.  
Cavendish probably more than others was particularly sensible to the 
fascination of imagination, or as she said fancy, considering it as full means not 
only of knowledge, but properly of perception, the unmediated perception she was 
looking for. If, as she has already argued, human beings see not only with physical 
eyes but also with mind, then there is a link between imagination and reason, a 
link which women are very acquainted to. This internalization of knowledge and 
perception makes vision work in two different ways, according to the Cavendish‟s 
Natural Philosophy: the first is the route vision traveled in The Blazing World, in 
which the vision was projected onto an internal and personal world; the second is 
the opposite mechanism that makes the external world be known thanks to 
internal, spiritual and imaginative properties the subject moves. These two 
passages seem to make Cavendish‟s considerations close to those of Irigaray‟s 
observation upon female gaze. Indeed, Irigaray finds the proper place of female 
understanding and expression in what she calls mysterique, a spiritual place in 
which the undeniable mystery of every knowledge process, the mystic as the 
precisely female experience of this encounter, and the hysteric, the peculiar 
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female expression as defined by men, produce a way of seeing not reducible to 
the male phallogularcentrism. This is why, first of all, the knowledge in Cavendish, 
as well as in Irigaray, doesn‟t work through fragmented means, but both material 
and immaterial tools work in a mixing experience of both the subject and the object 
of vision. Now since vision has been introjected, making sensual perception work 
together with internal cogitations, that is making the internal subject world 
encounter the external object world, a new role for imagination has to be founded. 
Or even for illusion as Irigaray pointed out: «And what if illusion were constitutive 
of thinking not in the sense that the cogitationes “fail” to correspond to (their) 
objective reality, but in that whereby illusion would serve as fiction of proof of the 
cogitatum itself, as coming to the same thing as the entity who is now thinking 
(himself)»18. In this reduction of the space between the knower and known 
imagination is not a mere distraction of reason, as Bacon argued, but rather the 
proof of the existence of the viewer who is not only assisting an image, but 
producing it. This insight is probably the primary awareness of the whole 
Cavendish‟s philosophy, especially as she presented in her Natures Pictures 
Drawn by Fancies Pencil to The Life19. 
The question of wonder and imagination is more complex in Aphra Behn, who 
declines the matter in different ways according to the kind of text, literary scientific 
or philosophical, she is producing. Oroonoko has already showed some of the 
characteristic wonder can assume in Behn‟s literature. It was the case of the 
wonder produced by the encounter with a different, but real, culture. But what 
Oroonoko represented was a particular kind of wonder both for who belongs to his 
culture, and for who belongs to another culture. His dark blackness, as we have 
already seen, makes him extraordinary, which means beyond any “natural” 
definition of racial identity or physical difference. The wonder he produced, not 
only because of his skin, but also because of his education and morality, was of a 
good kind. It served the author to demonstrate to all of her audience how the fixed 
categories of human and not human, and the images of white man and black man, 
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were only images constructed by a single point of view, and thus neither universal 
nor irreversible. 
She has a different consideration of wonder for what concerns the 
popularization of science. As she showed in The Emperor of Moone, in fact, the 
simplified version of scientific notions could produce a double effect: it can open 
the door to new classes of audience, offering them the opportunity to learn 
something previously forbidden because of their education, but it can also produce 
wrong scientific ideas in them. Imagination and wonder are not bad tools per se, 
but they need to be followed by deeper knowledge. Imagination, thus, might be a 
good medium of knowledge, but it cannot be the only one. 
Aphra Behn didn‟t deny the opportunity of imagination, also as a literary genre, 
for women, but she considered it more suitable to the image of fancy than to that 
of direct observation. Her critique, indeed, is addressed to the fashion of 
popularizing science in her period. In her opinion it was moreover an attempt to 
gain more audience for a New Science already in crisis, than a democratization of 
knowledge. Most of all she wanted, probably, to make her audience aware that 
what was presented to them was a fancy image. Reality, if it was, was elsewhere. 
It is in this sense that we will read her translation of The Plurality of World by 
Fontenelle, and moreover the introductive essay she wrote on it. Thus she not only 
demonstrated how far women can go, participating in cultural debates through 
works by others if they can‟t by themselves, but she also showed that a woman 
can find the difference between fancy narration and faithful report, and to unveil, 
once again, the tricks of male images. 
A third point of view, once again different is that of Eliza Haywood, who became 
interested in the topic especially during the last part of her life, when, as she 
herself affirms, all the adventures and follies of her youth passed and a new 
consciousness of chances and opportunities for women was raised. This period 
was particularly characterized by the task of the education of women. Not 
considering herself as a superior in knowledge or intelligence, rather only 
experienced, she devoted her last lines in a strong and very witty struggle for 
women‟s emancipation. In order to realize this she didn‟t renounce to use some of 
patriarchal concepts. This is a tactic she already used in passed years, assuring a 
good audience to her writing and less problems with male censors. In this case the 
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example we will analyze is the editing of Female Spectator, the magazine she 
issued from 1744 till 1746, after Addison and Steele‟s Spectator, which she often 
refers to as her «learned Brother of ever precious Memory»20. In this work the task 
of education is led in a quite invisible but coherent way, passing through the 
education of taste, history, love and also science. A precise concern of fancy is 
declared clearly throughout the work, and is quite negative. Her pessimistic 
account of fiction in particular is based on two grounds: the corruption of the mind 
it can produce and its ambiguous relation of truth. Relating real facts by means of 
fiction is a confusing rather than an informing means, and even more dangerous 
when it is applied to a non literary work. In fact, while the “title” of a romance warns 
about the fictive events explained, the fiction, for example the scientific fiction, 
might let the audience believe in facts that are not effective, even though inspired 
by scientific principles or, more often, philosophical speculation. Fiction, therefore, 
has a relation to truth similar to that of faith. In the two both truth is modified by 
means of flourishes that make it more desirable and more impressive, since 
impression is the main goal of both faith and fiction. What is worse is that the 
convictions achieved in this way produce prejudice, i.e. ideas we learn when we 
aren‟t really conscious of it. 
 
 
Wonder and Reason 
 
As Sarasohn has argued Margaret Cavendish was herself a wonder for her 
time, both because of her literary and scientific works, and for her personal 
aesthetic, which never stopped to astonish her contemporaries. Not only, in fact, it 
was already wonderful that a woman worked in specific male fields, but she also 
considered wonder itself as a fundamental means of literature and philosophy, of 
experimental work and knowledge. Wonder is, evidently, the first amusing motor of 
human knowledge, even though men of science in her age wouldn‟t accept it. In 
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her opinion, on the contrary, wonder is part of the “performatory nature” of 
experimental science21. 
Her building of a natural philosophical system – according to which world is 
made of both internal and external matter in motion –, and the skepticism she 
owned about the faculty of sensory means in plainly knowing nature – since her 
mysteries are too deep to be known – led her to a consideration of a “finer 
perception”, particularly suitable to the feminine imagination. This conception 
makes vision, and all different kinds of knowledge as well, work by means of three 
different mechanisms: the unmediated observation, the rational abstraction and 
the imaginative speculation. The first, as we have already seen, was one of the 
main concerns of the triad of women writers, because it poses a risk dealing with 
the optical devices which could both become the end in themselves of the 
pleasure of seeing, and they could be forgotten as a medium, as for example what 
usually happens with the forgotten medium of body. The second was one of the 
most debated questions of the time, when the power of reason was still working 
under the disembodiment process of sight, connected more and more with an 
internal and superior eye. Finally the third was probably the most dangerous 
concept for the Royal Society‟s age, in which everything related to the process of 
knowledge and experimentation had to be coded, mostly of course language and 
form of expression, where imagination could open some uncontrollable doors.  
For Cavendish believing in imagination, by the way, doesn‟t mean to completely 
abandon the concern with matter, because it is precisely in rational matter that 
human takes knowledge by means of two tools: reason, that is the qualities of 
intellect in searching the causes of material effects; and fancy, which is a voluntary 
creation of the mind, thus a “stylistic aesthetics” as Sarasohn defined it22. 
This complex system produces an ambiguous way of writing about science that 
lets us define Cavendish as a cultural hermaphrodite, who wasn‟t afraid of 
confusing languages of literature, gender and science. Thus fancy could become 
an expression of the knowledge of nature, as well as speculation. 
In the “rhetoric orthodoxy” of Royal Society the transformation of experiment 
into an amusement was unacceptable. However as Sarasohn and Shaffer 
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demonstrated, the Royal Society was the first director of popularization of science 
not only thanks to some editorial enterprises but also in the spectacular ways in 
which experiments were presented to members themselves of society. Of course 
most of the prominent members justify this kind of presentation as a way to 
stimulate curiosity in further and most complex field of studies, as for example 
Boyle and Hooke claimed. But the masqueraded visit Cavendish performed at 
Royal Society23 just denounced this innate characteristic of new science. Her way 
of facing scientists with a way of expression they used on their own without 
accepting the imagery weight it bared, was more stressed by her unique and 
repeated observation: “I‟m full of admiration”, which is at first sight only a 
superficial observation. In fact, admiration was for Boyle the most dangerous effect 
science could produce in human intellect, arresting it in its knowledge. 
The image of science produces, willy-nilly, imagination. Instead of being refused 
it should be exploited in order to achieve a larger part of audience. This is exactly 
the aim of many of Cavendish‟s writings, such as The Blazing World, as we have 
already seen, which not by chance was attached to a philosophical treatise:  
 
If you wonder, that I join a work of Fancy to my serious Philosophical Contemplations; 
think not that it is out of a disparagement to Philosophy; or out of an opinion, as if this 
noble study were but a Fiction of the Mind; for though Philosophers may err in 
searching and enquiring after the Causes of Natural Effects, and many times embrace 
falshoods for Truths; yet this doth not prove, that the Ground of Philosophy is meerly 
Fiction, but the error proceeds from the different motions of Reason, which cause 
different Opinions in different parts […] And this is the reason, why I added this Piece 
of Fancy to my Philosophical Observations, and joined them as two Worlds at the ends 
of their Poles; both for my own sake, to divert my studious thoughts, which I employed 
in the Contemplation thereof, and to delight the Reader with variety, which is always 
pleasing.24 
 
The study of the anti-platonic line in Cavendish‟s work, led on by Gabrielle 
Starr, explains the theoretical and philosophical foreground of this aesthetic25. In 
many of her works, such as Poems and fancies, A World in an Ear-ring and Of 
Many Worlds in This World, Cavendish founded her materialistic view with the 
encounter of three different instances, those of perception, imagination and form.  
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Starting from a Lucretian atomism, Cavendish sees the entire world consisting 
of material atoms, which give form not only to the external world but also to mental 
processes, first of all those of imagination. Fancy and imagination, thus, are 
creative tools of knowledge, by which the mind can apprehend form. In fact, our 
knowledge is, according to Cavendish, the knowledge of images, eidola. Of course 
senses are the first means through which we come in contact with these images, 
but «imaginative vision brings them into light»26, being mind and forms made of 
the same atoms: 
 
In every Braine loose Atomes do lye, 
Those which are Sharpe, from them do Fancies flye, 
Those that are long, and Aiery, nimble be. 
But Atomes Round, and Square, are dull, and sleepie.27 
 
Sensory is, then, limited and cannot bring us to a broader knowledge. 
Imagination, on the contrary, makes us discover what might exist beyond these 
limits. Otherwise how could have we discovered unimaginable things such as 
microcosm and macrocosm, other worlds in this world, atoms or air? Imagination 
is not considered as a free movement of the mind. It, belonging to the same brain 
material, is not fantastic and needs to be educated both with Natural Philosophy 
and Poetry, the first leading its orientation to significant forms, the second making 
form and beauty recognizable.  
The work that however seems to fully comprehend this aesthetic system, for 
what concerns the role of poetry, the role of form in knowledge and representation, 
the boundaries fancy can reaches, is Natures Pictures, a collection of poems and 
prose, diversely arranged in matters, such as war, marriage, passion beauty and 
of course philosophy. 
The plain title of the works Natures Pictures Drawn by Fancies Pencil to The 
Life, introduce the aim of this writing which is certainly made clear in the preface: 
 
I have described in this Work many sorts of Passions, Humors, Behaviours, Actions, 
Accidents, Governments, Laws, Customs, Peace, Warrs, Climates, Arts and Sciences; 
but have not Painted them all alike, some being done with Oily-colours of Poetry, 
others with Water-colours of Prose: some upon dark Grounds of Tragedy, and others 
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upon light grounds of Comedy. Nor are those Descriptions so lively express by my 
Pen, as Sir Anthony Vandike’s Pictures by his Pencil, being rather form‟d by Fancy, 
than copied from true Originals of immediate Action28 
 
The first aim of Margaret Cavendish, thus, seems to be that of combining the 
pleasure of Arts with the pleasure of Science, not being afraid of portraying diverse 
matters such as passions, laws or science, with the vivid colors of poetry and 
prose, and moreover, of imagination. It is, however, a different imagination from 
that of a pure fancy amusement, deriving, instead, from those “originals of 
immediate action”, even though this action is not immediately visible, as we have 
already seen. It is not the free and wild fancy that leads these writings, rather the 
educated and creative one, which pushes the mind beyond the sensual limits and 
makes “imagine” other territories where to expand the action of knowledge. 
All these narrations, differing in matter and form, are framed within a cordial 
setting around the home fire of the Newcastle circle. None of the fancies here built, 
however, is presented as true, since fancy has no need to be hidden. Thus 
Cavendish reveals how this setting and the characters populating it are produced 
by her own fancy. The friendly company decides to amuse in telling stories of 
diverse sort about love, passions, war and, of course, fantastic adventures, which 
are the ones we are interested in.  
The fantastic voyage to the center of earth, the fancy monarchy of poetry, the 
imaginary indispositions of mind, the observation of a speculator, are probably the 
most fruitful means by which Cavendish tries to explain her natural philosophy to a 
broader audience. That is why we could link this work to the fashion of literary 
popularizing scientific or philosophical discoveries, like Fontenelle and Algarotti did 
in that century and many others would do in the next one. 
The theme of poetry and of its close relation to the matter of reason and 
knowledge is explained in the prose entitled Fancy Monarchy in the Land of 
Poetry. This fancy depicts a monarchy in which the king is Reason, tall and strong, 
while the free and sweet Wit, is the Queen; Faith and Zeal the Arch-bishops; Study 
and Practice the Universities. In this realm where only profitable laws, strict rules 
and good rules are held, what is most important for our matter is what part senses 
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have. They are, in fact, the “ports” of the kingdom, while Heart plays the rule of 
magazine.  
Each of these ports has different businesses and managements, and different 
commanders. Thus, the port of Ears, whose commanders are Judgment and 
Understanding, is prescribed to not allow any «Sound but Harmony, no reports but 
Truth, no Discourses but rational or Witty; and they should shut the Gates against 
Flattery, Falshood, Discord, harsh loud Strains, Scraping, Creaking, Squealing 
Noises»29.  
In the port of eyes the governors are Love and Skill, which allow to enter 
nothing but uniform beauty, graceful motions, light and well mixed colors. What is 
forbidden is deformity, monstrosity, rude and cruel actions, and, moreover, false 
shadow and darkness. The two governors, then have to «set up the light of 
Dreams when they [eyes] are shut. Also to let no Tears pass through the Eyes, but 
those that have a Pass-port from the Governour of the Heart»30. 
Like and Dislike are the governors of the Nostrils, in which nothing is allowed to 
go in but sweet smells to refresh the brain. It is almost curious that the governors 
of “Mouth” are Truth and Pleasure. The first manages word, and allows no lies or 
lascivious words to enter its port. The second manages taste, which stops the 
passage of anything being too sharp, bitter, salty or sweet. Finally Touch is ruled 
by pain and pleasure, both of which «let in none but nourishing Warmth, soft 
Rubbing, gentle Scartching, refreshing Colds, and the like. And upon pain of 
Death, or at least high Displeasure, these Rules were to be kept»31. 
In this imaginative social asset, both Imagination and Invention play important 
and creative roles. The first represents the class of Merchants, which trade and 
traffic all over the world. The second are the handcrafts-men, and labourers. 
The introduction of something wrong in this fancy realm prevents us to define it 
as an utopian, or even a naïve Work. Indeed, not only Cavendish warns us about 
the corruptibility of the commanders of the ports, sometimes seduced by Bribery, 
but she designs the citizens as Appetites. The role of science, than, is very ironic: 
it represents the class of nobles used to amuse the citizens of the realm with 
Masques, Plays, and so on. 
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Summing up, human activities are described by Cavendish as mediated by 
sense, oriented to appetites and managed by diverse passions, all governed by 
Reason and Wit. But what is particularly interesting is that this whole realm is 
sustained by Imagination and Inventions, which with their fruitful traffics and 
creative productions assure the richness. Science, instead, as a pure diverting 
role, played by means of tricks such as Masques and Plays. In this way Cavendish 
is, of course, making a metaphorical critique to the social asset of societies and 
academies, which deny the role of imagination and rely on much faith in senses, 
without considering that they are only channels to be controlled and managed. 
This critical point of view continues with the tale titled Indisposition of Mind, 
which shows how both “divines” and “moral philosopher” are not able either to 
define what indispositions are affecting mind, whether they are caused by envy, 
the cancer of the mind, or hate, his apoplexy, or imagination and strange opinions, 
his wind colic. That is why they are not successful in defining the right cure. 
Poor mind, affected by unbearable pains, decides to cure himself, becoming at 
once his own apothecary, physician and “surgeon”, and finding the suitable cures: 
 
First, He left himself Blood, opening the willful Vein, taking out the obstinate Blood. 
Then he did take Pills made of Society and Mirth, and hose purged all strange and vain 
Conceits. Also the Mind eat every morning Mess of Broth, wherein was Herbs of 
Grace, Fruit of Justice, Spice of Prudence, Bread of Fortitude; these were boiled with 
the Flesh of Judgement, in the Water of Temperance. This breakfast as a Soveraign 
Remedy against the malignant Passions; for it did temper Heat, qualifie Sharpness, 
allay Vapours, and mollifie obdurate Passions, and foolish Affections.32 
 
But what makes this cure really work is the care all the five senses covered on 
him, giving in turn intelligence, news, recreation. 
Once again, thus, the mind seems to work better by “his” own activities, and by 
the fundamental support of senses. The support of moral philosophers can be 
barely useful. They seem not to comprehend how “he” works and whether his own 
activities are good or not, and proposing cures that seem to convince them of the 
moral value rather than the actual one. Just in this way we can explain how 
“noises and company” could help the mind in restoring better than free 
imagination. 
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Imagination, in fact, is the first step the mind makes towards new knowledge, or 
even towards the comprehension of discoveries made by someone else. This is 
the true aim of Cavendish work, which is devoted to the simple and funny 
explanation of her philosophical and scientific work, by means of fancy 
amusement. 
This is precisely the case of the fancy The Speculators, which talks about the 
observation of the deep secrets of nature.  
The story begins with a knight who, along his way, perceives with his naked 
eyes something vain in the air. Once dismounted, he lies on the ground trying to 
sharpen his sight, even though he doesn‟t know precisely on what object. While he 
is so lying an old man approaches him, asking what he is doing. The knight 
answers that in trying to keep the vision of he doesn‟t know exactly what, he has 
almost lost not only the vision, but also the sight. The old man explains to him the 
reason: 
 
The Body is like Mind, whereinto if you take more Learning than the Understanding can 
discuss, it overwhelms it, and knocks Reason on the head; as if you take more meat 
into the Stomack than it can digest, it surfeits; if the Ear receives too swift or harsh a 
Sound, it makes it deaf, smuthering the distinct notes. Likewise, if you draw more 
Species than can pass through the Eye, in order to the Optick Nerve, it‟s like a Croud 
of People at a narrow pass […] just so some the Eyes to be dimmed or obstructed.33 
 
Thus eyes are means of a sense that has no privilege in spite of the other. As 
all everything else it is limited, it can be wrong, and it can be managed. It cannot 
reach all the borders it presumes. This is also due to the self-asset of nature, who 
veils the plain figure of herself, obscures deeply her secrets, and makes one of her 
parts not known to the others: 
 
Besides, said the old man, Nature is not only curious in her workings, but secrets in her 
Works: for, none of her Works know themselves perfectly; not Man, who seems to 
have the best Understanding; because Nature governs her Creatures by Ignorance; 
and if any had perfect Knowledge, they would be as great as She.34 
 
Even though Nature prefers to be admired than to be known, she appreciates 
men who research her paths, that is why she lets the experimenters go a little 
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deeper into her secrets. Which they can do thanks to some instruments that 
sharpen their eyes.  
Thus the old man gives the knight three magic glasses that allow him to see 
three different dimensions: the lower region, the second region, the upper region. 
Looking through the first glass the Knight sees Winds and the way they are 
created. He first sees Vapors growing from the Earth as if they were an ascending 
rain, then transforming themselves into spongy clouds shaped like Honey-combs, 
in every cell there was a drop of water. All the drops being squeezed by the 
agitation of Air, or heated by the Sun, bubble out and fall down to the Earth again. 
The same glass allows the knight to observe the two poles and the relative winds. 
These winds appear through the glass made of the same substance of the drops 
in the Honey-comb, sucked and spout with such a force that it becomes very 
small, thin and quick. Then looking to the “Torrid Zone”, between the East and the 
West, here a “Cymbal” digests air, because of the heat, transforms it into winds. 
But it is a different kind of wind, more gentle than the previous. 
In the second region the Knight observed several waves of air, within each were 
cities, flowers, vegetables, and people. These people were shaped as fishes, so 
that they swam into the air, and their cities are built with snowy houses and Hail-
stones.  The ray of sun causes both the snow and the Hail fall down to the Earth. 
During the winter this causes the street to be dry and the Horse steps to be noisy. 
This noise is what we perceive as Thunder, and the heat of Horses‟ Nostrils the 
Lightening. 
Finally, in the upper region, through the third glass, he sees six moving circle 
cities, called planets. In the midst of which is a “metropolitan city” called Sun, 
peopled by Salamanders, who live in heat as fishes live in water. They produce 
and sell the light to all the other planets and their shape is that of angels. Thus 
men can‟t perceive them without the help of “Miraculous Glasses”. On the contrary 
they can perceive men, and, in fact, they discover our knight peeping at them. The 
King of the Sun raged at this, casting a ray of light to his glass, dissolving the lens 
by the heat and blinding the man by the light. 
More than the other stories, this one very well explains not only the natural 
philosophy of the young Margaret Cavendish, but especially describes the way in 
which knowledge can be gained by means of vision, through which means and at 
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what risks. It is clear, throughout all these stories, that man cannot reach the 
deepest secrets of nature, or either of himself, with the help of naked senses. They 
are too limited in spite of his desire of knowledge. So he has to ask the help of 
both optical devises and imagination, the first working together with the second, 
inspiring and challenging each other. 
What the two both can perceive, anyway, is not the pure reality, but images, 
such as those of the people within the waves of air, which allow men to 
comprehend realms of nature too distant from him, by making them similar to what 
it knows and to what he can understand. 
Optical devices, as well as eyes themselves, are a limited means of knowledge. 
Only reason can overwhelm these limits with the help of imagination and its 
images. 
 
 
Women of quality and plurality of worlds 
 
Aphra Behn‟s concerns about imagination were very different from those of 
Margaret Cavendish. More worried about the social impact of knowledge, dealing 
especially with the way in which knowledge was spread, Behn remained critical, as 
we have already seen, about the opportunity of publishing scientific works under 
the image of fancy. 
When Behn wrote, the academic system – that by the time of Margaret 
Cavendish was struggling against the undisciplined conduction of science – was 
already in crisis. Thus it starts different strategies to reach larger audience. Behn 
had already criticized this misconduct of science, on one hand carefully not to let 
marginal classes, such women, enter the sacred rooms of the Royal Society, on 
the other acquiescent to sell images and spectacles originally intended as studies 
and experiments. According to Aphra Behn, in doing so they stimulated the 
pleasure of seeing, more than the pleasure of knowing. 
More or less in the same period in which Aphra Behn published The Emperor of 
The Moone, the French philosopher Fontenelle published the Entretiens sur la 
pluralité des mondes, which represented one of the most popular writings of the 
time. Through this work, that was neither a treatise nor precisely a fancy, he 
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wanted to explain the Copernican theories and the philosophy of the plurality of 
worlds to an audience broader than the educated gentlemen who used to read 
about those questions. His end was not only that to educate this uneducated 
audience, but also to amuse them. Nature works, as Hooke had already showed 
with his Micrographia, are so wonderful that he can‟t resist on making everyone, 
even women, know them. To this end he built a nice frame to his explanation 
adopting a “woman of quality” as an interlocutor of his protagonist. The marquise 
was a perfect character representing the natural curiosities of the uneducated and 
the female inclination for wonder more than for serious observations. This is why 
he represents the whole project of Nature he is about to explain as a spectacle: 
 
Nature is a great Scene, or Representation, much like one of our Opera’s; for, 
from the place where you sit to behold the Opera, you do not see the Stage, as 
it really is, since every thing is disposed there for the representing agreeable 
Objects to your sight, from a large distance, while wheels & weights, which 
move and counterpoise the Machines are all concealed from our view; nor do 
we trouble our selves so much to find out how all those Motions that we see 
there, are performed; and it may be among so vast a number of Spectators, 
there is not above one Enginier in the whole Pit, that troubles himself with the 
consideration of how those flights are managed that seem so new and so 
extraordinary to him, and who resolves at any rate to find out the contrivance of 
them: You cannot but guess, Madam, that this Enginier is not unlike a 
Philosopher.35 
 
Nature is thus like an Opera, in which everything is staged for the pleasure of 
the spectators. But these spectators are distinguished between those who can 
only assist to the displayed images, and those who wonder what the mechanisms 
animating the movements are and the changing of these images. The protagonist 
might, then, be the “Engineer”, while the marquise the simple spectator. Fontenelle 
will open the curtain for her to the wonder of nature. 
The Entretiens were not impeded in the publication of this book, which was 
already well known among educated people, even though this kind of 
popularization of science might be considered a risk for the Royal Society, who 
tried to codify all the processes of philosophical observation in order to transform it 
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into science. In fact the Royal Society sponsored the translation made by Aphra 
Behn.  
This translation represented a unique opportunity for Aphra Behn, for diverse 
reasons. First of all because it was a public recognition of her authority, being the 
first official translator of such an important and popular work. Moreover this kind of 
work was particularly intriguing for Behn, because it was written in vulgar, thus 
resolving the problem of the lack of education of women in Latin. The character of 
the Marquise was not a secondary reason for her interest, in which she hoped to 
find the example of an intelligent and literate woman, able to understand even the 
most difficult principles of astronomy, geography, philosophy. 
The consideration she had of her authorial position, even though always within 
a patriarchal society, led Behn to take her own authoritative space within a preface 
that looks more like a critical essay than a formal introduction by the translator. 
After beginning with the central question of translation, regarding the difference 
between languages, the choice between a more or less faithful or literal 
translation, Behn allows the question relating to the topic of the book. She shows 
her appreciation for a work whose aim is to make more popular, especially to 
women, subjects such as the plurality of world and the Copernican system.  
 
The Design of the Author is to treat of this part of Natural Philosophy in a more familiar 
Way than any other hath done, and to make every body understand him: For this End, 
he introduce a Woman of Quality whom he feigns never to have heard of any such 
thing as Philosophy before.36 
 
But she can observe that this end is not perfectly reached. And this is because 
of the extreme fancy and the funny standard he tries to manage all the work, thus 
affecting the entire book with an inconstant style. It is particularly true for what 
concerns the matter of the Plurality of world: 
 
for endeavouring to render this part of Natural Philosophy familiar, he hath turned it into 
Ridicule he hath pushed his wild Notion of the Plurality of Worlds to that height of 
Extravagancy, that he most certainly will confound those Readers, who have not 
Judgment and Wit to distinguish between what is truly solid (or, at least, probable) and 
what is trifling and airy: and there is no less Skilland Understanding required in this, 
than in comprehending the whole Subject he treats of.37 
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It is thus clear how Behn‟s concern about reliability, is not founded on a 
question of authority or consent, as it was for the Royal Society, rather to the 
question of a true popularization. This translation, as all her works did, had the 
primary aims to instruct her public, making them aware of the mistakes of society, 
especially those that affect the free life or persons, especially woman. It was then 
a great chance to introduce to women, among others, such important and crucial 
questions of society at the time. But discovering that popularization had a different 
meaning for academics like Fontelle, disappointed her. If images produced by 
Fontelle are not agreeable, or worse they might confuse the public now, first 
coming to these matters, then popularization has no real meaning. Science is 
reduced to a common amusement. 
The denouncement against Fontenelle‟s ambiguity is led in different ways. 
First she stresses the ambiguity of the co-protagonist character, sometimes 
appearing as particularly witty, sometimes making stupid observations. It 
demonstrates in Behn‟s opinion the artificiality of the character: «Lady Marquiese, 
he makes her say a great many very silly things, thoʼ sometimes she makes 
Observations so learned, that the greatest Philosophers in Europe could make no 
better»38. Then she demonstrates how his fancy might gain the opposite effect his 
science expected, that of ridicule: 
 
How well he hath performed his Undertaking you will best judge when you have 
perused the Book: But if you would know before-hand my Thoughts, I must tell 
you freely, he hath failed in his Design; for endeavouring to render this part of 
Natural Philosophy familiar, he hath turned it into Ridicule; he hath pushed his 
wild Notion of the Plurality of Worlds to that height of Extravagancy, that he 
most certainly will confound those Readers, who have not Judgment and Wit to 
distinguish between what is truly solid (or, at least, probable) and what is trifling 
and airy: and there is no less Skill and Understanding required in this, than in 
comprehending the whole Subject he treats of.39 
 
Behn is clear, in making people understand such complex systems as those he 
is presenting, there is no other way than tell the truth, even if in a funny way. But to 
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have more care in amusement than of truth is not work by Natural Philosophers 
and the effect can only be that of confusing his audience. 
Below the extreme creations of Fontenelle‟s fancy, however, Behn is still able to 
apprehend and appreciate the real matters of the book. But it only demonstrates 
her education on the topic rather then his ability as popularizer: 
 
He endeavours chiefly two things; one is, that there are thousands of Worlds inhabited 
by Animals, besides our Earth, and hath urged this Fancy too far: I shall not presume 
to defend his Opinion, but one may make a very good use of many things he hath 
expressed very finely, in endeavouring to assist his wild Fancy; for he gives a 
magnificent Idea of the vastness of the Universe, and of the almighty and infinite Power 
of the Creator, to be comprehended by the meanest Capacity. This he proves 
judiciously, by the Appearances and Distances of the Planets and fixed Stars and if he 
had let alone his learned Men, Philosophical Transactions, and Telescopes in the 
Planet Jupiter, and his Inhabitants not only there, but in all the fixed Stars, and even in 
the Milky-Way, and only stuck to the greatness of the Universe, he had deserved much 
more Praise.40 
 
If she is able to unveil the useless excess of his prose, under which magnificent 
ideas reside, then she, like probably many other women, could be able to 
understand the same things with no distraction by fancy. 
What applies to this kind of treatment of the plurality of world, applies also to the 
treatment of the Copernican system: 
 
The other thing he endeavours to defend and assert, is, the System of Copernicus. As 
to this, I cannot but take his part as far as a Womanʼs Reasoning can go. I shall not 
venture upon the Astronomical part, but leave that to the Mathematicians; but because 
I know, that when this Opinion of Copernicus (as to the Motion of the Earth, and the 
Sunʼs being fixed in the Centre of the Universe, without any other Motion, but upon his 
own Axis) was first heard of in the World, those who neither understood the old System 
of Ptolemy, nor the new one of Copernicus, said, That this new Opinion was expresly 
contrary to the holy Scriptures, and therefore not to be embraced; nay, it was 
condemned as Heretical41 
 
At this point pretending to be a honorable women, as society at time prescribed, 
Behn plays the modest role of who cannot say anything about such an important 
and male question. Nevertheless, she will decisively enter the question neither 
demonstrating Copernican system by means of the mathematical comments nor 
precisely by refusing it through the Holy Scriptures. But what she really does is  
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prove how foolish it is to try to compare a scientific treatise with a religious one, 
which as Behn demonstrates is written with no intentions of empirical 
demonstration. The Bible in Behn‟s opinion has been written with the same intent 
as Fontenelle, that to be understood by its audience. The verbal images there 
contained and the mental they produce, are not there to be intended as a faithful 
description of reality, but rather a means to communicate with people who, 
otherwise, could not have understood those words. 
Imagination and the virtual images it produces are not absolutely negative, 
provided that these images are not devoted to creating illusion rather than 
provoking knowledge. 
The question of popularization, so spread in that period as Shaffer has 
demonstrated, is not so simply to define. It is a noble aim, but not necessarily it 
produces good effects. It is not like in Cavendish, for whom imagination is a 
material tool of knowledge exactly like the mind or the senses. The difference 
between the two writers is, probably, in the horizon they addressed to: a well 
educated the Duchess, a more popular Behn. It is thus in this optic that the 
difference between the two concerns of imagination seems to be interpreted. 
As Sarah Goodfellow42 has pointed out this Preface shows the role of Aphra 
Behn as a translator, but not only in a linguistic way. She is a translator, namely a 
mediator, between Copernican and Ptolemaic system, between secular and 
religious, between male and female instances. This mediation intent is the basis  
where Behn‟s suspicion over imagination resides. 
 
 
The mirror of true beauty 
 
The didactic task of the Female Specator is made immediately clear by the 
author from the first book, as well as the way in which it will be pursued. The task, 
indeed, is not only that of giving a new chance to semi-educated women, but 
rather that of changing women‟s mind as well as men‟s on the opportunity of 
female education. This is why I don‟t completely agree with the most of literary 
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critics who affirm that this magazine be addressed only to women, because it 
sometimes seems to speak more to men, responsible for the marginality of 
women. That is why the first attack Haywood launches is to the image of 
ignorance as related to innocence, and to its immediate result: the preservation of 
women acted by men, “preserving” them from education and thus from knowledge. 
All the issues of this magazine, indeed, will be devoted to disrupt this conviction, 
first in women‟s minds then in male‟s, showing that knowledge could never be 
negative. The task of knowledge is not that to destroy the order of patriarchal 
society, in fact women of knowledge can easily represent a worthy resource in 
family management, in the husband‟s cure, in breeding children but also in social 
events, when they are educated more than when they are not. For, as Haywood 
firmly believes, it is better for every husband to hear that his wife is so well 
educated, than to hear that she too foolish or stupid. This statement seems to be 
more of a provocation than a conviction. 
In this optic we should, thus, analyze the way in which this educational project 
is pursued, that is all within the acceptance of the male system. Throughout the 
twenty-four books of the magazine, indeed, Haywood never attacks the system 
nor provokes women to revolutionize against the order. The institution of marriage, 
for example, is never really criticized in itself, nor is a different end proposed for 
women. As well as no other serious activities are presented to them besides home 
keeping. She tries simply to convince both men and women that little changes, 
within this same system, could be productive for all. In short reassuring men that 
educated women will not threaten neither marriage nor family, is the first step 
Haywood has to do in order to make her model of education agreeable to men 
before to women. It doesn‟t mean that men are adulated or not addressed by any 
critique. Instead one of the first charges is that of the direct responsibility of 
women‟s ignorance and sometimes stupidity, which they often complain about. 
Both the style and the topics of Haywood are never simplistic, even though the 
discussions are not always on serious matter. The whole project is conducted 
according to precise code, the first of which is, in fact, to avoid simplistic figures of 
discussion, for what concerns both the structure of any single issue and its main 
topic. Thus any issue will be presented with an introduction letter or reflection a 
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little narrative by the author or discussion, ending with the result of an exchange of 
ideas. 
The first result of this plan is the figure of the author, which according to a 
complex task, could not be simply an author. Indeed, as the problems according to 
this project will be interested in are not at all simple, a single point of view would 
be not sufficient. Thus Haywood creates not an author alter ego, rather a real 
circle of four women, each of which will represent a different stage in a woman‟s 
life, coordinated, but not presided, by the most mature of all the female spectators 
in person. Haywood immediately presents each component of the circle, in their 
virtues and vices, to the reader, which is a male reader. First of all the narrator 
herself appears: 
 
As a Proof of my Sincerity, I shall, in the first place, assure him, that for my own part I 
never was a Beauty, and am now very far from being young […] I shall also 
acknowledge, that I have run through as many Scenes of my Vanity and Folly as the 
greates Coquet of them all. Dress, Equipage, and Flattery, were the Idols of my Heart 
[…] But whatever Inconveniences such a manner of Conduct has brought upon myself, 
I have this Consolation, to think that the Public may reap some Benefit from it.43 
 
As anticipated, the authorship Haywood reserves to herself is no more that of 
an authoritative subject who can cast her secure gaze upon the facts of woman 
life, and decide what Womankind is and how it acts or should act. Rather she is 
fully part of that world. And this is coherent with all poetic, which is characterized, 
as the previous chapter has showed, by a vision which is not from above. 
Womankind, is not her object or, at least is not in the sense in which men usually 
consider it: she herself is the subject, or conversely we can say that the object has 
become the author and thus the subject. Subject and object together cooperate in 
order to construct a different image of women, not a crystallized image, but rather 
a dynamic and multiple one. 
This explains why Haywood decided to pretend that her work be written by 
other three women. These are obviously three points of view differing not only in 
the age they represent, but also their relation with the main social question for 
women, that of marriage. Thus the young girl is: 
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The Daughter of a wealthy Merchant, charming as an Angel, but endued with so many 
Accomplishments, that to those who know her truly, her Beauty is the least 
distinguished Part of her. The fine young Creature I shall call Euphrosine, since she as 
all the Chearfulness and Sweetness ascribed to that Goddess44 
 
The necessity of assistance, by which the female spectator justifies the 
introduction of this quadruple author, brought Mira as her first choice: 
 
A Lady descended from a Family to which Wit seems hereditary, married to a 
Gentleman every way worthy of so excellent a Wife, and with whom she lives in so 
perfect a Harmony, that having nothing to ruffle the Composure of her Soul, or disturb 
those sparkling Ideas she received from Nature and Education, left me no room to 
doubt if was she favoured me with would be acceptable to the public45 
 
It is worthy to stress that it is the first time the education of women is 
introduced, and it is presented as a result of both nature and education. Haywood 
presents, already, her opinion according to which women are endowed by nature 
of the same intellectual skills of men. The difference in attitudes is caused by the 
difference in education, as Cavendish has already argued. This is demonstrated 
by those few women who had the occasion to study like men did and who gained 
good results in philosophy and in science. 
After the young beauty of Euphrosine and the mature consciousness of Mira, 
the Widow of quality should represent the austerity fitting with her status and her 
advanced age. However her showing is not so predictable: 
 
Not having buried her Vivacity in the Tomb of her Lord, continues to make one in all the 
modish Diversions of the Times, so far I mean, as she finds them consistent with 
Innocence and Honour; and as she is far from having the least Austerity in her 
Behaviour, nor is rigid to the Failings she is wholly free from herself46 
 
This introduction makes the four authors appear more as characters than as 
editors of the magazine. Indeed they are immediately significant within the whole 
project. First of all they appear as characters perfectly organic to the society they 
belong to. Yet at the same time they demonstrate something we could refer to as 
uncanny. Because besides this perfect adherence to patriarchal system they 
present something not perfectly matching: the young lady, who is supposed to be 
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interested mostly in her beauty – her means to find a husband – is more notable 
for her personality; the married woman, who is supposed to have found her fortune 
in marriage, is presented as a fortune for her husband, and conveys the image of 
a lucky marriage, as it has not deprived her of her “natural and educated” qualities; 
finally the widow, yet conducting her life in a not dishonorable way, doesn‟t 
renounce her life and some diversion decency offers her. 
To present her authors in an uncanny way is, in my opinion, the precise intent 
of Haywood who after having depicted them so acutely, lets them vanish in a 
confused authorship in which it could no longer be understood who is writing in 
turn. After all it doesn‟t matter. Haywood‟s goal is that of writing from multiple 
points of view at once, and not to choose a single one for each occasion. In this 
way her observer ends up vanishing, or better becoming indistinguishable, 
invisible, as it was in the Invisible Spy, which is somehow mentioned in the first 
book: «to secure an eternal Fund of Intelligence, Spies are placed not only in all 
Places of Resort in and about this great Metropolis […] so that nothing curious or 
worthy of Remark can escape me»47. No one, however, should feel in danger, for 
her intention «being only to expose the Vice, not the Person»48. 
Her educative project is spread over all the volumes of the magazine, but in a 
way that makes it very recognizable. I think we can find the beginning point, more 
or less, in the explanation of the importance of individual thinking. Then it 
proceeds first with the program of women‟s educational rights, and then with the 
proposals made by the only man of the magazine, a certain Philonaturae. Finally, 
it ends with the allegoric image of the “mirror of true beauty”. 
The first point is discussed in Book IV, which is devoted primarily in the 
education of what are the best employments for mind. Haywood‟s opinion is not 
too restrictive, and we couldn‟t expect anything different in a woman with her past. 
Indeed she suggests reaching a good balance between the company of other 
people and the time needed to take care of own personality, besides her own 
person. Because conversation is not negative, it can furnish new matter of 
observation. However, to pursue only company, and have no other interest 
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besides that, would produce an individual living like “clock-work” in which no 
component of the mechanism can work without the other working. Thus: 
 
A real fine Genius can never want Matter to entertain itself, and tho‟ on the Top of a 
Mountain  without Society, and without Books, or any exterior Means of Employment, 
will always find that within which will keep it from being idle: Memory and Recollection 
will bring the Transactions of past Times to View; Observation and Discernment point 
out the present with their Causes; and Fancy, temper‟d with Judgement, anticipate the 
Future. This Power of Contemplation and Reflection it is that chiefly distinguishes the 
Human from the Brute Creation.49 
 
It is curious to note how on the same question of the difference between the 
human and the “brute”, and on the responsibility this superiority brings, the 
consideration of men accused for female un-education is found. It is showed in an 
issue that seems to be definable like the first manifesto of women‟s educational 
right. In Book X we find the letter of a certain Cleora, who complains about the 
charges that are always addressed to women because of their vanity and their 
scarce interest in serious matter such as those which men are interested in. 
Cleora clearly claims that those who should be charged of this guilt are the same 
men who joke women, because it is their fault if women are forbidden to study and 
are relegated to marginal works. Their guilt is much heavier because they suppose 
themselves to be the highest level of all Creation, and, therefore, their mistakes 
can‟t be founded on their limits but completely on their malice. This is the 
inspiration that provokes one of the most intense issues of the whole magazine. 
The female spectator starts by agreeing with Cleora, but she addresses this 
charge not only to men as husband, but in a larger way to the parents, both 
mother and father, who should take care of their growing child not only in a 
physical way, but also in a mental one. She suggests that the study of philosophy, 
correcting the vices of mind, inspiring it with virtues, bringing a new self-
acquaintance, is particularly suitable for female minds that are often considered so 
volatile that the reflection on philosophical inquiry could be the best medicine, at 
whatever level it is conducted: 
 
Whether our Speculations extend to the greatest and most tremendous Objects, or pry 
into the smallest Works of the Creation, New Scenes of Wonder every Moment open to 
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our Eyes; and as Love and Reverence to the Deity is by every one allowed to be the 
Ground-Work of all Virtues and Religion, it is, methinks, no less impolitick than unjust 
to deny us the Means of becoming more good as well as more wise. From the Brute  
creation we may learn Indistry, Patience, Tenderness, and a Thousand Qualities.50 
 
The main character of this discussion seems to me to be ironic, which will grow 
as the chapter goes on. In fact, she proceeds by mentioning some of the most 
enlightened female minds that from classicism to her days have demonstrated 
how far woman‟s minds can go, in spite of the difficulties and the obstacles posed 
by men. Two names are sufficient Hypatia, philosopher in Alexandria killed by St. 
Cyryl for her irreverent education and intelligence, and Donna Lawra, who is Laura 
Bassi, professor of Anatomy at the University of Bologna, master of Lazzaro 
Spallanzani, «who has not only disputed with, but also confuted the most learned 
Doctors in Italy, in those Points on which they happen‟d to differ from her»51. Then 
she continues suggesting also some branches of Mathematics and Geography, a 
true amazement for ladies. At the end of this excursus, irony seems to grow more 
and more: 
 
The Ladies Themselves, methinks, begin to seem sensible of the Injustice which has 
long been done them, and find a Vacuum in their Minds, which, to fill up, they, of their 
own accord, invented the way of sticking little Pictures on Cabinets, Screens, Dressing-
table […] There is no doubt but a Pair of Globes will make a better figure in their Anti-
Chambers than the Vice and Wheel; but great revolutions are not to be expected at 
once, and if they once take it in their Heads to prefer Works of Ingenuity, tho‟ in the 
most trifling Matters, to Dress, Gaming, and rambling Abroad, they will, it is to be hop‟d, 
proceed to more noble and elevated studies.52 
 
Starting from an innocent, even naïve point the question becomes more 
dangerous, and it seems to see the sign of an upcoming revolution. But it is a 
revolution that doesn‟t have men‟s world as a target, but rather the women‟s mind. 
In fact, she goes on, once the married women amuse themselves with this studies 
even the young ladies will desire to do the same. And once the mother has 
obtained this task, they will teach it to their daughters, and the revolution will be 
done from generation to generation. 
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What, then, still remains against women education? It is men‟s arrogance, and 
the supposed visionary by which these statements seems to be written: 
 
But all this, I doubt, will be look‟d upon as visionary, and my readers will cry, that my 
Business, as a Spectator, is to report such Things as I see, and am convinced of the 
Truth of, not present them with Ideas of my own Formation, and which as the World 
now is, can never be reduc‟d to Practice; To which I beg leave to reply, that the 
Impossibility lies only in the Will; much may be done by a steady Resolution, without it 
nothing.53 
 
The author, whoever of the four it is, will have to wait till the fifteenth Book to 
find another visionary like her, and, what is more interesting, he is a man. His 
supposed name is Philonaturae, and he writes a letter in which invites women to 
the pleasure of the natural observation, that is in a more deep contemplation of 
nature rather than the simple beholding. The studies of Natural Philosophy are not 
so far from their skills, since they have no need to publish treatise and discuss 
them in academies. However once they are acquainted with the use of 
microscope, which is now so small becoming a nice object to bring with them 
during their trips, they will discover how many wonders Nature can disclose to their 
eyes, aided by the art of magnifying glasses54. Thus, they will discover what 
wonderful metamorphosis their dear silk comes from, and how even the black and 
common fly55 can reveal astonishing eyes, and how industrious ants are. This kind 
of observation is not only pleasing, but can also improve moral virtues, and not 
only provide nice inspirations for new conversations. In Philonaturae‟s opinion, 
therefore, women observing nature would be useful for themselves, for their 
society, but they also could do something interesting for the Royal Society as well: 
 
As Ladies frequently walk out in the Country in little Troops, if every one of them would 
take with her a Magnifying Glass, what a pretty Emulation there would be among them, 
to make fresh Discoveries? They would doubtless perceive Animals which are not to 
be found in the most accurate Volumes of Natural Philosophy; and the Royal Society 
might be indebted to every fair Columbus for a new World to employ their 
Speculation.56 
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Philonaturae‟s councils have the hoped effects, and the portable microscope 
becomes immediately a fashion and educational toy. But deeper effects will be 
produced in the nineteenth book, in which the female spectator suggests some 
more precise observations, perfectly suitable for women. She talks for example 
about the observation of vegetables and curative plants, an amusing and useful 
observation especially for mothers, who should know these plants better, to help 
their children when doctors aren‟t available. But even the observation of vessels in 
bugs, and the comparison with vegetable vessels, should be of a certain interest. 
After all this amusement, an observation closes the issue that makes clear what a 
great consideration Haywood had of vision, if only women were allowed: 
 
It is our Reason, and the Power of contemplating on the Blessings we receive, that the 
chief Happiness of possessing them consists. It is that, more than his outward Form, 
with distinguishes Man from the rest of sublunary Beings: it is that which crowns him 
Lord of all; and if he willfully degrades himself, and puts himself on a Level with his 
Subjects, he is unworthy of the Honour conferred upon his Species, and ungrateful to 
the Divine Bestower. Can it be supposed that the Almighty Wisdom gave such a 
Profusion of Varieties merely to feast the Senses of Mankind! […] They were, without 
all Question, destined for a much nobler and exalted Purpose, to convey Instruction 
through the Canal of Pleasure; to inspire us with the highest Ideas Human Nature is 
capable of conceiving, of that Divine Bounty to which we are indebted for them; to 
harmonize the Soul, and at the same Time to enable it to pour forth a due Tribute of 
Praise and Adoration.57 
 
In discovering the power of the art of vision, thanks to the ratified instruments 
that men and women have known, all the female spectators are invited to admire 
to what extent it can reach and what pleasure it can give. But what is important to 
stress is how this great power provokes a desire of admiration in Haywood, and a 
movement toward what she is looking at. There is no desire to hold, to penetrate 
or to conquest, as it was in almost all men observers, from Hooke to Baker. 
Rather, what mostly strikes our spectators is to discover that what was previously 
believed empty is a full, admirable universe, as complex as those Fontenelle and 
Behn showed. If there is no vacuum around us, then these new discovered senses 
should lead us to the desire of harmonization with what is in front of us, with a fully 
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de-erotized gaze. It is the Buddha‟s gaze at the flower Luce Irigaray will theorize 
two hundred fifty years later58, but Haywood couldn‟t have known that. 
Finally, how does all this new knowledge act on female spectators, both authors 
and readers? The final effect is showed in one of the final images of the entire 
magazine, not a fantastic image but a metaphoric one, extraordinarily suitable for 
women beholders, both seen by men and by themselves. In Book XX, a certain 
Philoctetes donates a mirror to all women. But he warns them that it is not a 
common mirror, for it doesn‟t show women as they could expect. A beautiful 
woman could appears distorted and horrible, while a face ruined by Small Pox 
could be reflected as the most amiable. The mirror then has another peculiarity: 
 
It is not like other Glasses daubed on one Side with Quicksilver, but clear, transparent 
as Innocence and Truth: It not only shews the Person who looks into it herelf, such as 
she is in reality; but displays impartially every Charm or Imperfection to those who 
stand on the other Side, and even at a very great Distance from her.59 
 
A strange sort of uncanniness overwhelms us. This image seems to 
condensate some of the most important questions on vision in twentieth century 
philosophy. In the mirror in which we see ourselves, not only from our point of view 
but also from that of the other, we re-encounter obviously the mirror stage of 
Lacan. But it is inverse for two reasons. First, the image does not represent a 
more perfect being than the subject is supposed to be. On the contrary it could be 
even worse. Second, the screen on which this image is projected is no more 
opaque. It is transparent, and someone is looking behind the mirror. It is no more a 
screen, something dividing us from our image and from someone else.  
This new image of the self seems to be shared between two beholders, in such 
a deep way that physical appearance does not matter anymore. 
To reach this end, only one is the way: 
 
But I have already […] taken Notice, that of we took but half of the Care of embellishing 
our intellectual Part as we do of setting off our Persons, both would appear to much 
more Advantage.60 
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Routledge, 2001, especially p. 23, and id., J'aime à toi. Esquisse d'une félicité dans l'histoire, Paris, 
B. Grasset, 1992, trans. Alison Martin, I Love to You: Sketch of A Possible Felicity in History, New 
York-London, Routledge, 1996. But also our previous discussion in chapter I, pp. 51-52. 
59
 Eliza Haywood, The Female Spectator, cit. p. 25. 
60
 Ivi, p. 258. 
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Conclusion 
 
This could be considered the conclusion of our research, at least for what 
concerns Haywood who, in this chapter seems to have reached the most modern 
point of view on the question of female gaze.  
At the beginning Cavendish showed us a phantasmagoria of images that being 
inspired by science arrived to the wonder and then to the fancy. It was an 
educated and controlled fancy that allowed those images to comeback to science 
once they had overcome previous borders and discovered new frontiers. If “men of 
science” like Bacon discredited imagination as a rupture of knowledge, Cavendish 
re-vindicated it as a peculiar form of female knowledge. It is hard to decide 
whether this statement was based on a personal observation or on the historical 
situation in which this observation was held. Since it was actually patriarchal 
society that forbad women from high educated levels and allowed them only 
marginal and fictional spaces of observation. That of Cavendish, therefore should 
be considered as a tactic, using the enemy‟s armies to fight a struggle even if on a 
fictional field. 
Aphra Behn, on the contrary, seems to entirely reject the reduction of female 
observation within a fictitious, and thus false, dimension. She wants women to 
access scientific and philosophical studies plainly. But to well understand these 
matters and reason in the right way, they don‟t need any fancy just truth, and they 
need to be explained in a more sincere way. Neither Bible nor Fontenelle are 
enough any longer. 
Finally Haywood, seems to have come to a longer and harder road. Her 
observations came in an age in which the Scientific Lady was in crisis, and 
women‟s space in science seemed to have been reduced, rather than increased. 
She is no longer allowed to attack phallogularcentrism as Cavendish and Behn 
did. Her young fame and the new reformed society would censor her images and 
her educational plan would have been lost. Thus it is necessary to convey these 
verbal images, hoping they will be transformed into mental images, little by little. 
Because, as she herself said, revolutions do not happen at once. It is worth it to 
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convey to women an image of themselves that is different from what men and 
themselves can expect. At the same time it is necessary to convey to men an 
image of an educated woman who is exactly like the re-assuring woman they 
expect. This would give women time to enter in a different world of vision in which 
their image is no longer that of an ornament or of a commodity, but it would 
depend on what they are inside. This inside is no longer only the realm of love, pity 
and grace, but that of awareness, knowledge, reason, judgment and taste. Once 
the metamorphosis, as the chrysalis of Philonaturae, is completed they can look at 
themselves in the mirror of true beauty, and let others look through that mirror, 
without be scared of the image which he or she will see. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
Indefinite gaze 
 
Two parallel, but somehow, opposing movements between cultural and 
historical situations and the female reflection on gaze have been observed in the 
examined historical period. These movements seem somehow paradoxical. The 
seventeenth century had witnessed the opening of a gap in the practices of 
looking in England. This opened up new chances to feminine gaze that, thanks to 
the political and cultural revolution, could participate in public discussion, even 
though outside of academic institutions. Conversely the seventeenth century, 
especially since the second half, witnessed the enclosing of spaces in which the 
eyes and the pen of the women found less freedom of movement. Yet the 
awareness of the cultural and social power that gaze can give or take, became 
more and more secure. Indeed, among the three reference points that we have 
examined, chronologically the closest to us, that of Eliza Haywood, is also the 
most conscious. 
At the end of this research we can draw a line in which the first point is 
represented by the figure of Margaret Cavendish, who in the middle of the 
seventeenth century, and therefore also in the midst of cultural and political 
revolution, looks curiously at the new borders of vision, remaining, however, still 
anchored to traditionalistic positions. These positions are suspicious of new 
technological discoveries that, in her view, lead to a dangerous isolation of the 
subject. While less confident about his or her own perception, if not helped by 
optical devices, and increasingly at odds with other areas of learning more and 
more fragmented, this subject ends up abandoning the practice of genuine rational 
thought. The inner and mental activity of the individual has no part in the 
observation of the new philosophy, especially in the experimental one, which takes 
a completely disembodied subject holding a position of absolute dominion and 
control over the object to be observed. Nature becomes increasingly distant from 
man, and the desire to penetrate her more urgent, to become and end in itself. In 
short, as feared by Evelyn Fox Keller, the observer, at least the scientific one is 
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simultaneously severed from the object of his gaze and from his own subjectivity 
and becomes, or wants to become, a pure mechanical eye. In this view women try 
to find their own authorship, where granted, and to propose an entirely different 
rationality. It is mainly established in the awareness of the inevitable influence of 
the subject, with his or her beliefs, with his or her inevitable point of view, and with 
his or her own bodily, exercised if nothing else by manipulating the object. This 
period of great cultural movements, turns and reversals paradoxically represents 
the most difficult for a liberal women's reflection on vision, as demonstrated by the 
isolation in which Cavendish stayed. She never joined the public debates if not 
through a masquerade. 
The second point of the line is represented by the more decisive role occupied 
by Aphra Behn. Her situation looks different. The restoration defined a new asset 
that looked back at the roles and the dynamics not only between political arts but 
also genres. More space for public debate is given, allowing Behn to stage several 
times the critique of the politics of the gaze. She had also some applause from the 
public, although we cannot determine with certainty whether it was caused by 
curiosity or by the desire of enjoying a new phenomenon. The focus of the female 
gaze has shifted from the experimental side to the more generally social, from the 
attempts to participate in new visual activities – though always from the point of 
view of an outsider – to the attempt to uncover the tricks of power hiding behind 
the new practices of the look and performance, especially political performance. 
If Behn warned a wide audience from passivity in which the beholder positioned 
it, in the following century Haywood would be devoted to a more specific audience, 
denouncing as the defined structure of the patriarchal gaze had defined once and 
for all the role of women as well. The role was that of the object of a look now 
definitely portrayed as a sexual one, and so encoded to be internalized by women 
themselves. They not only give pleasure to the viewer but feel pleasure in being 
watched, rather they build themselves to be looked-at. They are so manipulated as 
to really believe in the power of the glance that kills, and that more and more 
relegate to the territory of isolation, marginalization, and silence.  
The awareness of the disparity of the gaze, especially as a gender issue, has 
grown and looks remarkably like the twentieth century reflections that made of this 
crisis its precise mark on the look, often forgetting how far the origin of this crisis 
were, even involved in the very birth of the modern gaze. Yet the horizon of action 
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of the female authorship, if it ever actually existed, was first granted, then 
punished, and finally accepted in new and narrower terms, ending up being 
governed by the Augustan milieu1.  
This appears to be a female analysis on the gaze of the other, or rather on the 
dominant eye that creates the other, even others. But the question that kicked off 
the research is another: is there, within this same critical reflection on the 
observer, a parallel observation about how the person who sees is seen? 
Fortunately, the answer is yes. 
First of all it is necessary to define the object of vision within the contingent 
panorama in which these three women act. The question of vision is today hardly 
incorporated in a binary relation that divides the two poles between male and 
female, active and passive. Still more complex appears the horizon of the 
seventeenth and the eighteenth century2. We have already seen that the 
categories of sexual identity were almost shaded, as matter such as 
hermaphrodite demonstrates. This shifting of fuzzy identities, in which the subject 
is not perfectly definable as man or woman, produced or influenced somehow the 
fashion of masquerade in which also defined identities were allowed to cross their 
roles, even gender roles. This shifting of roles cannot be intended as a related 
confusion of existing roles. In fact, they were fixed and held by the dominant male 
position. That is precisely why this gap in the system represented a unique chance 
for women to change their point of view positioning themselves on the other side 
of the field. Thus, wearing the dresses of man, or a mask different from her identity 
she could reach an active role, or at least experience a different being. But at best 
she could also transform herself in a beholder, and transform man in a beheld.  
Here at stake was not merely the question of gender, but properly the question 
of power founded on gender. Once they can demonstrate that gender is not a fixed 
category but that it can be reversed within masquerade, women understood that 
this tool could be transferred outside the court ballad and the theatre stages. 
Loosing the control of this medium men experienced, probably for the first time, 
the elusive character of image, that, even in that century, was so plastic to 
                                            
1
 See Jane Spencer, The Rise of the Woman Novelist, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986. 
2
 Roberta C. Martin, “Beauteous Wonder of a Different Kind: Aphra Behn's Destabilization of 
Sexual Categories”, in «College English» 61 (1998), pp. 192-210. 
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transform the subject into object, but also to transform itself under different 
aspects, for example shifting from the status of science to that of imagination. 
The passage from the seventeenth century and the next was, therefore, 
particularly characterized by political, social and cultural confusion, which women 
tried to take advantage of. 
The three points through which we have analyzed their work, inspired by the 
contemporary study in science studies, have demonstrated their particular 
suitability with our purpose. The first point of the research was the implication of 
the viewer in the process of observation, by which I mean, according to Evelyn 
Fox Keller, the contemporary process of disembodying the viewer and of 
embodying the viewed. The disembodied gaze was fixed in the perspective 
regime, in which an invisible eye dominated the world. As Shaffer demonstrated 
this process of disembodiment was amplified by the new diffusion of optical 
devices, which proposed a new distancing between subject and object, even more 
by putting a physical screen between them. This is the origin of the ambition to a 
mechanized vision that science has continued to pursue till the invention of 
photography.  But it is also the origin of the “optics of truth”3. According to Irigaray, 
it is the consideration of vision forgetting its materiality and its mediation. It leads 
also to the phobia of the absence, lack, and castration that characterizes male 
vision. This phenomenon, according to Irigaray, is in turn caused by the male 
belief in the vacuum that divides the subject from the object of vision.  
The common characteristic of the twentieth century discussion about the 
subject of vision has been the destabilization of this symmetric project unveiling 
this partiality. First of all Irigaray has remembered how subject and object are not 
divided since the space between them is not empty. In fact it is full of all those 
elements that allow men to communicate with the outer world, such as for example 
the air and the light4. Convicted of the embodied and mediated character of male 
vision is also Donna Haraway who instead of an objective vision, and of the 
contemplative vision proposed by Irigaray, found a new form of situated vision. It is 
a vision aware of its partiality, which means that it takes into account the situation 
in which the process takes place, and the media used to observe. It is a situation 
                                            
3
 Luce Irigaray, Speculum de l’autre femme, Paris, Editions de Minuit, trans. Gillian G. Gill, 
Speculum of the Other Woman, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985. 
4
 Luce Irigaray, Oubli de l'air chez Martin Heidegger, Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1983, trans. Mary 
Beth Mader, The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1999. 
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in which subject and object are closer and both perceive through their own 
bodies5. A vision from below in which the two parts are conscious of the reciprocal 
difference, is the proposal of Keller who identifies a new kind of subject, that of the 
outsider. This outsider acts within the same scopic regime of phallogularcentrism, 
being constructed by the same cultural mechanisms of the insider, but he/she/it 
breaks the barriers of the detached points and sees in a different way. 
The subject is thus criticized in three points: the distancing between subject and 
object; the forgetting of the space in which the two both move; the point of view 
and its extent. It is striking to see how all these three points are central in the 
poetic of vision we have till now analyzed.  
The spatiality of every scopic regime till now considered is refused by 
Cavendish, Behn and Haywood. But after our analysis we can well see that this 
principle carries out a lot of secondary effects. If, indeed, the abolition of distance 
and also distinction between the subject and the object is a metaphysical instance 
in the fancy of Cavendish, the deflagration of the two levels has more and heavier 
effects in the colonial setting of Oroonoko. Here the distance between the subject 
and object of vision is no longer an abstract one, rather a cultural one. It is the 
product of a cultural hegemony that has fixed some categories by which declaring 
what is white and what is black. But exactly how the natural philosopher discovers 
that what he or she is looking for in the secrets of nature is only a projection of 
what he or she has inside, in the same way the colonial white man discovers that 
the characteristic of cruelty, infidelity, ignorance and inhumanity are no more black 
than white. It is uncanny that what demonstrates it is an extraordinary blackness, 
more black than black. What, then, is the female spectator if not an oxymoron of 
vision? How can a woman, who is the most volatile being on Earth, be a spectator 
of society assuming the role of an impartial observer? Actually she doesn’t want to 
do that. It is not impartiality what she is looking for. What she is looking at is 
herself as a woman, and other women as herself. Individuals who need to be 
educated especially in the process of vision, that is not limited to the “objectness” 
they are till now confined. They now need to be aware of the roles they can in turn 
assume, sometimes objects, sometimes subjects, sometimes images. 
                                            
5
 Donna J. Haraway, Situated Knowledges. The Science Question in Feminism and the Priviledge 
of Partial Perspective, in Muriel Lederman, Ingrid Bartsch (ed.), The Gender and Science Reader, 
London-New York, Routledge, 2001. 
 206 
In the same way, even though the Emperor of the Moone is an exemplary 
specimen for the male “forgetting of the air”, whose immediate consequence is 
that of a mediation and embodiment of vision, even other works presented in this 
research could be eligible for the same reason. It is for instance the case of The 
Invisible Spy, which plays the role of a fully carnal observer implied in the scenes 
he assists on, and aware of both the possibility that he has to manipulate these 
events and the deriving responsibility. Another enlightening example is that of The 
Speculators, one of the fancies of Cavendish’s Poems and fancies, for it shows 
vision in all its mediation. The speculator could not be able to deeply comprehend 
natural phenomena without glasses. Actually he couldn’t either exactly perceive 
them. Ironically, then, it ended dazzled by the light, which melted even his glass. 
We have individuated the exemplar role of an outsider observer in the Invisible 
Spy of Haywood, but this probably more than all the other principles, is shared 
among all the characters we have encountered. The outsider is Lady Victoria in 
Bell in Campo, and a very proud one. The outsider is Fantomina and in a very 
“organic” way, that is using the very same tools of male voyeurism for unveiling it. 
But moreover the outsiders are all the three writers: Cavendish, in her writings and 
mostly in her visit to the Royal Society; Behn in translating Fontenelle, and in 
working as a spy for the King;  Haywood as a coquette and a journalist in turn. 
At the same time in which the observer becomes disembodied, the observed is 
imprisoned in his or her body to be written, read, and penetrated in the name of 
science and progress. The objects are subjected to medical eyes, colonial eyes, 
prison eyes, which not only control them, but also transform their privacy in 
publicly. This is the phenomenon Foucault calls “political anatomy”6, which posed 
under public gaze the body of the observed, and covered under the pursuit of 
science a sexual pleasure destined to grow all the centuries long. Moreover 
Schaffer has showed how, just in the period we have analyzed, another drive 
toward the publicity of more or less scientific observations was carrying 
experiments out of private cabinets or laboratories, and was transforming them 
into public spectacle7.  Under the lens of this “scientific” gaze Nature fell down and 
all the ones closer to her, namely women and other inferior beings, whose bodies 
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 Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Paris, Gallimard, 1975, trans. A. 
Sheridan, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, New York, Vintage Book, 1979, p. 28. 
7
 Simon Schaffer, “Self Evidence”, in «Critical Inquiry» 18 (1992), pp. 327-362. 
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were shaped by this gaze as well as their intellective and moral values. This 
process will last long, in fact the questions regarding gender and race in visual 
studies is still very important.  
At the beginning of this process as well as at the end of it an image was 
produced in which the observer crystallized his view of the object, but in which the 
different objects could not recognize themselves. This is what Fanon intends by 
“mask”8. As oppressive as these masks could be (or can be), the different subjects 
behind them started at a certain point to discover that these things could become a 
resource beyond slavery. If the phallogularcentrism constructed a visual regime in   
hopeless objects, they could have the chance to build up new regimes in which the 
directions are multiple and the objects, at least, are scattered. These are the 
scopic regimes of masquerade and mimicry.  
The first is a regime particularly related to women, which has been studied by 
many feminist critics, especially in psychoanalysis and in film studies9. Both 
psychoanalysts and film scholars almost agree in defining femininity as an image, 
full of roles, rules and values, imposed to women. In what they do not agree is the 
value this mask can assume once the woman decides to wear it. Doane sees in it 
a chance to separate the cause of desire and oneself, distracting the gaze on a 
false image, while the subject is kept safe. Irigaray, conversely, sees in it the 
female surrender to the “objectness” of their status.  
The second term has usually been attributed to the subaltern races, but even 
Irigaray uses it as an interim strategy for dealing with the realm of the discourse10. 
However the specific field of this term is the colonial one. Even within this field the 
opinions do not always agree. Bhabha11 considers it as a tendency not to 
harmonize or repress the different, but rather to form a resemblance, which is 
similar but not exactly the same. It is a contested terrain in which the subject 
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encounters the object. Fanon, somehow like Irigaray, sees in this phenomenon the 
loss of the black man as an actual man. 
The question is really difficult to solve, especially for the effects it has had and 
still has in the twentieth century. Surely the two categories have demonstrated 
certain utilities in the analysis of a different female gaze during the early modern 
period. Masquerade and mimicry are two different forms12 of the “other’s” 
recognition of his or her own bodily, on which are inscribed the signs of difference 
and subalternity. Once these objects discover their subalternity they have two 
choices: to refuse their “objectness” and reach the same role of the observer; or to 
refuse them both, and decide to be a different subject, a non dominant one. If in 
choosing the last one they weren’t to be successful they had at least scattered 
their own image, becoming elusive objects. 
This is the way in which our writers act, sometimes through mimicry, assuming 
the same characteristic of maleness in order to demonstrate its debatably, 
sometimes through masquerade, assuming the image of womanliness that men 
attributed to them but in an exaggerated, “medusan” way. Through the mask of 
mimicry Cavendish moved her attack to predominant male knowledge. By wearing 
the male dress of lady Victoria during the visit at the Royal Society, she was 
mimicking a female who mimicked a male, disappointing a male Society 
threatened by her showed femininity. Adopting the tactic of confusing the enemy 
seems to be the choice of Cavendish.  
Behn, instead, adopts a completely different point of view, because under her 
masquerade staged in the Emperor of Moone, she does not put any objects, rather 
subjects. The point of view of the masks is that of the wise observers, who looks at 
the crazy peeping, putting him in front of his-self madness. In this way the one who 
pretended to be the perfect natural observer realizes not only the foolishness of 
his observation, but mostly the fact that everyone has already realized it. 
Haywood, finally, assumes all the objectness of the female masks, both in 
Fantomina and in the Female Spectator, but she cannot be said to be the object of 
the male gaze. In fact, if the women of the two fictions are aware of the masks 
they wear, men are not always aware of the masks they have made up. 
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 For a broader discussion of the difference between the two terms see pp. 130-131. 
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After having make explicit the implicit observer – reducing the distances 
between subject and object – and having hidden the gazes of the observed, all 
that remains is the image. Just at a first glance the images produced within the 
works we have analyzed are very confusing: they are never univocal or 
predictable. In fact, they are the images of uncertain realm, neither surely factual, 
nor definitely fictional. In recollecting the image of science to that of fancy, 
Cavendish, Behn and Haywood are denouncing a real phenomenon that of the 
popularization of science, due more to economical reasons than to enlightened 
democracy. The relation between image and imagination is very dangerous in 
Foucault’s13 opinion, who sees in the image the surrender of imagination, that is 
the deepest way of reasoning that leads beyond the space of perceptual reality. 
The confusion between science and fiction, however, was already broken and a 
new genre was founded thanks to the imagination of new and different worlds 
dealing with the new and different discovers in astronomy, microscopy and 
geography. But it is hard to decide whether the curiosity they provoked went 
behind the images showed or mostly ended in them. 
The verbal images coming from the pages of the three female observers are 
very different. Cavendish is enthusiastic with the images of fancy, for, in her 
materialistic view, imagination is made up of the same matter of mind, and thus it 
is an actual way of reasoning. This can make science more amusing, but 
imagination always needs to be educated in order to imagine new borders that 
reason alone could not reach. Conversely Behn, while translating Fontenelle, 
refuses any kind of false image, even if under the pretest of popularization. In her 
opinion, popularization has no value if its object is false. The value of 
popularization has been showed by the Female Spectator who, within a fictional 
frame does not conceive any image, if not a true image. Popularization does not 
necessarily mean to joke. What women want is not amusement as men believe, 
but true knowledge. And they do not need to be accomplished with dreams and 
fairs, because they are aware of having the same intellectual skills as men. 
The age between the seventeenth and the eighteenth century was dominated 
by epochal images: that of Hobbes’ Leviathan, and that of Boyle’s Air Pump. The 
first was the emblem of rational knowledge supposing not to need material means 
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or public spectacle, in order to assert the veracity of its statements. It seemed to 
find in reason itself matter of research and discovery. The second was the emblem 
of the new science supposing to reach the full objectivity of knowledge, beyond 
any human limits, beyond human imagination. It was the science of The Royal 
Society, guarantor of science and of the elite. Between these two images a third 
one circulated very much during that century and a half: the flea of Robert Hooke. 
It was the symbol of a new way of conceiving new science, inside and outside the 
Royal Society, by provoking wonder, by stimulating fancy, by selling culture. But it 
is also an image out of control whose extent goes far, towards the continent, until 
romanticism and the birth of the fantastic. 
These images suddenly reached a great popularity going beyond the limits their 
author had foreseen. It was the beginning of a new age of images, an age in which 
they started to have their own life, like the new discovered animal they 
represented. They were now able to reproduce, to clone themselves, to invade 
space and time, to free themselves. 
At the same time new observers were rising. They did not believe in their own 
superiority in vision, nor in that of others’. They were not seeking objects to 
manipulate, to conquest, to penetrate, but to meet, to share with undefined points 
of view. They were starting to apprehend a new visual literacy under their masks.  
That training has not yet ended, and images are still alive. But the masks are 
still on, waiting for their persons to be safe enough to remove them. 
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